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ABSTRACT 
The fear of being left alone against Russia in an environment of confronting blocs was 
the main factor behind the decision of the Ottoman government to enter the First 
World War on the side of the Central Powers. The liberation of the Muslims of Russia 
from the Russian yoke henceforth became one of the important war objectives of the 
Ottoman Supreme Command. Nevertheless, the tragic defeat of the Ottoman army in 
Sankarru~ did not only constitute a serious obstacle against the realization of these 
aspirations, but it also helped the Russian army to penetrate deep into Ottoman 
territory. The outbreak of the revolution in Russia and the Bolshevik power seizure in 
October 1917 provided the Ottoman government with the opportunity of 
compensating war losses and realizing the strategic aims embodied on the eve and at 
the beginning of the Great War. The Ottoman government's policy with regard to 
Russia between 1917-1918 can be analyzed under two main stages. In the short-run 
the primary aim was the restoration of the pre-war frontier with Russia and acquisition 
of as much territory in Transcaucasia as possible. With the Russian Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, the Ottoman government successfully accomplished its plans with regard to 
Transcaucasia. In the long-run Ottoman leaders aimed at separating Transcaucasia 
from Russia in order to create therein independent states that would prevent Russian 
aggression in the future. In spite of the peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, the Ottoman 
army continued its military operations in the region. The Ottoman government did 
everything in its power, militarily or politically, to persuade the Transcaucasian peoples 
to proclaim their independence. As time went on, Ottomans were not only satisfied 
with Transcaucasia and North Caucasia was made part of these strategic aims. There 
were even plans concerning the independence of the Muslims of the Volga basin and 
Turkestan. Consequently, the primary subject of the relations between the Ottoman 
and Bolshevik governments in the final two years of the war was the Ottoman 
activities with regard to the Caucasus region and the Muslims of Russia. These 
Ottoman objectives not only caused disagreements with the Bolsheviks, but also 
became a serious source of contention with Germany. 
OZET 
Rusya'ya kar~1 "yaJruz kalmamak" kaygis1 Osmanh Hiikiimeti'nin Birinci Diinya 
Sava~1'na ittifak Devletleri tarafinda ginne karanru aJmasmda birinci dereceden rol 
oynanu~ir. Ote yandan, bu Olkede ya~yan Muslumanlann Rus boyundurugundan 
kurtanlmas1 Osmanh Genelkurmayi'run Rusya'ya doniik sav~ hedeflerinin ana temas1ru 
olu~turmu~tur. Fakat, sava~m hemen birinci yilmda Dogu Cephesi'nde ya~an 
Sarikami~ felaketi bu tasanlarm ger~kl~tirilmesine onemli bir ket vurdugu gibi, hatm 
sayihr bir Osmanh arazisinin Rus ordusu tarafindan ~galine meydan vermi~ir. 1917 
Subat'mda Rusya'da patlak veren devrim ve Ekim aymda Bol~kler'in iktidan ele 
gei;iri~i Osmanli yoneticilerine biitiin bu olumsuzluklari telafi etme ve sava~m ba~mda 
~killenen stratejik hedefleri geri;ekle~irebilme yoniinde hayati bir firsat sunmu~tur. 
191 7-1918 ytllan arasmda Osmanli Hiikilrneti 'nin izledigi Rusya politikas1run iki onemli 
ayag1 vardrr. Klsa vadede Rus i~gali altmdaki Dogu vilayetlerinin kurtanlmas1 ve 
~artlann izin verdigi oli;Ode ilave toprak ele geyirilmesi amaylannu~ttr. Rusya ile 
imzalanan Brest-Litovsk Andl~mas1. ile bu hedef b~yla geryekl~tiril~tir. Uzun 
vadede ise, Osmanh yonetimi, Katkaslar' da gelecekteki Rus saldmlanna engel olacag1 
du~niilen tampon devletler kurdurmayt planlanu~t1r. Bu amai;la Brest Andl~mas1 'ru 
muteakip giinlerde Osmanh Ordusu'nun oolgedeki askeri harekatlan devam etmi~tir. 
Osmanh devleti Katkas halklarinm Rusya'dan aynldiklaflill ilan etmeleri iyin hem askeri 
hem de politik yonden buytik bir baskt gostermi~tir. ilerleyen gOnlerde Kuzey Kafkasya 
da bu kapsama aJminl~, hatta iy Rusya ve Turkistan oolgelerinde y~yan 
Muslumanlarm da istiklallerine kavu~turulmalanrun planlari yapdrru~trr. Dolayistyla, 
sav~m son iki senesinde Bol~vik ve Osmanli hO:kOmetleri arasmdaki ili~kilerin ana 
konusunu Osmanh HukOmeti'nin Kafkasya'ya ve Rusya Muslumanlari'na doniik 
tasarruflari te~kil etmi~ir. Osmanli Hiikilrneti'nin bu yondeki emelleri sadece Rusya ile 
anla~mazhklann dogmasma sebebiyet vermemi~, ayru zamanda Almanya ile de onemli 
siyasi ~~malann temelini olu~turm~tur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every historical phenomenon must have its foundations in the conditions that preceded 
it and its results, therefore, cannot be completely unrelated to what went on before. 
However, while the relations between the Republican Turkey and Soviet Russia have 
been dealt with in numerous well-documented studies, the diplomatic relations 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Bolshevik Russia from 1917 to 1918 have so far 
received little scholarly attention. Except for Alcdes Nimet Kurat's excellent work 
(Turkiye ve Rusya) on the relations between the Ottoman and Russian empires that 
partly focuses upon this period, no attempt has been made to describe the political and 
military events in those two years. Recently there emerged some Turkish scholarly 
monographs that have dwelt upon singular cases. Selami Ktliy's Tiirk-Sovyet 
ili~kilerinin Dogu~, for instance, analyzes the Ottoman diplomacy during the Brest 
talks. This research covering the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and 
Bolshevik Russia during the last two years of the Great War is hoped to be the first 
step of a work that will help to fill the gap on the subject. I first thought to work on 
this subject when I realized, after reading the memoirs of leading Ottoman personalities 
of the time, that ''the sick man of Europe" was in 1917 no more sick, at least against 
its traditional enemy from the North. 
Russia was the main factor which, above everything else, led the Ottoman leaders to 
enter the war in 1914. Following Turkey's intervention on the side of the Central 
Powers, it will be not wrong to say that the Ottoman public emphatically welcomed the 
government's decision regarding Turkey's entrance into the war. After the fresh 
enthusiasm of the early months of the war, however, the Ottomans soon realized that 
in real life the distance between reality and expectations happens to be great. In the 
year 1917, due to the military defeats on several fronts, there were huge territorial 
losses. The economic conditions were rapidly worsening and it was the German 
economic aid that helped the government to keep its ragged armies on the field. 
Consequently, at a time when hopes were lost, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia 
provided the Ottoman government with new opportunities. Thus the central question 
to which this research addresses itself is how the political and ,strategic aims of the 
Ottoman government had evolved between 1917 and 1918. What were the Ottoman 
aims on the eve and at the beginning of the First World War and what long-range plans 
did the Ottoman government develop with regard to Russia in the initial months 
following the Bolshevik Revolution. Besides, the period under investigation is of 
particular importance for the Turco-German relations. The developments in the 
Caucasus following the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk prove that Germany was not 
as influential or dominant in the Ottoman Empire as suggested. 
I tried to utilize mainly the memoirs of the leading Turkish as well as German and 
Russian personalities since they are the most valuable asset in reflecting the spirit and 
psychology of the time. Various scholarly monographs in Turkish, Russian and 
German and other secondary sources were also utilized. It was relied on the published 
public documents of the related countries, mainly Russia. The Kmlay Ar~ivi in 
Etimesgut (Ankara) needs to be reorganized in a modem way. Therefore, under the 
current circumstances, the information regarding the cataloguing of the documents that 
are utilized in this research is confined only to file numbers. 
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All dates in this research are given m accordance with contemporary Gregorian 
calender. 
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OTIOMAN WAR AIMS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
For any research dealing with the Ottoman history during the First World War, of 
fundamental importance has been the question which factors lay behind Turkey's 
entrance into the war. Paradoxically, in Turkish historiography there has been two 
contradictory opinions. According to the first view, Turkey's entrance into the war 
was inevitably caused by the anxieties of leading Ottoman cadres regarding the 
preservation of the territorial integrity of the empire. Indeed, this argument strongly 
associates with the memories of almost all the leading Unionists. 1 There is a common 
point in these sources that allegedly financial difficulties2 and . secret engagements of 
the Entente powers3 that can be traced to the Reval meeting4 between Edward VII and 
Nicholas II in the summer of 1908 made it inescapable to remain outside the war. The 
only point of conflict is related to the timing. 5 The second view assumes that 
miscalculated and irredentist policies of the leading Unionists whose motives centered 
on the prevailing intellectual movements of the time such as Pan-Turkism and/or Pan-
Turanism were the primary reason of Turkey's forceful entrance into the war. Unionist 
leaders, the leading troika6 in particular, have been accused of being romanticist 
daydreamers that accelerated the disintegration of the empire. There have even been 
some extreme claims that the Unionists had sold their country to the Kaiser or that 
they were under a definite obligation to subscribe to German diplomatic policies. 7 
Instead of a coherent policy based on political considerations, it was the twists and 
turns of CUP's diplomacy that shaped the last decade of Ottoman foreign policy. On 
the eve of the First World War, there were hardly any sign demonstrating that the CUP 
had abandoned the traditional Ottoman policy of maintaining a balance between the 
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Great Powers. The chief concern of the Ottoman authorities before the outbreak of the 
war was the Cz.arist Russia. The fear of being left alone against Russia in an 
environment of confronting blocs forced the Ottomans to look for allies to balance this 
traditional menace from the North. It was assumed that to save the country from 
Russian aggression, support of Britain and France was essential. 8 However, due to the 
entangling alliances, neither France nor Great Britain was willing to risk Russia, a 
powerful ally against German expansion, for the sake of a disintegrating empire. When 
in spring 1914 it became apparent that a general war would erupt in Europe, the panic 
of Ottoman leaders heightened. In their view, such a war would result in Moscow's 
final blow on Turkey. Consequently, Ottoman leaders even attempted to seek an 
alliance with Russia. An Ottoman delegation headed by Talat Pasha visited the Czar in 
May 1914 in Livadia, in the summer palace of Russian czars in the Crimea. 9 
Additionally, Cemal Pasha, in his visit to France in July 1914, repeated the Turkish 
proposal regarding an alliance between the two countries. 10 However, none of these 
efforts created any positive outcomes. Under these circumstances, the German-
Ottoman alliance of 1914, instead of being the logical culmination of carefully laid 
German plains, became a hastily made arrangement. 11 
Speculations concerning the fact that the alliance negotiations were initiated by a small 
clique of Ottoman ministers and that several members of the Ottoman cabinet were 
neither aware of, nor agreed to the formal alignment of their country with Germany 
will not be touched upon. Of primary importance, we believe, are the nature and 
purpose of this alignment and how and why the Ottoman leaders decided to enter the 
war. The Sultan, on July 12, 1914, authorized the Grand Vizier to carry on 
negotiations for an alliance with Germany that was supposed to "secure the Ottoman 
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Empire from a Russian aggression. " 12 Indeed, the Treaty of Alignment signed between 
the two countries on Aug. 2, 1914 was formally directed against Russia alone. While 
the Ottoman government accepted to enter into the German-Austrian Alliance, in case 
Russia would resort to military means (Article II), Germany obliged itself to defend the 
Ottoman Empire whenever it would be threatened by Russia (Article IV). 
On August 3, the Porte ordered full mobilization, but also issued its declaration of 
neutrality in the rapidly broadening European war. Meanwhile, the tidal maneuvers of 
CUP's diplomacy continued. In spite of the treaty with Germany, Enver Pasha initiated 
talks with the Russian military attache in istanbul concerning a possible alignment of 
the Ottoman Empire with the Entente. 13 These curious overtures by Enver Pasha have 
been a matter of discussions. The fact that he kept the German embassy informed 
about his talks with the Russians have been pointed out as demonstrating his 
insincerity. 14 Nevertheless, there is no doubt today that, combined with the British 
government's requisition of the two battleships, Sultan Osman and Re§adiye, without 
any tangible provocation from Turkey, it was the refusal and indifference of the 
Russian government, of Sazonov in particular, that hindered a would-be Ottoman 
proximity with the Entente. 
On October 27, the Ottoman fleet steamed out of the Bosphorus into the Black Sea 
and two days later several harbors and points on the Russian coast were shelled, mines 
were dropped in major shipping lanes and a number of Russian vessels were 
destroyed. 15 In spite of the excusatory note delivered to the Russian government on 
November 1, the language of the message asserting that the hostilities in the Black Sea 
had been provoked by the Russian fleet made it clear that the Ottoman government 
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risked the war with Russia. Consequently, on Nov. 2, 1914, four days after the 
provocative attack of the Turkish fleet on the Russian Black Sea coast, the Cz.a.rist 
Government formally declared war on the Ottoman Empire. 
Much has been written on these contradicting motives of the Ottoman leaders during 
these two crucial months. It has often been alleged that by the time the Turks were no 
longer masters of their own house because of the entrenchment of German officers in 
their army and the attack on the Russian Black Sea coast was Admiral Souchon's fail 
accompli. 16 However, there is no doubt today that the leading Ottoman figures at the 
time, first and foremost Enver Pasha, were willing to fight with Russia. It was again the 
"Russian factor" that played the primary role in determining the fate of the Ottoman 
Empire. The consequences on the Ottoman expectations of German victories in the 
Eastern Front are deeply anchored in the last decade of the Ottoman history of constant 
crises and disappointments which directly contributed to the Ottoman entry into the 
war. 
According to E. D. Ramsaur, "The conclusion to which one is forced after a study of 
the origins of the Revolution (of 1908) is that no foreign power supported the Young 
Turks or even had any advance knowledge of the Revolution. " 17 In that sense, it was a 
purely Turkish enterprise aimed at replacing the disastrous regime of the Sultan with a 
strong constitutional monarchy that would end foreign interference. The word 
"foreign" requires a particular concentration for any research dealing with the history of 
the Committee of Union and Progress. In its publications before the Revolution, the 
CUP exhibited a marked hostility and suspicion towards all the Great Powers and it did 
not manifest any special sympathy towards Britain and France. 18 The Unionists believed 
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that the Ottoman Empire must eventually rid itself of foreign administrative influence, 
foreign capital invested under far-reaching economic concessions and foreign 
interference in Ottoman political affairs. But for a period of transition, during which the 
country could learn the secrets of Western progress and adapt them to her own 
purposes, it was the obvious duty of a forward-looking government to utilize European 
capital and European technical assistance for the welfare of the empire. An indication of 
this phenomenon is appointments of various British and French officials to different 
branches of the Ottoman government to carry on reform programs that continued until 
the end of the year 1909. 
As in the case of their predecessors, Young Ottomans, the primary concern of the 
Young Turks was the salvation of the empire that was supposed to be disintegrating. 19 
However, in comparison to the Young Ottomans, they had a program that was less 
theoretical and more speculative.20 A well-known Unionist journalist, Hiiseyin Cahit 
Y al~tn, described the Young Turks as "inexperienced young people who did not have 
any knowledge regarding the world, life or politics. "21 Moreover, the so-called Young 
Turks were composed of people of differing social and professional status. 
Consequently, except for Ottomanism -for a very short period of time indeed-- they 
never reflected anything resembling an ideological homogeneity. What brought these 
people together were their common hatred to Abdulhamid and the belief that the 
proclamation of a constitutional monarchy would resolve both the external and internal 
problems the country was facing. How naive the expectations of the Young Turks at 
the time were is to be understood from these reproachful words of Said Halim Pasha, 
one of the leading Unionists: 
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'We hoped that the constitution would have a 
miraculous strength to alter the political and 
economic conditions of our society; to help us 
forget our internal disputes which were extremely 
vulgar; and, to unite us altogether under one great 
and noble Ottoman nation which would only think 
of the glory and greatness of the Ottoman 
Fatherland. "22 
After the fresh enthusiasm of the early months of the revolution, it became obvious that 
in real life the distance between expectations and reality happens to be great. From the 
beginning of the Young Turk movement, while non-Turks were more inclined toward 
far reaching liberalization and decentralization, except for Prince Sabahaddin' s small 
fraction, their Turkish partners' basic concern was preservation of a strongly unified 
empire. After coming to power this latter group, composed largely of Turkish officials, 
officers and professionals and centered around the Committee of Union and Progress, 
officially pursued Ottomanist policies of their predecessors, the leaders of the Tanzimat 
in particular, who hoped to establish the doctrine of Osman/1/ik mainly based on loyalty 
to the common Ottoman vaJan (fatherland) and the ruling dynasty. As time went on, 
however, it was the national aspirations of the non-Turks of the Empire that hastened 
the failure of Ottomanism. There emerged revolts in Macedonia, Albenia and by 
Armenians that were suppressed with an iron hand; there were massacres in Adana and 
elsewhere in Anatolia and in Cilicia. With regard to external developments, the situation 
was also worsening. Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by Austria-Hungary; Bulgaria 
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declared its independence and Crete decided to unite with Greece. The news papers of 
France and Britain roundly denounced the Adana massacres and came to adopt a 
hostile attitude toward the Young Turk Revolutio~ which only a short time previously 
they had ebulliently praised. The Italian attack on Tripoli and the Balkan Wars were the 
two final blows. The unavoidable response of many Turkish intellectuals to these 
premises was the development of a strong Turkish nationalism. 
It is obvious that the Young Turks had certain nationalistic feelings even before the 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and, contrary to commonly held views, this policy did 
not begin after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The main source of confusion is related 
to the lack of a differentiation between Pan-Turkism and Turkism. According to I. M. 
Landau, during the early twentieth century, Ottoman Turkish interest in the Outside 
Turks grew to such an extent that the terms Turkism and Pan-Turkism were often 
confused with one another and used interchangeably. 23 Although the development of 
Turkism will not be examined in detail here, certain points, clarifying the emergence of 
Pan-nationalistic movements in the Ottoman Empire, will be mentioned briefly. 
When the famous Turcologist Arminius V ambery asked for permission to deliver a 
lecture in the Galata College on the ethnology of the Turkish race, Abdulhamit bluntly 
refused, saying "We must not touch the question of nationality~ all Mohammedans are 
brethren and any national partition wall will cause serious dissensions. "24 The Sultan 
indeed was a stubborn believer in Ottomanism and his Pan-Islamism was principally 
directed to the sphere of foreign policy. As a matter of fact, Turkism during the first 
half of Abdiilhamid' s reign became limited merely to cultural and linguistic issues. 
Because other types of discussions were banned, historical and cultural matters 
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assumed a great importance in the newspapers and magazines. 25 The principal source of 
inspiration of Turkism was the discoveries made by European Orientalisrn that directly 
contributed to the evolution of Turcology in the Ottoman Empire. This European 
interest in the Asian peoples and their culture helped the native scholars in the Ottoman 
Empire rediscover their past history, the riches of their language and the beauty of their 
literature. Particularly, Necib Aslill's translation of Leon Cahun's Introduction a 
/'histoire de l'Asie. Tures et Mongols des origines a 1405 (published in 1896) had a 
great impact upon the Turkish intellectuals. Rather than the originality of the work, the 
timing of its publication played a crucial role because towards the end of the nineteenth 
century the situation was rape enough for Turkisrn's transformation from the cultural 
sphere to the political one. 26 The Turkish-Greek War of 1897 and Armenian revolts in 
istanbul accelerated this process of transformation. Among other nationalistic writers 
of the same generation, the widest appeal generated by the poet Mehmet Emin 
[Yurdakul] who was known as the poet of the Turks (Tiirk '¥liri). His nationalist poems 
strove to stir up the reader's patriotic sentiments and awaken his pride in his own race. 
ikdam founded in 1894 by Ahmed Cevdet became the most popular journal in istanbul 
because it was published by a Turk. 27 Around ikdam, Ahmed Cevdet gathered a group 
of writers such as Veled Celebi, Bursah Tahir, Necib Aslill and RaufYekta who infused 
the newspaper with a strong nationalist spirit. 
Such publications of European Orientalism, on the other hand, stimulated interest in 
kindred peoples, particularly those of Central Asia, whose history, language or 
literature had an affinity with those of the Turks themselves. The increasing flow of 
intellectuals from Turkic provinces in Russia into the Ottoman Empire, especially 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, gave a further impetus to the growing 
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Ottoman interest in Turks living outside the empire. Thus the bases for Pan-Turkism 
were laid down at approximately the same time that Pan-Turk ideology was making 
headway among the Tatars and other Turkic groups in Russia. Yusuf Akcura, the most 
influential figure among these emigres, published his article ''Oc Tarz-1 Siyasef' in the 
Cairo journal Turk in 1904 that stated Pan-Turk:ism's raison d'etre. In this article, after 
rejecting Ottomanism and Pan-lslamism, Turkism was lauded as offering the only reaJ 
opportunity for union in the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the author concisely presented 
the essence of Pan-Turkism by arguing for a national union of all Turkic groups, with 
Turkey at its center. 28 The debates about this article pointed out two crucial facts: 
First, it was again the Turks of Russia that transferred the emphasis from the cultural 
level, once so ably fostered by the Crimean Tatar ismail Bey Gasprralt, to the political 
one. Second, as apparent in the reaction of some Ottoman intellectuals to Akcura's 
proposal concerning Turkism, the two policies, Ottomanism and Turkism, were 
inconsistent and incompatible with one another and it was inevitable that one of them 
had ultimately prevail over the other. 
The common characteristic of Pan-nationalistic movements is their reaction to external 
factors as a source of inspiration. While Fichte was writing about the German 
Volksgeist, he had in mind a strong reaction against French cultural hegemony and 
Germans' inefficiency to resist Napoleonic armies. When Ivan Aksakov dreamed of a 
unity of Slavic nationalities under a mightier, more integrated and more powerful 
Russia, he stubbornly believed that the Catholicism of Bohemia and Poland allegedly 
constituted a hostile and alien element that he considered incompatible with the element 
of Orthodoxy among the other Slavs. Pan-Turkism at first aimed at the revival of an 
ancient culture as a proof of a joint heritage and a collective identity, but as time went 
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on, it received political overtones and turned to be a counter-movement to Pan-
Slavism. Pan ideologies generally were accepted by Turkish intellectuals as a counter-
weapon to foreign interference. Dr. N~ for instance, an influential figure within the 
CUP, used to say, "We are determined to realize the same incitements the Europeans, 
the Russians in particular, do in our country. We will provoke the Muslims in Tiflis."19 
Pan-Islamism provided the Ottoman leaders for more than thirty years with a weapon 
against European imperialism. Pan-Turkism's villain image to be negated and fought 
against was undoubtedly the old enemy of the Ottoman Empire, Czarist Russia. 
There has been a divergence of opinions regarding when and where Pan ideologies 
were applied by Ottoman ruling circles. According to one source, u(Ottoman leaders) 
envisaged the three policies being pursued simultaneously and side by side, each one 
being emphasized in whatever place, at whatever time, it was the most appropriate 
policy to apply." The author argues that Ottomanism continued to be the keynote of 
internal politics~ Turkish nationalism the keynote of relations with the Tatars of Russia~ 
Pan-Islam, that of relations with the Arabs and other non-Turkic Muslims within the 
empire and of the Muslim peoples of North Afiica and elsewhere outside it. 30 This 
pragmatism of Turkish leaders indeed played a crucial role in the pursuit of these Pan 
ideologies. Notwithstanding, instead of being the initiative of the Ottoman leaders, it 
was the circumstances of the time, mainly influenced by external factors, that 
determined Pan-nationalistic motives. Consequently, the Ottoman intellectuals never 
managed to overcome the confusions between Turkism and Pan-Turkism or Pan-
Turkism and Pan-Turanism.31 The scope and essence of these Pan ideologies could 
never be clarified properly and strategy and tactics missed a systematization. The only 
person who partly succeeded in overcoming this handicap was Ziya Gokalp. Instead, 
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the movements derived their strength from an idealism that is almost unique in world 
history. Mejkure (ideal), an innovation of Ziya GOkalp and an important component of 
Turkish romantic nationalism, occupied the comer stone of Pan-nationalistic policies. 
In contrast to the racial, ethnic, geographic or political interpretations, Gokalp's nation 
is one composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and 
aesthetics. 32 According to Gokalp, in every nation, facing a serious threat or suffering 
an immense disaster, individualism dies and there emerges a national will. This national 
will is the creative ideal of every nation and it preserves a strong enthusiasm and 
sacredness. 33 The political connotation of this ideal is best pictured by GOkalp' s poem, 
"Turan," written in 1911. It was a resounding call for Pan-Turkism: "For the Turks, 
Fatherland means neither Turkey, nor Turkestan; Fatherland is a large and eternal 
country- Turan." 
Under these circumstances, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 are of particular 
importance. Their consequences were twofold. In the past, due to an "intuitive" 
approach, the Turks refrained themselves from risking for the sake of an ideal what 
were present in their hand. Therefore, they opted for Ottomanism. 34 The fact that 
almost all the territories were lost in the European part of the empire meant for the 
CUP a relative purification of the Christian subjects of the "Ottoman nation." 
Ottomanist policies were not left aside, but Turkist activities speeded up and became 
openly supported by the CUP. Secondly, this new spirit of idealism began to dominate 
the thoughts of Ottoman intellectuals. A German political agent, entrusted with a 
mission to istanbul, during 1913, in the closing days of the Balkan Wars, wrote in his 
memoirs that "The sense of inferiority which had pursued (the Turks) since the days of 
Count Ignatieff, of San Stefano fame, had died out.'..35 In Cemal Pasha's words, dating 
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from the Balkan Wars, the CUP was determined to follow a more active foreign policy 
that would enable the country to secure an equal and peculiar place within the league of 
nations. 36 Gokalp held that Turan was the ideal country that was inhabited by the Turks 
and where Turkish was spoken. Thus, the guiding objective of Pan-Turkism became to 
strive for some sort of union, cultural or physical, among all peoples of proven or 
alleged Turkic origins, whether living both within and without the frontiers of the 
Ottoman Empire. As it evolved, it increasingly assumed an irredentist character. In 
1918, during the initial months following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, it reached 
its zenith. 
[n 1894 France and Russia signed an accord of mutual defence and they engaged 
themselves to come to each other's aid if attacked by Germany or one of her allies. 
From that time the General Staff's of France, Russia and Germany concentrated on 
strategies that would tum the prospect of a two-front war to their best advantage. In 
Germany's Schlieffen Plan, the speed of the mobilization was the crucial factor because 
Germany had to crush France before Russia fully mobilized and then rapidly shift her 
armies to the East. When the war broke up, Schlieffen Plan's grand strategic design had 
failed and the two Russian armies deployed in the Eastern Front made good progress. 
Nevertheless, the German victory in Tannenberg did not only stop the Russian forces, 
but also inflicted heavy losses on them. 
On the Eastern Front the initial months following Tannenberg were spent on intense but 
inconclusive fighting. Nevertheless, Ottoman public was in some measure illusioned by 
German war strength and neither Russian victories over the Austrians in Galicia, nor 
the Marne counteroffensive that saved France from German invasion echoed in 
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istanbul. The impatience of Ottoman ruling circles, the members of the Central 
Committee of the CUP in particular, became augmented.37 It was strongly believed that 
Germany, within a very short period of time, would crush the French and turn to 
Russia. Enver Pasha and his friends feared to miss this opportunity.311 The members of 
the Central Committee, especially Celal Sahir, were mentioning the necessity to enter 
the war in order to occupy Caucasia and Egypt· because it would enable the Ottoman 
Empire to come closer to both the Muslim and Turkic worlds. Besides, it was 
supposed that, for the economic development of the country, petroleum of Caucasia 
and cotton of Egypt were essential.39 For the CUP, one of the important war objectives 
henceforth became the liberation of both co-religionists and people of ethnic relations. 
from the foreign yoke. 
The Ottoman proclamation of Jihad on Nov. 11, 1914 was introduced by five fatwas of 
the Seyhulislam. 40 An exceptional ceremony was held in Fatih Mosque.41 The fatwas 
called on all Muslims to join the Ottomans, with life and property, in the Jihad against 
Britain, Russia and France that were accused of enslaving millions of Muslims for their 
own interests and of persecuting Muslims in India, Asia and Central Africa. The Caliph, 
additionally, demanded from the Muslims not to serve in the military forces of these 
three countries, nor to take up arms against Germany and Austria, under penalties of 
sinning and meriting the fires of hell. The Crimea, Kaz.an, Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva, 
India, China, Afghanistan, Iran and Africa were specifically mentioned. In the 
declaration of the Ottoman Parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan, 42 as well as m the 
Beyanname-i Hiimayun of the Sultan, 43 Russia was particularly accused of being 
responsible for the outbreak of the war in Europe and of trying to destroy the Ottoman 
Empire. Amongst these proclamations, the most interesting was the appeal of Enver 
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Pasha to the army, as the deputy comrnander-in-chief44 He held that the people in the 
lost territories of the Ottoman Empire were praying for the victories of Ottoman 
soldiers. 
Ay~ Osmanoglu, the daughter of Abdulhamid II, wrote in her memoirs that her father 
was surprised when he heard that Jihad was proclaimed. According to the Sultan, 
Jihad had been no more than a symbolic weapon and -the British would never be 
deceived.45 Nonetheless, there were great expectations from this call for Jihad by 
Ottoman ruling circles. Cabinet members, particularly Hayri Bey, were of the opinion 
that the proclamation of Jihad would have a great impact on the Muslim world. It was 
believed that the whole Muslim world, stretching from Mecca to Morocco, was waiting 
for a signal of the Ottoman Sultan.46 Following the proclamation of Jihad, official and 
unofficial Pan-Islamic activities47 were started by both the Ottoman and German 
Governments. A joint Turco-German mission was sent to Afghanistan to persuade the 
Emir to join the cause of Pan-Islam and make war against the British in India. 48 A 
secret expedition was made into India to stir trouble among the Muslims. Numerous 
pamphlets in different languages were published and distributed among Muslims 
everywhere. Agents of Te~ki/at-1 Mahsusa, an organization set up for clandestine work, 
devoted much of their energy to guerrilla and sabotage activities among the Muslim 
subjects of the Triple Entente, mainly in India and Central Asia.49 In spite of these 
efforts, the Pan-Islamic card of the CUP failed to create any positive results. Except for 
some isolated cases of desertion by Muslims in British forces, 50 there was hardly any 
response in regions specifically mentioned in the fatwas proclaiming Jihad against the 
mortal enemies of Islam, namely Russia, Britain and France. Islamic solidarity had long 
been in existence, but Pan-Islamism manifested itself as an aspiration rather than a 
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consistent activity, an idea more than an organized movement. Consequently, although 
the Islamic card was utilised to the fullest extent, Pan-Turkism and its political 
implications became increasingly emphasized. 
The Turks fought during the First World War on over half a dozen widely scattered 
fronts. In Enver Pasha's war plans, however, the two regions of priority were 
Transcaucasia and Sinai Desert. The fact that at the beginning of the war Enver Pasha 
reinforced troops on the Caucasian frontier and took over the command of the Third 
Army in eastern Anatolia, replacing old, obstinate officers by younger, imaginative men, 
sufficiently explains the particular importance attached by Enver Pasha to this front. 
The Third Army was assisted with troops from Thrace, which contradicted Ottoman 
war plans.51 A new division was set up under the command ofHalil, the uncle ofEnver 
Pasha, to be sent to Dagestan over Southern Azerbaijan to instigate the Turks and 
Muslims there against Russia. 52 In addition to the existing three Turkish armies, Enver 
Pasha created a fourth one in the Arabic provinces of the Empire and in November 
1914, entrusted its commander, Cernal Pasha, with the Pan-Islamic campaign. Between 
January 1915 and August 1916 the Turkish armies abortively launched two maJor 
advances and several smaller raids to the Suez Canal to reach Egypt. 
The most valuable contribution the Turks made to the war effort of the Central Powers 
during the First World War was tying down sizeable Entente military forces throughout 
the Near and Middle East. The successful Ottoman resistance to the British and French 
at the Dardanelles in 1915 and the victory at Kut-el-Amara in 1916 were of 
considerable importance_ However, expansionist drives of Ottoman armies in different 
fronts, sometimes independent from the joint plans of the Central Powers, sometimes in 
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accordance with them, became heavily routed. After 1916, the military operations of 
the Entente in the various Turkish theaters of war forced Ottoman forces, in several 
cases, to withdraw. In the Palestinian area, after September 1916, the British assumed 
the offensive, cleared the Turks out of. the Sinai Desert, advanced into southern 
Palestine and captured Jerusalem in December 1917. In Mesopotamia the Turks lost 
Bagdad to the British in 1917 and were on the point of withdrawing from Mosul 
towards the end of the war. In the Arabian peninsula, the British-sponsored Arab revolt 
in the summer of 1916 provided effective assistance to the British army in its advance 
through Palestine and Syria. Before the break-up of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ottoman 
forces were on the verge of evacuation from Persia In Transcaucasia, after the defeat 
of Ottoman forces in Sarikamis, the Russians penetrated deep into Ottoman territory. 
Consequently, part of eastern Anatolia became eontrolled by the Russians since 1916. 
In addition to these, beginning from the summer of 1916 the Ottoman Empire 
contributed several army divisions to the European campaigns ofits allies. 
The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, was ill-prepared to conduct military 
operations in such a great European war because the country was economically 
backward and state treasury was notoriously empty. It was the massive transfer of gold 
and money and of war material and other supplies from Germany53 (and Austria) that 
helped the Ottoman Government to keep its ragged armies in the field. Nevertheless, 
daily economic conditions and living standards of the ordinary people were increasingly 
worsening. Combined with the rumours of bribery and territorial losses including Holy 
Places, the unrest was growing. The prestige of the CUP, ofEnver Pasha in particular, 
became seriously damaged. The German ambassador to the Porte, Count von 
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Bemstorff, for instance, complained in his letter to von Gwinner that, due to these 
premises, the position of Enver Pasha was steadily weakening. 54 
These were the circumstances in the Ottoman Empire when the Bolsheviks seized 
power in Petrograd and Cz.a.rist regime became totally toppled in November 1917. 
Consequently, the period between December 1917 and August 1918 was of particular 
importance for the Ottoman Government because it provided Ottoman leaders with the 
opportunity of realizing the strategic aims embodied during the first days of the war and 
compensating war losses. However, it, at the same time, signified the deterioration of 
relations with Germany because the initial developments following the Russian Treaty 
of Brest.:J.,itovsk on March 3, 1918, caused, due to the conflicting interests, a 
divergence of ways between the two allies. 
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THE TALKS FOR THE RUSSIAN TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK AND THE 
STANCE OF THE OTIOMAN GOVERNMENT 
One of the most prominent students of the field, Richard Pipes, argues that "the tsar, ... , 
could have saved the throne if that were his supreme objective. All he had to do was to 
sign a separate peace, exactly as Lenin would do in March 1918."55 Before the war, it 
had been widely expected that the coming world conflict would be decided in a 
relatively short period of time, but it lasted for over four years. Consequently, it 
brought a heavy economic burden to each belligerent country. Russia alone had to 
spent fifty million rubles every day the war continued. 56 Nevertheless, until the sununer 
1917 the Russian army held together. Contrary to a widespread belief that the 
''February Revolution" was brought about by war weariness, anti-German sentiment 
ran high and the public favoured the continuation of the war until victory. 57 This was 
also the stand of all the leading parties in the government and in the Soviet, the 
Bolsheviks excepted. The party programme of the Bolsheviks declared for a general 
European peace based upon the dictatorship of the proletariat. The issue was so 
sensitive that the Bolsheviks exercised great caution in public pronouncements. 58 
However, it was the failure of the June 1917 offensive of Kerensky that aided the 
Bolsheviks and why the Russian army disintegrated. 59 Lenin, the principal driving force 
behind the revolution and the only person with a plan of action, did not miss this 
opportunity. An Army Intelligence Report for October 2-13, 1917 stated that the 
defeatist agitation was increasing in the fronts; the influence of Bolshevik ideas was 
spreading very rapidly; and, apart from the Bolshevik not a single political movement 
had any popularity. 60 
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Stalin, in his article titled "Strategy and Tactics in Communist Thought," wrote: 
''During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, depending on 
the flow or ebb, the rise or decline, of the revolution.''61 The third stage of the October 
Revolution indeed, the objective of which was to consolidate the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in one country, using it as a base ·for the defeat of imperialism in all 
countries,62 witnessed these changing tactics of Bolsheviks. 
,. 
The Bolsheviks' main concern after October was to solidify their power and to expand 
it nationwide. This difficult task they had to accomplish required the immediate 
conclusion of peace. During the debates on the Brest Treaty, Lenin presented the issue 
starkly simple: ''Our revolution was born by the war: if there were no war, we would 
have witnessed the unification of the capitalists of the whole world, a unification on the 
basis of a struggle against us. ''63 At the center of this capitalist world stood relations 
with Germany. The Russian army was not able to resist a German advance. On the 
basis of responses to questionnaries distributed to delegates at the All-Army 
Conference on Demobilization, Krylenko concluded that the Russian army retained no 
combat capability.64 Furthermore, in Lenin's judgement, unless the Bolsheviks made 
peace, the peasant army, exhausted by the war, would overthrow the socialist workers' 
govemment.65 Consequently, on Nov. 8, 1917, the Decree of Peace66 was adopted at a 
meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' 
Deputies. It called on all warring peoples and their governments to begin immediately 
negotiations for a just and democratic peace- a peace without annexations and without 
indemnities. 
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This declaration of the Second Congress of Soviets proposing an armistice of three 
months for the negotiation of a general peace evoked no response· from either enemies 
or allies. The Bolsheviks, therefore, made new moves. General Dukhonin was ordered 
to begin direct negotiatioQS with Germans on November 21 67 and the next day Trotsky 
publicized the Entente secret treaties. Besides, Trotsky invited the Allies and the United 
States to consider the declaration of November 8 a formal offer of an armistice on all 
fronts and of general peace negotiations. Despite to the protests of the Allied military 
missions against separate negotiations, on his arrival on the sector of the front held by 
the Russian 5th Army, Krylenko, who had been appointed supreme commander-in-chief 
by decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars, arrested General Boldyrev, the army 
commander, and sent a delegation across the lines with an offer to the Germans to 
negotiate an armistice. The Germans promptly accepted and on December 2 the 
Russian armistice delegation chaired by A A. loffe, an ex-Menshevik and a close friend 
of Trotsky, arrived in Brest-Litovsk. 
Since the beginning of the year 1916 the Ottoman government was chiefly informed 
about the situation in Russia by its embassy in Stockholm. 68 When the news regarding 
the collapse of the Czarist regime and the emergence of Prince Lvov's Provisional 
Government in Petrograd in mid-March 1917 arrived at istanbul, the Porte, through its 
ambassador to Stockholm, ismail Canbolat Bey, attempted to seek ways for a 
conclusion of peace. 69 These developments, on the other hand, were strengthening the 
hope of the Ottoman public that a would-be withdrawal of Russia from the war would 
aid the Ottoman government to preserve the Straits and to end the war with a relatively 
harmless damage. Nevertheless, the well-known expansionist orientation of Russia and 
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the first official statements of the new foreign minister, Paul Miliukov, produced the 
impression in istanbul that Russia was not ready to quit the war or to abandon its 
claims to the Turkish Straits. Miliukov's resignation in mid-May appears to have 
persuaded the leaders of the Ottoman Empire that Russia might soon agree to come to 
terms with its enemies.70 Consequently, Ottoman policy with regard to Russia, from the 
Provisional Government to the Bolshevik seizure of power, was based upon the 
assumption that Russia should not be "startled." This line was in full accordance with 
German leaders' approach who were generally inclined to await further developments 
in Russia. The Ottoman ambassador to Berlin, Haklo Pasha, in his cable to istanbul in 
April 1917, pictured Germany's strategy as dependent upon the pursuit of a prudent 
policy. German leaders were of the opinion that the Central Powers should refrain 
themselves from provoking Russian soldiers on the front and await the increasing 
pressure of the people upon the government. 7l Consequently, on June 11 Enver Pasha, 
in his cable to the Commander of the Third Anny, Ahmed izzet Pasha, ordered that 
unless being attacked by the Russians the military operations on the Caucasian Front 
were to be suspended upon the request of the German Supreme Command. 72 
Due to the military defeats on several fronts, huge territorial losses and rapidly 
worsening economic conditions, the impatience of the Ottoman public regarding the 
conclusion of a peace became spontaneously augmented. Under these circumstances, 
the Bolshevik proposal for a peace without annexations and indemnities was met with 
great enthusiasm. Moreover, Trotsky's publication of the Entente secret treaties 
exceptionally echoed in istanbul. Between November and December 1917 the 
credibility of the Bolsheviks in the Ottoman public increased to a considerable extent.73 
The response of Ottoman ruling circles to the Bolshevik proposal did not contradict 
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with the sentiments of the public. According to Kurat, the first cabinet meeting 
negotiating the proposal of the Bolsheviks was on Nov. 12, 1917.74 The same day, 
Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Pallavicini, visited Turkish 
Foreign Minister, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, and tried to obtain the support of the Ottoman 
Government. In view of Austria-Hungary, the Bolshevik proposal was no more than a 
dream, but it made clear that, if the Central Powers could behave cautiously and begin 
negotiations with Russia, it would be relatively easy to separate Russia from its allies 
and to conclude a peace. This approach of Austria seemed to have been approved by 
the Ottoman government.75 The next day, Ahmed Nesimi Bey cabled Balda Pasha, 
stating that he should persuade the Germans to start immediately negotiations with the 
Russians. 76 
As time went on, the Germans had come to realize that their one remaining chance of 
winning was to break up the enemy alliance, preferably by forcing Russia out of the 
war. Having failed to realize this by military means, Germans now resorted to political 
measures. A Revolutionierungpolitik of cultivating the Bolsheviks in Russia was 
started. From March 1917 till the Bolshevik seizure of power, the German government 
organized the transport of the Russian revolutionaries through Germany and Lenin's 
contingent was the first of these transports. Besides, the German Treasury approved to 
allocate five million marks to be used for political purposes in Russia. 77 Consequently, 
the initial news regarding the Bolshevik victory in Petrograd was met in Berlin with 
great gladness. General Ludendorff requested the intercepted radio transmissions 
concerning the break up of revolution in Petrograd to be exploited for propaganda, 
because the victory of the of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council was desirable from 
German point ofview.78 The Germans, however, were skeptical whether the Bolsheviks 
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could manage to hold in power. The German embassy at Stockholm, the most valuable 
center of information about the developments in Russia, reported on November 8 that 
"the Bolshevik victory was not yet certain, since they controlled the Telegraph 
Agency. "79 Furthermore, German ruling circles believed that any sign of hastiness on 
the side of the Central Powers could harm their interests. The State Secretary of the 
German Government, Kuhlmann, in his cable to the Foreign Ministry Liaison Officer at 
General Headquarters, Lersner, wrote that it would be inadvisable for them to make 
any offers of peace at the front. According to further reports from Stockholm, the 
Bolsheviks there have said that the new government could only remain in power if it 
achieved a cease-fire in the immediate future. Therefore, in the event of offers of 
general kind being made by the enemy, these should merely be accepted and no more.80 
Exactly these arguments were presented to Hakk:i Pasha, who, on the basis of Ahmed 
Nesimi Bey's aforementioned cable, visited German Foreign Minister.81 
Russia's defection from the alliance, however, promised one vital benefit: the release of 
hundreds of thousands of troops for transfer to the West. After the Bolshevik power 
seizure in Petrograd, the German General Staff drew up plans for a decisive offensive 
on the Western Front in the spring of 1918. The Kaiser affirmed the plan.82 Hence, the 
transfer of divisions from the Eastern Front essentially required the obtainment of a 
quick armistice with Russia. 
The armistice talks opened on Dec. 3, 1917, and the parties agreed on a cease-fire to 
begin on December 6 and remain in force for eleven days. The Bolsheviks did not wish 
to appear in the eyes of the people in the Allied countries as helpmates of Germany. 
The Soviet delegation, therefore, declared categorically that they were treating for an 
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annistice on all fronts with the view to the conclusion of a general peace on the basis 
already established by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. 83 Trotsky, on December 6, 
informed the Allied Governments of the course of the armistice negotiations. Before it 
expired, the armistice was extended to January 14, 1918. It was aimed at giving the 
Allies an opportunity to reconsider and join the talks. Besides, the Bolshevik delegation 
sought to insist that, during the period of armistice, no troops should be moved from 
Russia to the West. However, these moves were showpieces. Using the actual terms of 
the annistice,84 several divisions were shifted by the Germans to the Western Front.85 
While the German motives regarding the armistice chiefly revolved around the transfer 
of troops from the Eastern Front for a decisive offensive in the West, the main concern 
of Ottoman leaders was the evacuation of Russian forces from the eastern Anatolia. 
The Bolshevik proposal regarding a peace without annexatio~ therefore, was of 
particular importance for Ottoman leaders. Enver Pasha, in his cable on Dec. 3, 1917, 
to the Ottoman representative at Brest-Litovsk, Zeki Pasha, stated that the evacuation 
of Russian troops in the Caucasian front should be included into the annistice terms. A 
similar cable was sent to Ludendorff Nevertheless, the Allied representatives at Brest 
promptly denied the feasibility of this proffer.86 The Germans in particular hesitated to 
support the Turkish insistence on the evacuation of occupied territories since they did 
not want to pull back its annies for the time being. In the proceeding days, Ottoman 
attempts of similar nature did not create any positive outcomes. Consequently, the 
Armistice Agreement of Brest-Litovsk87 (Dec. 15, 1917) between Russia, on the one 
hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, on the other, failed to 
clarify the situation in the Caucasian Front. Article III of the agreement envisaged the 
conclusion of a separate arrangement between the military commanders of both sides 
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concerning the lines of demarcation in the Russo-Turkish theaters of war in Asia. The 
Armistice Agreement of Erzincan that was signed between Russia and Turkey on Dec. 
18, 1917, will be dwelt on in the following chapter. 
After the signing of a separate armistice between the Central Powers and Russia, the 
question of affairs was transferred from the military sphere to the political one. The 
talks to draft a peace treaty between the two sides resumed at Brest on December 22. 
In the first session, presided by KtihJmann, the head of the German mission, the Russian 
delegation was invited to state the principles on which it hoped to conclude peace. The 
Russian "Six Points," which had been drafted by Lenin, 88 quickly disappointed the 
representatives of the Central Powers, the Germans in particular. Ioffe, after reading 
the larger part of the Decree of Peace of November 8, repeated Bolshevik call for 
peace without forcible annexation of territories and war indemnities. Furthermore, the 
Russian delegation proposed the right of self-determination for the European nations, 
as well as the colonies, as a basis for peace discussion. 89 
The chief ground of disagreement henceforth became the future status, under the peace 
settlement about to be concluded, of the areas, which included Courland and Lithuania, 
Russian Poland and extensive territory inhabited by the Belorussians and Ukrainians. 90 
At the center of German peace proposals stood the separation from Russia of Poland, 
Lithuania and Courland, all of which at the time were under German military 
occupation. In his reply to Ioffe's statement on December 25,91 Czemin, the Austrian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and chairman of the Austrian mission, agreed to a public 
acceptance of the Soviet formula of "no annexations" on the important condition that 
the Entente should also accept the formula. Hoffmann and Kiihlmann, however, made it 
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clear that this did not apply to Poland, Courland and Lithuania,92 which, allegedly, had 
decided to separate from Russia for the sake of Gennan rule. This time, the Russians 
become irritated. Having reached a deadlock, the talks were adjourned on December 
28, but the negotiations between expert legal and economic commissions went on. 
During the first round of Brest talks, there appeared an important divergence of 
opinions among the Central Powers. Towards the end of the year 1917, Austria-
Hungary was on the verge of dropping out of the war and needed the immediate 
conclusion of peace. Consequently, Czemin threatened the Germans to sign, if 
necessary, a separate peace with the Russians. 93 The Bulgarians, who had been 
promised Serbian and Romanian territory, demanded a clause stating that the 
acquisition of these territories should not be regarded as annexation.94 There also 
appeared important disagreements between the Gennan and Ottoman governments. 
Nevertheless, the difficuhies, which the Germans would run into with their Turkish 
allies, were yet on ice. 
So far it has been explained, how the Ottoman government welcomed the Bolshevik 
proposal of a peace without indemnities and annexations. During the Brest talks, except 
for the evacuation of the occupied territories in the eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman 
delegation hesitated to present the main tenets of their peace proposals and awaited the 
course of negotiations to shape further demands. The Ottoman approach during the 
first round of negotiations thus was based on a policy of wait-and-see. Numerous 
attempts were resolutely made to obtain the support of Germany, but they generally 
remained in vain. A researcher, investigating the Gennan documents concerning the 
diplomatic correspondence between Germany and Turkey during this period, concluded 
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that there are no indications demonstrating that the Germans sympathized Ottoman 
wishes.9S The main contribution of the German delegation to Turkish expectations was 
Kiihlmann's proposal on December 21'6 that the withdrawal of occupation troops after 
the signing of peace should be effected in all those areas where popular self-
determination was not at issue. His proposal seemed to imply that the Central Powers 
would evacuate all occupied Belorussian and Ukrainian regions, while the Russians in 
tum should withdraw from the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.97 
After the initial surprise with regard to these rapidly changing circumstances, however, 
Ottoman expectations became shifted and widened. One of the fundamental reasons of 
Ottoman entrance into the war was to get back the lands they had lost to the Russians 
since the war of 1877 and, if possible, to expand wider. The Germans, to speed up 
Ottoman intervention against the Entente, especially after the Austro-Hungarian 
general staff needed the Turkish support regarding an amphibious landing of about 
50,000 men in the Odessa region, 98 utiliz.ed this card to the fullest extent. Following the 
Treaty of Alignment of August 1917, a deal was signed (August 6) between the two 
sides, the fifth point of which stated that Germany would secure for Turkey a 
correction of her eastern border that would enable Turkey to come into direct contact 
with the Muslims of Russia. 99 Just before the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea opened fire 
on Russian ships and bombarded Russian coast, there had been many important 
conferences between Enver Pasha and the German ambassador to the Porte, Baron von 
Wangenheim. The Baron told Enver Pasha that "Turkey could be promised no 
compensation or reward in the Balkans; anything in that direction would be too 
productive of further trouble, as Roumenia, Austria and Bulgaria all held strong views 
on Balkan matters. There remained, therefore, only Egypt, Algeria and the Russian 
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provinces forming part of the Caucasus.''100 Consequently, the Ottoman leaders, Enver 
Pasha in particular, had come to realiz.e that these newly emerging premises were 
offering to Turkey those opportunities that the Ottoman Empire entered the war for. 
While the armistice talks were still underway the Ottoman government gave notice to 
Berlin that in the impending peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks it would not merely 
insist on the restoration of the 1914 border, but also lay claim to the Districts ofBatum, 
Ardahan and Kars which had fallen to Russia after the War of 1877-1878. 101 In his 
cable to Zeki Pasha, on December 21, 102 Enver Pasha expressed the Turkish demand 
that the return of these districts should be negotiated with the Russians. Five days later, 
Nesirni Bey informed istanbul that the issue in question was handled amongst the allied 
representatives, but it needed further elaboration. 103 To strengthen the Turkish claims 
to these districts Enver Pasha, towards the end of December, set up a delegation 
composed of people born in this region and sent it for lobbying to Berlin, Vienna and 
Sofia. 104 Kuhlmann, in his memoirs, wrote that the anxieties of the Turks were rising 
because the actual situation with regard to the German approach on the Bolshevik 
proposals had brought them to think that their expansionist aims could not be realized. 
In order to calm these anxieties, a conference amongst the allies, where the German 
tactics had to be clarified, was necessary. 105 
The second round of the Brest talks resumed on Jan. 9, 1918. This time Trotsky headed 
the Russian delegation. Before the delegations reassembled, however, there appeared 
some important signs demonstrating that the German position appreciably hardened. 
Throughout the conference questions of high policy were the subject of fiercest 
contention between the Imperial Government and the Supreme Command. 106 Assessing 
the results of the first round of the negotiations, the German general staff doubted 
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whether the Russians were merely playing for time to unleash social unrest in Europe, 
particularly in Germany. Certain Russian actions such as the Soviet government's 
allocation of 2 million rubles to foreign groups supporting the international 
revolutionary movement 107 were justifying these arguments. In his letter to the Kaiser 
on January 7, Hindenburg complained of the weak and conciliatory tactics pursued by 
the German delegation at Brest and stated that it was the time to act forcefully. 108 The 
Kaiser agreed. 
Under these circumstances, the session of January 9 was opened with an unpleasant 
surprise for the Russian delegation. Kiihlmann led off with a declaration that, as the 
Entente Powers had not seen fit to take part in the negotiations, the declarations made 
by the Central Powers on December 25 and 28 were null and void and formally rejected 
the Soviet request for the transfer of the seat of negotiations to Stockholm. 109 Czemin 
followed, saying that the Russians must now confine themselves to the question of a 
separate peace and that the responsibility for the continuation of the war would fall 
exclusively upon them. 110 The Bulgarian and Turkish representatives associated 
themselves with this statement111 since the day before Kuhlmann, Czemin, Talat Pasha 
and Popov had conferred together about their plan of campaign and decided that attack 
was the best method of defence. 112 Hoffmann then took up the attack and protested 
that wireless messages and appeals signed by the representatives of the Russian 
government constituted a violation of the spirit of the armistice. He was joined by the 
Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian military representatives. 113 
The second incident that hardly shocked the Russians was the presence of a Ukrainian 
delegation at Brest that arrived on January 7114 at the German invitation to open 
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separate talks. The Ukrainian delegation made a declaration115 at Brest on January 10, 
stating that the Ukrainian People's republic, that was proclaimed by the third Universal 
of the Ukrainian Central Rada on Nov. 20, 1917, entered upon a course of independent 
international relations. Since the government of the Soviet of People's Commissars did 
not extend over the whole of Russia, the Ukrainian People's Republic had to participate 
in all peace negotiations and conferences on an equal basis with other powers. On 
January 12 the Central Powers recognized the Ukrainian Rada as that country's 
legitimate government and the prelude to a separate peace treaty with the Ukraine was 
laid down. 
In his statement in the Special Commission on Political Questions on January 12, 116 
Kamenev repeated once more the Russian proposal of a plebiscite in Poland, Lithuania 
and Courland, since no democratically elected organs, expressing the will of the 
majority of the population, were created in them. Hoffinann, in tum, stated that the 
German Supreme Command considered it necessary to prevent any attempt to interfere 
in the affairs of the occupied territories. m In the proceeding days no progress was 
made in adjusting the divergent points of view, but a significant event occurred. 
General Max Hoffmann, on January 18, unfolded a map showing the Russians the 
future border between Germany and Russia. 118 This was the final blow. It called for the 
separation of Poland from the old Russian Empire and German annexation of extensive 
territories in western Russia, including all Lithuania and parts of Latvia. In reply to 
Trotsky's question regarding the delimitation of the occupied areas to the south of 
Brest, Hoffmann said this would be discussed with the Ukrainian Republic. Ll9 Trotsky 
requested an adjournment of the political talks and undertook to return by January 29. 
On the night of January 18 he left for Petrograd, leaving Ioffe behind. 
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On Dec. 6, 1917, Zeki Pasha initiated the first meeting at Brest with the Russian 
delegation. The issue in question was the evacuation of the occupied tenitories. 
According to Kamenev, the Russians agreed to the evacuation on the important 
condition that the Ottoman government should allow the return of the deportees, 
regardless of religious belief or ethnic origins, under the strict control of a commission 
composed of delegates of both sides. 120 These words of Kamenev calmed the Ottoman 
leaders. In the proceeding days, however, the news concerning the formation of a 
separate commission amongst the German, Austrian and Russian delegations to work 
out the stipulations of a plebiscite in the occupied tenitories increased the anxieties of 
the Ottoman government. Especially Talat Pasha and Halil Bey became troubled 
because such a development signified the delay of the evacuation. 121 Due to this vibrant 
situation, Talat Pasha decided to come to Brest to chair the Turkish mission. Likewise, 
the Turkish claims to the districts of Kars, Batum and Ardahan needed a stronger 
emphasis. 
Having failed to hinder Ahmed Nesimi Bey's travel to Brest, 122 Talat Pasha's decision 
to join the talks once again worried the German and Austrio-Hungarian governments. 
Just before his departure, the Austrian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Pallavicini, 
told Talat Pasha that the accomplishment of the Turkish claims seemed to be impossible 
and unrealistic. He feared the Turkish insistence particularly on these three districts 
would cause an adjournment of the talks. 123 Nevertheless, during the talks Talat Pasha 
followed a very cautious policy and carefully abstained from entering into any conflict 
with the Germans, saying that Czemin was doing it very "successfully."124 Besides, he 
aware that the German delegates were hampered by the contention between the 
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German Supreme Command and the Parliament (Reichstag). Under these sensitive 
circumstances, the best thing to do was to wait and see. 125 
In view of Talat Pasha, the resolution of the status of the occupied territories would 
help both sides reach a compromise over other contentious issues. 126 On Janwuy 11, 
however, a significant event occurred totally affecting the optimism of the Ottoman 
delegation. The Soviet of People's Commissars promulgated a decree127 proclaiming 
the right of Turkish Annenia to national self-determination. The decree stressed that to 
realize this right it was essential to withdraw all troops from Turkish Armenia, to allow 
the deportees and refugees to return to their homes, to entrust the safety of the 
population to an Armenian militia and to form a provisional government of Turkish 
Armenia in the form of a Soviet. The Ottoman mission at Brest, as well as istanbul, was 
informed of this decree by Galip Kemali Bey [Soylemezoglu]128 who, at the time, was 
in Petrograd as the head of the Turkish delegation that was to arrange an exchange of 
civilian prisoners of war and the resumption of economic and cultural ties. In his reply, 
Talat Pasha requested Galip Kemali Bey to organize protests to be done by the 
Muslims of Russia against this decree. 129 Additionally, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, during his 
meeting with Trotsky on January 18, vehemently protested this promulgation of the 
Soviet government saying that the responsibility for the eruption of violent acts in the 
region would fall exclusively upon the Russians. 130 Talat Pasha, in his cable to Enver 
Pasha on January 17, argued that they had two alternatives: either to seek the 
guarantee of Russians as well as Germans regarding the evacuation of the Russian 
troops from the eastern Anatolia, but this option lacked reliability; or to launch an 
amphibious landing in the Transcaucasian region that was supposed to enable them to 
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"unite with the Muslims of Caucasia, as they had planned at the beginning of the 
ar ,,131 w. 
Trotsky returned from Petrograd and the talks resumed on January 28. Nevertheless, 
because Trotsky continued playing for time negotiations again bogged down in 
rhetoric. Irrelevant remarks and propagandistic speeches of the Soviet delegation 
during the talks and the alanning effects of the Bolshevik propaganda on the army and 
domestic politics of Germany (as well as of Austria) helped the "military party'' gain the 
upper hand in Berlin. The German military stepped in and the idea of a dictated peace 
began to be widely pronounced by German ruling circles. Accordingly, Kuhlmann, on 
February 1, told the Ottoman delegation that he believed the conclusion of peace with 
the Bolsheviks seemed to be no more than a dream. Therefore, it was necessary to 
prepare the armies for military operations. 132 
As time went on, no progress was made. The Central Powers responded to these 
premises with the signing of a separate peace treaty with the Ukrainian Republic on 
Feb. 9, 1918.133 Besides, the Kaiser sent a cable to the German delegation at Brest, 
ordering an ultimatum to be given to the Bolsheviks. It requested Trotsky to sign until 
the morning of February 10 the peace treaty without procrastination. In the event of 
refusal, the armistice would be terminated and the German armies of the Eastern Front 
would move forward. 134 The next day, Trotsky made his famous declaration of "no 
peace and no war,"m stating that although Soviet Russia refused to sign the annexation 
peace, she was leaving the war and would proceed to demobilize her armies. The 
Russians then left Brest-Litovsk. 
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The Germans became very nervous about this postponement. A wave of political 
strikes organized by the socialists backing the Bolsheviks could set off civil 
disturbances in the industrial centers of Germany. Besides, for the decisive campaign 
scheduled for March on the Western Front, the frontiers in the East had to be secured 
and the bulk of armies shifted to the West. 136 Having these considerations, Ludendorff 
urged that the Brest negotiations be broken off Instead, the anny had to march into 
Russia to replace the Bolsheviks with a more acceptable government in Petrograd. 137 
For the final decision, a conference was convened in Homburg on February 13 that was 
chaired by the Kaiser. 138 The recommendations of the General Staff and the Foreign 
Ministry clashed. The radical views of the General Staff weighted heavier than the 
conciliatory approach of the civilians. 139 The conference decided that the armistice 
would expire on February 17, following which the Gennan army would march into 
Russia and resume offensive operations. The issue of overthrowing the Bolsheviks, 
however, remained untouched. General Hoffmann at Brest informed the Russians that 
Germany would recommence military operations on the Eastern Front following the 
termination of the armistice at noon, February 17. Consequently, on February 18, 
without encountering any resistance, the German troops began to advance and 
occupied Dvinsk 
Following General Max Hoffinann's map calling for the separation of Poland from 
Russia and German annexation of extensive territories in western Russia, there emerged 
two main contending positions in the Bolshevik leadership, represented by Lenin on the 
one hand with Trotsky and Bukharin, who merely differed from each other in tactical 
nuances, on the other. Lenin, supported by Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin, favored an 
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immediate peace on Gennan terms. The second faction of the 'L,eft Communists" 
headed by Bukharin140 wanted to break off the Brest negotiations and conduct partisan 
warfare, while fanning the flames of revolution in Germany. This position of Bukharin 
enjoyed great popularity in Bolshevik ranks and Lenin's resolutions within the party 
remained in minority. It was Trotsky's conciliatory line, as in the case of his slogan 
"neither war nor peace," that avoided the danger of a serious division within the party 
ranks. For Lenin, the German advance, nevertheless, was the final straw. On the same 
day when the Germans occupied Dvinsk, he convened the Central Committee. At first, 
his resolution in favor of capitulation to the German demands failed to win a majority. 
In the second vote, however, with Trotsky's support his motion received a slender 
majority. 141 A cable was sent to the Germans stating that the Russian delegation was 
returning to Brest. 142 
The Bolshevik formal acceptance reached Berlin on February 21. Still the Germans 
advanced into Russia's interior. In the north German troops entered Livonia and 
Estonia. In the south the Germans and Austrians were advancing into the heart of the 
Ukraine. In the center the German forces moved on Pskov and Minsk_ Consequently, in 
the Gennan reply on February 23, the German government informed the Russians of 
new and harsher terms presented in the form of an ultimatum. The Germans now 
demanded, in addition to the territories they had seized in the course of the war, also 
those they had occupied following the breakdown of the Brest negotiations. The 
evacuation of the Ukraine and Finland was another stipulation. Besides, the Russians 
were to pay a contribution and make a variety of economic concessions. 
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On February 24, Lenin convened the Central Executive Committee and presented a 
report143 on the situation which pointed out two crucial facts. First the Russian army, 
under no condition, could oppose advancing German forces. Secondly, except for the 
capitulation to the German demands, they did lack any other alternatives. In the voting 
that followed he won a victory for his resolution to accept the German ultimatum. 144 
Having received the approval of the Central Executive Committee, Lenin drafted an 
unconditional acceptance of the German ultimatum that was communicated by wireless 
to the Germans. 145 
So far we have dwelt upon the evolution of the Turkish claims from evacuation to 
annexation. Although Talat Pasha followed a moderate approach during the 
negotiations, he was waiting for the appropriate opportunity for putting forward further 
claims regarding the regions of Transcaucasia. In case this would fail, the Turks were 
determined at least to create some buffer states in the Caucasus that were supposed to 
prevent a Russian aggression in the future. In his cable to Enver Pasha on February 1, 
Talat Pasha argued that the Ukrainian independence would enable the establishment of 
Muslim governments in the Crimea and the Caucasus. 146 A member of the Turkish 
delegation at Brest, Ahmet izzet Pasha wrote in his memoirs that together with Rauf 
Bey he persuaded Talat Pasha to work for the realization of this idea. 147 When the talks 
were adjourned some members of the Ottoman delegation, including Talat and Ahmed 
izzet Pashas, came to Warsaw. They met a Georgian there who was a member of the 
Menshevik party in Georgia and concluded with him that both sides would combine 
their forces and work together. It was planned to send this Georgian to istanbul who 
would proceed from there with a Turkish mission to Transcaucasia to work for the 
independence of Georgia. 148 
39 
Nevertheless, two incidents significantly increased the Turkish expectations regarding 
the Caucasus. The first one is undoubtedly the Bolsheviks' acceptance of the harsh 
German demands. The second one is related to the Turkish disappointment arising from 
the course of negotiations with Rumania for the conclusion of peace. Their increasingly 
bitter dispute with Bulgaria over the disposition of the Dobruja and readjustment of 
their common border in Thrace forced the Turks to satisfy some of their ambitions in 
the East. 149 
The Russian delegation reached Brest on March l. Two days later, without further 
discussion, they signed the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 150 The terms of the treaty 
were exceedingly heavy. Russia agreed to give up Poland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania 
and Latvia, as well as parts of Transcaucasia. She was also obliged to recognize the 
Ukraine as an independent republic. Besides, the Russians committed themselves to 
demobilize their army and navy; to desist from agitation and propaganda against the 
governments, armed forces and public institutions of the other signatories; and to 
respect the sovereignty of Persia and Afghanistan. Economic clauses embodied in the 
appendices151 granted Germans exceptional status in Russia. 
During the final round of the talks, in addition to the Turkish requests regarding the 
evacuation of the occupied territories, restoration of the 1877 frontiers between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire and abolition of the capitulations, the Turkish delegation came 
up with new demands. Russia should recognize the formation of an independent 
Muslim state in the Caucasus and guarantee the granted right of self-determination to 
the Muslims in the interiors of the country. 152 On March l Enver Pasha, on behalf of 
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the Turkish Foreign Ministry, informed General von Seeckt of these requests of the 
Turkish government. 153 While a very short period of time previously the Turks were 
complaining of the extreme German demands, 154 now the Germans believed that the 
Turkish demands were unacceptable. Consequently, the German delegation hesitated to 
support the Turkish mission. The Turks th~mselves had to work for their realization. 
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OTTOMAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CAUCASUS (FEBRUARY-
MAY 1918) AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
Article IV of the Russian Treaty ofBrest-Litovsk is as follows: 
" ... Russia will do everything in her power to 
secure immediately the evacuation of the 
Anatolian provinces and their regular return to 
Turkey. 
The districts of Ardahan., Kars, and Batoum shall 
likewise without delay be evacuated by Russian 
troops. Russia shall not interfere in the 
reorganization of the constitutional and 
international affairs of these districts, but shall 
leave it to the population of these districts to carry 
out the reorganization in agreement with the 
neighbouring States, particularly Turkey_" 
Before dealing with the significance of this clause for the Ottoman Empire it is essential 
to dwell on the situation in the Caucasus following the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Colonization has been one of the fundamental phenomena of Russian history. A 
prominent Russian historian, Kliuchevskii wrote: "The history of Russia is the history 
of a country which colonizes."155 Dating from the sixteenth century, Russian 
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expansionist drives brought the state vast territories, stretching from the Baltic Sea to 
the Pacific Ocean_ The Russian Empire, as it appeared in 1917, was the product of 
nearly four centuries of continuos expansion_ According to the first systematic census, 
undertaken in 1897, the majority (55.7 per cent) of the population of the Empire, 
exclusive of the Grand Duchy of Finland, consisted of non-Russians. 156 In the late 
nineteenth century, while the country, experiencing a rapid economic, social and 
intellectual change, essentially needed new and more flexible fonns of administration, 
the government clung to the anachronistic notion of reactionary absolutism_ 
Consequently, besides the alienation of social classes to the regime, the unrest among 
the minorities was also increasing. For Lenin, determined to exploit every possible 
means for the downfall of the Czarist regime, the ferment of the minorities constituted 
an important force in his struggle for power. 157 
A detailed emphasis on the evolution of the Bolshevik thoughts regarding the national 
problem is behind the scope of this research_ However, it is necessary to focus on the 
main tenets of Lenin's theory of self-determination. 
Trying to steer a middle course between the views of Rosa Luxemburg on the one 
hand, and Renner and Bauer on the other, 158 Lenin interpreted the principle of self-
determination as the right to separation and creation of an independent government 
This radical view had been attacked for many years by other party members on the 
basis of an accusation that it preserved the likelihood of Russia disintegrating into its 
national components. Nevertheless, as written by Trotsky, "In this the Bolshevik party 
did not by any means undertake an evangel of separation. It merely assumed an 
obligation to struggle implacably against every form of national oppression, including 
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the forcible retention of this or that nationality within the boundaries of the general 
state. Only in this way could the Russian proletariat gradually win the confidence of the 
oppressed nationalities. "159 Stated differently, whenever the interests of nationality and 
the proletariat conflicted, the former had to yield to the latter and the right to 
separation had to go overboard. 160 In a similar argument, Stalin concluded that the 
principle of self-determination, including secession, was temporary in nature and it was 
necessary to approach the national question from the Soviet viewpoint, subordinating it 
entirely and finally to the interests of the toiling masses organized into soviets. 161 
Besides, Lenin finnly believed that he could use the right of self-determination as a 
psychological weapon in the struggle for power abroad. He realized that "the colonial 
dependencies of the great European powers contained over a billion people who were, 
according to his views, victims not only of capitalist exploitation but also, in a sense, of 
national oppression." Thus socialism could take full advantage of the forces of popular 
dissatisfaction by allying itself with the liberation movements in the colonies. 162 
Having these in mind, the Bolsheviks announced the "Declaration of the Rights of 
Nations of Russia" on November 2, 1917, that granted the peoples of Russia free self-
determination, including the right of separation and the formation of an independent 
state. Before the Bolshevik power seizure, except for Poland and Finland, none of the 
border peoples seemed to be either willing or ready to separate themselves from Russia. 
However, following Finns (December 6, 1917), one ethnic minority after another 
declared independence from Russia. Due to its peculiar features and the "Turkish 
factor," the situation in Transcaucasia was more complicated. 
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The news of the "February Revolution" reached Tillis, the administrative capital of 
Transcaucasia, on March 15 and the very next day the entire fabric of Russian imperial 
authority crumbled. 163 In Baku the situation was not different. Public demonstrations 
were held and workers were calling strikes in support of the revolution. 164 Foil owing 
the abdication of Nicholas II and the Provisional Government's declaration dismissing 
all governors and their deputies, the Imperial Governor-General in Transcaucasia, the 
Grand Duke Nikolas Nikolaevich, resigned his post. On March 22 the Provisional 
Government formed the Special Transcaucasian Committee (the Osobyi Zakavkazskii 
Komitet or Ozakom) to restore order and to introduce civilian rule in Transcaucasia. 
General Yudenich assumed the military functions. Before the local agency of the new 
central government was designated, the workers of Tiflis and Baku had elected their 
own representatives to local soviets. This signified the beginning of dvoevlastie (dual 
power). Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Ozakom was unpopular and lacked 
power to solve any of the important problems that were brought before it, 165 real power 
in Transcaucasia passed to the soviets. Especially those located in Tillis and Baku 
enjoyed more authority than the Ozakom. The soviet alone could bring crowds in to the 
streets, order the soldiers to fire and compel obedience to its decrees. 166 
In comparison to the other regions of Russia, the first year of the Revolution passed in 
Transcaucasia with relative calm. During this period Transcaucasia represented "the 
realization of the Menshevik ideal of a "bourgeois" government (i.e., the Provisional 
Government and the Ozakom) controlled and directed by "proletarian" organs of self-
rule (i.e., soviets)."167 Unlike to the strength of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks were 
very weak and enjoyed little popularity. The enthusiasm of the first days of the 
revolution made the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks forget their factional disputes and 
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reunite into a single Socialist party. During March and April they worked together, but 
some differences of opinion developed shortly. 161 Consequently, the Bolshevik power 
seizure in Petrograd was approved neither by the soviets, nor by the Ozakom nor 
national councils. On November 11, a new organ of government was fonned by the 
heads of the leading political parties under the name Transcaucasian Commissariat 
(ZLlkavkazskii Kommissariat) to replace the defunct Ozakom and exercise authority 
pending the action of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. On November 28 the 
composition of the Commissariat was announced. 169 The Georgian Menshevik, E. P. 
Gegechkori was elected to the presidency. One another Menshevik, two Socialist 
Revolutionaries, four Musavatists, two Dashnaks and one Georgian Federalist were 
members of the Commissariat. 
The Commissariat declared that, being a provisional government, it would attempt to 
solve problems only of the most urgent character. 170 Undoubtedly, most threatening of 
all these problems were the results of the complete disintegration of the Russian anny 
on the Turkish Front. According to the Turkish estimation, the Russian Caucasian anny 
at the beginning of the year 1917 consisted of about 250,000 persons assisted by 470 
cannons and planes given by the British to strengthen Russian military operations. 171 As 
time went on, however, the detrimental effects of the revolutioruuy chaos began also to 
influence the Russian soldiers on the Turkish Front. In the autumn what was left from 
the Russian Caucasian Anny of about 250,000 men was nearly 40,000 soldiers. 172 The 
Polish, Georgian, Armenian and Ukrainian soldiers were called back by their respective 
national organizations to form national regiments. 173 The remaining part of the Russian 
Caucasian anny was not in a position to organize any effective resistance to a Turkish 
advance. Discipline in the anny had almost completely disappeared. The war against 
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Turkey was quite possibly more unpopular than that against Germany and since April 
revolutionary crowds had been demonstrating against the imperialist war. 174 The effects 
of this propaganda were so efficient that the movement of the deserting soldiers gave 
the Bolshevik party in Transcaucasia its first opportunity to gain a mass following. m 
This "Turkish threat" combined with the threat of Bolshevism and the struggle for the 
Caucasian army with the Bolsheviks, forced the Commissariat to take necessary 
measures. The Commissariat issued orders to local soviets to disarm all soldiers 
entering the territory of Transcaucasia. The Armenians and Georgians, meanwhile, 
started to form their national armies. While the Georgians had only an insignificant 
national army of not more than 10,000 men, by 1 January 1918 the Armenian Corps 
consisted of two divisions of Armenian rifles, three brigades of Armenian volunteers 
who were natives of Turkish Armenia, a cavalry brigade and some battalions of militia. 
There was no lack of good equipment because General Yudenich's dissolving army 
provided the Armenians with guns and munitions. 176 
Shortly after the Bolshevik representatives at Brest had signed a general armistice with 
the Central Powers, officers of the Russian Caucasian Army and delegates of the 
Commissariat concluded a separate cease-fire treaty with the Turks at Erzincan 
(December 18, 1917). 177 Although the Erzincan Armistice was the implementation of 
the Article III of the Brest-Litovsk Armistice, Kazemzadeh argues that it was the first 
major act of the Transcaucasian Commissariat that could be interpreted as an act of a 
sovereign govemment. 178 Indeed, the members of the Transcaucasian delegation, 
rejecting the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Armistice on the Eastern Front to be applied to 
the Caucasian Front, were behaving as if they were representing an independent 
Caucasian state. 179 According to the terms of the armistice, both sides immediately 
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suspended their military activities. A demarcation line between the two armies was 
drawn on the basis of their positions on the day of the signing of the armistice. Advance 
notice of two weeks was required if one of the parties should want to break the 
armistice, otherwise it would continue until the signing of a general peace. 
In the second chapter we focused upon the evolution of the Turkish claims from 
evacuation to annexation during the Brest talks. Especially dating from February 1918 
the Turkish delegation openly expressed its desire that the three districts (Kars, 
Ardahan and Batum) should become attached to Turkey. Another curious component 
of the strategy of the Turkish government was the separation of Transcaucasia from 
Russia in order to create buffer states that would prevent Russian aggression in the 
future. Consequently, the Turks endeavored to open separate peace talks with the 
Commissariat in mid-January. On January 14, Vehib Pasha, the commander of the 
Turkish Caucasian Anny, sent a letter to General Odishelidze, the commander of the 
Georgian contingent within the Transcaucasian army, saying that Enver Pasha wanted 
to know how peaceful relations could be established with the "independent government 
of the Caucasus." He proposed to send a Turkish peace delegation to the capital of 
Transcaucasia. 180 Two days later Vehib Pasha, in an another letter to the Georgian 
general, invited Transcaucasian Commissariat to the peace conference at Brest stating 
that the Turks would do everything possible to facilitate the recognition of the new 
state. 181 In its reply to Vehib Pasha's first letter, 182 the Commissariat wrote that 
Transcaucasia was a component part of the Russian Republic and could only negotiate 
on the authoriz.ation of the Russian Constituent Assembly. According to Avalov, the 
Commissariat failed to give a clear answer to the Turkish proposal not only because 
they waited for the convention of the Constituent Assembly, but also the sense of 
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loyalty to the Empire and an obscure feeling of unity with Russian revolutionary 
democracy forced them to think in that way. 183 
The Constituent Assembly was forcefully dispersed by the Petrograd Bolsheviks on 
January 18. The Transcaucasian deputies, after returning home, organized a 
Transcaucasian Diet (Zakavskii Seim) with residence in Tillis. The Diet was composed 
of the representatives of the three major ethnic groups of Transcaucasia. The 
Mensheviks and Musavatists were the largest factions of the Diet, each holding thirty 
seats. The Dashnaktsutiun held twenty-seven seats. Thus, at the beginning of February 
1918 Transcaucasia was on the verge of independence with its possession of a 
legislative body (Seim) and an executive organ (Kommissariat). Nevertheless, none of 
the major political parties was yet prepared to move toward separation and the Socialist 
Revolutionaries (SRs) particularly were suspicious of any separatist tendencies. 184 
The Porte, meanwhile, was anxiously following the Armenian outrages 185 against the 
Muslims in the eastern Anatolia. In the territories that the Russian army had conquered 
and which were now held by Georgian and Armenian military formations, the Muslim 
population was persecuted by the Armenians bent on vengeance. Enver Pasha, on 
January 3 and 6, ordered Vehib Pasha, the Commander of the III Army, to take 
necessary measures to protect the Muslim population of the region from Armenian 
aggressions. The legitimate objective of a would-be advance of the Turkish troops was 
presented by Enver Pasha as an attempt to preserve the contact with the Russian 
forces. 186 Receiving these orders from the general staff, the command of the Third 
Army requested the army corps to prepare for a military operation. 187 However, any 
military activity of the Turkish army on the Caucasian Front was dependent upon the 
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course of the Brest talks. Vehib Pasha, failing to launch a military action, sent several 
notes to Generals Odishelidze and Przhevalskii, requesting them to prevent these 
cruelties. Nevertheless, the massacres continued. 
During the second half of January, Lieutenant Hiisamettin [Tugay] accompanied by an 
Azerbaijani, Naki Bey Seyhzamanh, reached the headquarters of the Turkish Third 
Anny in Su~ehri. HOsamettin Bey, after nearly three years of imprisonment in a Russian 
prisoner camp in the interiors of Russia, managed to escape and before coming to 
Turkey, spent a substantial period of time in Transcaucasia with the Azerbaijanis. In his 
report to Vehib Pasha, 188 he pointed out three important facts regarding the situation in 
the Caucasus: While deserting, the Russian soldiers were leaving a considerable amount 
of munitions and provisions behind (that were passing to the Armenians); the 
Dashnaktsutiun was planning to make a massacre of the Turks in the occupied 
territories; on the basis of the decision taken by all the Azerbaijanian political parties 
and the Azerbaijani National Council in Gence the Azeri Turks were inviting the 
Ottoman army to interfere. The reason Naki Bey was accompanying him was to inform 
the Ottoman authorities formally of this decision of the Azeri Turks. 189 He proposed 
the immediate advance of the Turkish army. This intention of Azeri national leaders 
regarding the Ottoman military interference was strongly supported by popular masses. 
Cafer Seydahmet, a prominent figure in the Crimean Tatar national movement who 
visited Gence in those days, wrote in his memoirs that the Azerbaijanis were 
enthusiastically waiting for Ottoman soldiers. 190 That night Vehib Pasha contacted 
Enver Pasha and the next day he told Hiisamettin Bey the advance of the Turkish 
troops was to be realized on the basis of Hiisamettin Bey's report. 191 On January 23, 
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the Command of the Third Anny ordered the anny corps to prepare for a military 
operation. 192 
The advance of the Turkish troops into the occupied territories began on February 12. 
After capturing Erzincan on February 13 the Turkish troops rapidly advanced eastward 
aJI along the line, encountering only ineffective resistance from some Armenian units. 
On February 24 Trabzon was occupied. Witnessing the advance of the Turkish troops 
the Transcaucasian Commissariat was eager to enter into peace negotiations with the 
Ottoman Empire at the earliest moment. After tackling the problems posed by the 
Turkish advance, on March 1 the Diet unanimously passed a resolution defining the 
principles upon which peace could be made with the Turks. It approved conditions 
which provided for the re-establishment of the Transcaucasian frontier of 1914. 
Besides, it stated that an effort should be made to obtain autonomy for those Armenian 
districts which would pass back to Ottoman rule. 193 The Diet chose a delegation to 
carry on peace negotiations with Turkey, but on February 2 the departure of the 
delegates for Trabzon, the city selected for the negotiations, was postponed. The 
telegram received from Karakhan, a member of the Russian delegation at Brest, stated 
that Russia had decided to accept the German conditions and the Brest-Litovsk peace 
treaty was to be signed on the following day, in accordance with which, Batum, 
Ardahan and Kars were made over to Turkey. Having no information as to the further 
position of the Ottoman government, the delegation was obliged to wait at Titlis until 
an answer was received to a question on the subject, which had been sent to Trabzon to 
Turkish headquarters. 194 The Diet promptly made a declaration, stating that the 
"Government of Transcaucasia" considered any agreement affecting Transcaucasia and 
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its borders and reached without the knowledge and consent of the government as not 
binding and as having no international significance. 195 
On March 7, when a communication was received from General Kolosovsky stating 
that the Turkish delegates were expected on that day, the Transcaucasian delegation set 
out for Batum, crossing from there to Trabzon. On their side, the Transcaucasian 
delegation held that Trabzon constituted a neutral point, which did not lawfully belong 
either to Turkey or to Russia and that, therefore, no conditions of binding character 
could be imposed on the delegation. 196 But on their arrival, the Transcaucasian 
delegation had the unpleasant surprise of learning that on March I 0 Vehib Pasha 
demanded the immediate evacuation of the regions of Batum, Kars and Ardahan. 197 At 
the first meeting held between the presidents thus a written question was presented to 
the Turks asking whether the demand made by Vehib Pasha was an intimation of a 
refusal to continue negotiations. Rauf Bey, the head of the Turkish delegation, replied 
that his mission had come to Trabzon to lay the conditions and requirements of the 
Porte before the Transcaucasians, knowing nothing of the demands ofVehib Pasha. 198 
The talks adjourned on March 13 facing an important dilemma. Although having 
declared to be a component part of the Russian Republic, the Diet announced that 
Transcaucasia did not recognize the Russian Soviet Government and the peace it had 
made in Brest-Litovsk. Consequently, the Turkish delegation was pressing the 
Transcaucasion mission to state definitely and precisely whom it represented. At the 
first official meeting Rauf Bey asked for a true declaration of the nature, form, political-
administrative organization of the government in the Caucasus. t9'J According to the 
Turkish view, Transcaucasia had no right to dispute the validity of the Brest-Litovsk 
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settlement since it had never officially declared its independence from Russia. Ever 
since the Turks had made their first peace moves in the autumn of 1917, Transcaucasia, 
trying to steer a middle course between the two available options (i.e., to declare its 
independence or to continue war), was trying to convince the Turks that Transcaucasia 
was an almost independent state. 200 Accordingly, in the answering declaration, the 
Transcaucasian delegation said ''that, after the [B]olshevik [R]evolution in Caucasia, a 
new and independent government had arisen there, at present responsible to the Diet, 
and that Transcaucasia already constituted an independent government which had 
entered into international relations and which protested against the Brest Peace Treaty, 
which was concluded without its consent, although it had not yet declared itself and no 
notification had been made of its independence, to the powers. "201 On the basis of this 
information, the Turkish delegation asked for official information concerning the form 
of government, the boundaries, the recognized language and religion of the state and 
also for exact information as to the situation and position of the Transcaucasian 
government in relation to the Ottoman Empire. 202 
Before the talks officially started, Rauf Bey received some of the Muslim members of 
the Transcaucasian delegation. In this secret meeting three issues of fundamental 
significance were discussed: All the Caucasian Muslims were waiting for the Ottoman 
army; Bolshevism and Armenian military formations constituted a serious threat for the 
Muslims of the Caucasus; and, the conclusion of peace depended upon the declaration 
of independence of the Diet. Rauf Bey, in his cable to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
concluded that the proclamation of Transcaucasia's independence was essential, 
however, the chance of survival of a republic composed of the Muslims, Georgians and 
the Armenians seemed to be impossible. 203 The divergence of opinions among the three 
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major ethnic groups even reflected among the members of the delegation was justifying 
this argument. In secret meetings with Rauf Bey, while the Georgian members of the 
delegation were stressing that they could soften the Armenian desires in return for 
Batum to themselves, 204 the Armenians were stating that if the Ottoman government 
was to allow the return of the deportees, they would agree to the Ottoman claims to the 
three Transcaucasian districts. 205 
The debates regarding the status of the Transcaucasian government were giving the 
Turks a theoretical justification for continuing their military advance. Towards the end 
of March the Turkish forces reached the prewar Turco-Russian border and crossed it at 
several points. The Transcaucasian delegation, being disturbed by this exchange of 
notes regarding this judicial quarre4 demanded the negotiations to be of a "business 
nature. "206 
Rauf Bey presented the Turkish point of view starkly simple. He argued that because 
the Ottoman government would not consent any Russian demands regarding the 
Caucasus, the question to be decided upon was whether, in the proceeding days, the 
Turkish frontiers would stretch from the Caspian to the Black Sea or a Transcaucasian 
state under the protection of the Ottoman Empire was to be established. 207 On March 
20 the Turkish delegation expressed its desire that Transcaucasia should proclaim its 
independence and declared that the conference had been entered into only for the 
purpose of preparing a basis for economic and commercial relations and deciding their 
practical and technical details. A negative feeling towards the Brest treaty was 
unacceptable. However, the Transcaucasian delegation retained their original point of 
view. At the fifth setting, they repeated the four points decided upon the 
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Transcaucasian Diet on March l. The Ottoman delegation bitterly protested the fourth 
point of this resolution regarding autonomy for those Armenian districts that would 
pass back to Ottoman rule. It constituted an interference to the internal affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire.208 Thereafter, by general consent of both delegations a suspension of 
the conference was announced until the receipt of further instructions from their 
respective governments. On March 22 part of the Transcaucasian delegation returned 
to Tiflis to report to the Diet. 209 
A full-scale debate ensued in the Diet on March 25. Kachaznuni, an Armenian member 
of the Transcaucasian peace delegation, reported that aiming at creating a buffer ~ate 
between Turkey and Russia the Turks demanded the proclamation of Transcaucasia's 
independence. However, because they were not sure whether it could survive against 
Russia they wanted to keep Kars and Batum for themselves. Another member of the 
peace · delegation, a Muslim, added that if independence were not proclaimed the 
Muslims would not support the Diet.210 The Georgian and Armenian representatives of 
the Diet argued that attempts should be made to obtain the support of either Britain or 
Germany against the Turkish advance.211 Needing time, the Diet decreed that 
Chkhenkeli, the head of the Transcaucasian mission, was given full power to take 
independently any steps ''to abide by its decision regarding the question of peace terms 
with Turkey, but to attempt to make an honourable peace, acceptable to the Caucasus 
and Turkey. "212 
After the Bolshevik Revolution the primary concern of the Entente powers became the 
ongoing disintegration of the Russian army. This posed three dangers for the Entente: 
the transfer of divisions by the Central Powers to other fronts, primarily to the West~ 
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the enemy acquisition of large amounts of military equipment, Russia was supplied with 
from the beginning of the war by its allies;213 and, the opportunity of penetrating deep 
into the interiors of Russia that would enable Germany and its allies to reach some vital 
raw materials, including petroleum. For Britain thus, the Caucasus acquired a particular 
importance. It did not only possess countless raw materials, but it also was strategically 
vital to its powers in India, Afghanistan and Persia. From the British point of view, as 
far as the south Russian and Caucasian territories were concerned, Bolshevism had 
merely cleared the way for the Germans and the Turks. 214 Having these in mind, the 
British government encouraged the Christian nations of the regions to erect a firm 
barrier against the Turks. 215 Allied military attaches, agents and intelligent officers were 
actively aiding the Transcaucasian government to form such a bloc. Nevertheless, for 
the time being, nothing could be done to prevent Turco-German penetration into 
Transcaucasia. Consequently, when the Diet sounded out once again the possibility of 
the Allied help against the enemy, before submitting to some of the Turkish demands, it 
was soon realized that it was useless to expect help from England, France or United 
States. 216 It was Major-General Lionel C. Dunsterville, who was appointed chief of the 
British mission to the Caucasus and also British representative at Tillis in January 
1918217 under the mission of "reorganizing the broken units of Russian, Georgian and 
Armenian soldiery and restoring the battle-line against the Turkish invasion,"218 who 
partially succeeded in organizing a resistance against the Turkish advance. 
In his memoirs, Major-General Dunsterville expressed his views with regard to the 
situation in Tillis and the Georgians as follows: 
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"The inhabitants of Tillis read their Reuters and 
compared them with the glorious revelations of 
the German wireless: Obviously Germany was 
going to win the war. "Therefore why should we 
have the British here to prolong matters ? Let the 
Turks take the country: we look to a victorious 
and magnanimous Germany to protect us from 
Turkish excesses and to turn them out again when 
the war is over. The Turkish invasion is only a 
temporary inconvenience from which the Germans 
will later relieve us.,, Such was undoubtedly the 
Tillis train of thought, especially among the 
Georgian population."219 
Although, for the time being, exaggerated, these arguments of Dunsterville were not 
baseless. Indeed, there was a strong "German orientation" among the Georgian 
population. However, Germany at that time was so busy with the dispute between 
Bulgaria and Turkey over the disposition of Dobruja and readjustment of their common 
border in Thrace that it was forced to follow a very moderate approach with regard to 
Turkish wishes in the Caucasus. The German ambassador to Turkey, Bemstorft: 
pointed out the danger this dispute between the two allies posed to the German 
interests. 220 On March 15, in his cable to General von Seeckt, General Ludendorff 
stated that the Turks had to satisfy their ambitions in the East 221 When the talks 
adjourned at Trabzon, German position thus was based upon a policy of "wait-and 
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see." Kuhlmann was of the opinion that until the appropriate moment rape enough for 
an interference both sides had to be left alone. 222 
In the first days of April the pressure of the Turkish Caucasian army, strengthened 
through the transfer of the Turkish troops from the Rumanian Front towards the end of 
March, 223 intensified. The Georgian military formations were slowly retreating from 
Batum, while the Armenians were on the verge of losing the district of Kars, the key 
position in the defense of the Caucasus. Combined with the deteriorating relations 
between the Armenians and the Muslims as a result of the March events in Baku and 
the rising power of the Bolsheviks, this situation on the front forced the Diet to make 
its first concession. On April 5 the Transcaucasian peace delegation offered the Turks 
some territory in the districts ofKars and Ardahan and rephrased their original demands 
regarding the status of the Armenians in Turkey. Nevertheless, they continued to refuse 
to recognize the validity of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.224 The Turks in response issued an 
ultimatum on April 6 that restated their view that only the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
could serve as a basis for further negotiations and requested the Transcaucasian 
delegation to return a definite answer within the next forty-eight hours. 225 Chkhenkeli 
contacted his government and stressed that the Turks should be informed of the 
maximum concessions Transcaucasia would be willing to make. He advised to accept 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk only when all the other means of reaching an agreement 
had been exhausted.226 The Diet accepted Chkhenkeli's advice. However, two days 
later, when Chkhenkeli admitted that the tactics of the Transcaucasian delegation had 
failed and urged the proclamation of independence, the Diet hesitated to do this. 
Without awaiting further instructions,227 Chkhenkeli informed the Turkish delegation 
on April 10 that the Transcaucasian mission was accepting the Brest-Litovsk treaty and 
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was ready to cany on further negotiations on this basis. 228 The declaration of the 
Transcaucasian delegation requesting that Turkey's allies should take part in the 
negotiations for a fuendly conference was refused by the Ottoman delegation. 
According to the statement of Rauf Bey, in order to make it possible for the 
representatives of the other Central Powers to join the talks, Transcaucasia had to 
proclaim its independence. n 9 
Though the decision of the Transcaucasion delegation to accept the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk had been unanimous, 230 there appeared bitter discussions in the Diet. Except 
for Azerbaijanis, the members of the Diet recommended to follow a more radical 
approach. 231 Consequently, on April 14 Gegechkori telegraphed Chkhenkeli to 
terminate negotiations and to leave Trabzon.232 The Diet risked the war with Turkey. It 
published an appeal to the peoples of Transcaucasia, explaining its policy: "The 
destinies of our common fatherland are at stake ... we are confronted with the choice: 
either a shameful peace or slavery, or war ... That choice we made without hesitation. 
We did not sign a shameful peace, and peace negotiations were broken off From now 
on the conflict must be decided by force of arms on the battlefield. "233 Nevertheless, the 
weak attempts at resistance by the Georgian and Armenian troops could not stop the 
victorious march of the Turkish army. Batum, the third largest city in Transcaucasia, 
fell on April 15. Between the Turkish army and Tiflis stood only a handful of loyal 
Russian troops and a few Armenian volunteer detachments. On April 22, in his cable to 
Chkhenkeli, Vehib Pasha accused Transcaucasia of breaking the Trabzon negotiations 
and stated that the question of peace depended entirely upon Transcaucasia. He asked 
whether the Transcaucasian government wanted to resume the peace talks. 234 The 
sensitive premises were pressing for the acceptance of the Turkish proposal. At the 
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session of the Diet on April 22 two resolutions were accepted: a proposal to the 
Turkish government to resume negotiation and a formal declaration of the 
independence of Transcaucasia. 235 The Turkish government accepted both resolutions 
on April 27 and peace discussions reopened at Batum on May 11. 
The Batum Conference took place on May 11, 1918. The Turkish delegation was 
chaired by Halil Bey, Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. He 
was accompanied by Vehib Pasha. The Transcaucasian delegation of forty-five persons, 
headed by Chkhenkeli, included representatives of all political parties and factions of 
Transcaucasia because no one trusted anyone else. 236 Halil Bey informed the 
Transcaucasian delegation that the Ottoman government was no longer satisfied with 
the Brest-Litovsk settlement and would claim some additional territories east of the 
1877 border line, since it was Transcaucasia who had broken the negotiations at 
Trabzon and had replied to the original Turkish proposals by armed resistance. In a 
Turkish draft treaty, consisting of twelve articles237 and three appendices, Ottoman 
territorial demands included the Aluska and the Ahilkelek districts where the Muslim 
population was already ready to proclaim independence in accordance with Lenin's 
right of self determination, city of Giimrti [ Aleksandropol], the larger part of the 
Ecrniyadzin district, as well as the control of Giimrii-Culfa railway. To accept the 
cession of the Armenian districts like GumrO meant to give Armenia to the Turks. 238 
The Turkish claims were in full accordance with Talat Pasha's views that neither the 
Armenians nor the Georgians should be allowed to remain powerful. 239 Nevertheless, 
the Turkish government was at the same time worried about the possibility that the 
harsh Turkish demands would cause an alignment between the Georgians and 
Armenians. The Azerbaijani delegates at the conference warned Halil Bey that this 
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posed a vital threat to the Muslims of the Caucasus. Consequently, Halil Bey, under the 
instructions from istanbul, proposed to the Georgi.ans the partition of the Armenian 
territories between the Porte and Tiflis. The Georgi.ans refused. 2A0 
While discussions were held amongst the badly divided members of the Transcaucasian 
delegation regarding these Turkish claims, the Turks suddenly broke the existing 
armistice and marched into the regions they claimed. Ottoman troops entered Giimlii 
on May 15. 241 They continued to move beyond Gomrii in the direction of Lori and 
Tillis. The new military objective was Baku. Consequently, realizing that they could 
take by force what Transcaucasia refused to give up at the conference tables, on May 
26 Halil Bey issued a new ultimatum, claiming this time the district of Nahcivan. 
Avalov wrote that allegedly the Turks were motivated by the desire to come to the 
rescue of the Muslim population of Transcaucasia, especially Baku. Chkhenkeli was 
given seventy-two hours to answer the uhimatum. 242 Enver Pasha ordered the 
command of the Turkish army to advance towards Tiflis, in case the Turkish ultimatum 
be rejected. 243 
At Batum, seeing their inefficiency to resist the Ottoman claims, the Georgian members 
of the delegation were seeking ways to involve Germany in the negotiations. It was 
believed the use of German prestige and authority could contain the Turks. 244 When the 
Transcaucasian delegation suggested that the treaty should be concluded not between 
Turkey and Transcaucasia alone, but rather between the Quadruple Alliance on the one 
side and Transcaucasia on the other, however, the Turkish delegation strongly refused 
this idea, saying that they could not recognize the right of Transcaucasia to express 
itself on the matter of who was or was not going to sign the peace treaty. 245 The Tiflis 
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government then turned to General von Lossow who had been sent by the German 
government to the conference to make sure that the German interests in the region 
would be properly respected by the Turks. 246 On May 18 when the negotiations had 
reached a deadlock, von Lossow offered Gennan mediation. His efforts at mediation 
proved futile, especially since the Azerbaijanis strongly opposed this act and refused to 
become involved in a German-sponsored settlement. 247 
Facing the increasing pressure of the Turkish army, on May 21, a meeting was held 
among the representatives of the three major nationalities of the Transcaucasian 
delegation to discuss what to do. When the Azerbaijanis argued that it seemed to be 
very difficult for the Republic of Transcaucasia to survive the present crisis and, 
instead, a "dual state" should be established, the Georgians replied that if such a blow 
befell Transcaucasia, Georgia would consider itself free to act as it pleased.™ The next 
day when the Georgian delegates met alone to discuss their next step, it was decided 
that Germany was the only hope of Georgia's salvation. Once Georgia was 
independent, she could invite the Germans to protect her against the Turks. 249 Indeed, 
the turn toward Germany was defended by Georgian leaders as the only alternative left 
after Russian withdrawal and Turkish advance. 250 On May 24 in a secret meeting 
between the Georgians and von Lossow an agreement was reached. 251 The next day, in 
his cable to Tillis, Chkhenkeli wrote that the German representative to the Georgian 
government would be Count Schulenburg and a series of agreements with Gennany 
was ready to be signed.252 On May 26, 1918, the Georgian National Council issued a 
declaration of independence. Two days later the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis 
followed the suit. The Confederation was formally dissolved. While the Georgians 
turned to Germany for protection, the Azerbaijanis looked to Turkey. 
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On May 31 the Porte issued an ultimatum to the Georgian govermnent in which it 
demanded the immediate Georgian acceptance of the Turkish peace tenns. The Turks, 
moreover, asked that a definite answer to their uhirnatum be given not later than the 
midnight of 31st May. The Georgians, not feeling strong enough to defy the Turks, 
promptly replied. The Georgian govermnent agreed that its southern frontier be 
determined by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk; announced its willingness to let Turkey use 
its railways; and, accepted in principle the separation of Ahtska and Ahilkelek. :m On the 
basis of these principles, on June 4 the peace treaty was concluded between Georgia 
and the Ottoman Empire. In the treaty, the Georgian government abandoned its claim 
to two districts of Ahtska and Ahilkelek and accepted various limitations of its 
sovereign rights such as the Turkish right to use and if necessary to protect with their 
own troops the Georgian railroad lines or the Georgian obligation for determining the 
size of their army by an agreement with the Porte. In the Turco-Armenian treaty, signed 
on the same day, the terms the Turks imposed on the Armenian government were more 
severe. There were huge territorial losses, including Kars, Ardahan, parts of the district 
of Ecmiyadzin, as well as the larger part of the district of Nahcivan. Besides, the 
Armenian govermnent was forced to accept the continuation of the Ottoman control of 
the GUmrti-Culfa railroad line. The third treaty that the Porte concluded on June 4 was 
with Azerbaijan. It reflected a spirit of solidarity. Besides the promise of economic aid, 
under the Article IV of the treaty it was agreed that Azerbaijan would receive Ottoman 
military assistance for restoration of security and order. 254 This was an obvious 
reference to the recovery of Baku. 
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THE DIPLOMA TIC MISSION OF GALiP KEMALi BEY, THE OTTOMAN 
AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW (APRIL-AUGUST 1918) 
In 1917 Galip Kemali Bey was a forty-four-year-old career diplomat with considerable 
experience in Ottoman diplomacy. He came from a wealthy family whose members 
filled important administrative posts within the Ottoman ruling oligarchy. Before having 
been appointed to Moscow, he had spent a substantial period of time ( 1902-1911) in 
Bucharest as the first secretary of the Ottoman embassy. Thereafter he had served as 
councilor in the Ottoman embassies. in Athens and Berlin. Particularly his activities in 
Athens (i.e., his warnings of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry regarding the Balkan 
alliance against Turkey) helped him improve his career. After the Balkan Wars he was 
promoted to the Ottoman ambassador to the capital of Greece. In 1917 he was 
appointed to Teheran, but the fever of Russian affairs destined him to go to the East.255 
In his books256 written in the Republican years he particularly stressed that he had never 
been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, though he ebulliently praised 
the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Nevertheless, as claimed by Kurat, 257 the 
significance of this mission to Bolshevik Russia proves that he should be an ardent pan-
Turkist and a diplomat who gained the confidence of Talat and Enver Pashas. 
The first time Galip Kemali Bey went to Russia was in December 1917 when he headed 
the Turkish rnission2511 that was to arrange an exchange of civilian prisoners of war and 
the resumption of economic and cultural ties. The decision regarding a 'joint 
committee" for that purpose was taken during the armistice talks at Brest. 
Paradoxically, however, until arriving in Petrograd neither the Turkish government nor 
the members of the delegation were aware of the exact purpose of this mission. 259 
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Count Mirbach, who since the armistice had been in the Russian capital negotiating 
agreements on the matter in question, informed the Ottoman delegation of the purpose 
of this joint committee. Only Enver Pasha seemed to have a definite expectation from 
the Turkish delegation. In his visit to Enver Pasha before his departure for Petrograd, 
Enver Pasha wanted Galip Kemali Bey to collect in Petrograd as much information as 
possible regarding the situation of Ottoman war prisoners in Russia and ordered to give 
him 50,000 lira to be used for this purpose.260 
Among other things the main concern of Germany as well as Austria-Hungaiy was the 
opening and regulations of commercial relations without any delay_ However, the 
attitude of the Russian delegates in Petrograd was not contradictory to that of the 
Russian mission at Brest talks_ After the initial sessions the representatives of the 
Central Powers soon realized that the primary aim of the Bolsheviks was to play for 
time, while fanning the flames of revolution in Germany and particularly amongst the 
German soldiers on the front_ The Bolshevik delegation thus refrained to enter into any 
engagements regarding the economic relations, but an agreement was signed on F eh_ 9, 
1918 between the two sides concerning the exchange of civilian prisoners of war.261 
This was of particular importance for the Ottoman government, since Russian 
authorities, following the occupation of eastern Anatolia, departed some Muslim 
residents of the region and of the three districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, chiefly 
the Ajarians, into the interiors of Russia. The treatment of the Ajarians by the Russian 
government at that time evoked a harsh reaction of the Muslims of Russia_ The Muslim 
Fraction of the Duma presented a report for a general questioning in the parliament and 
this report was published by if_ In the proceeding days other Muslim newspapers 
republished that article. In a very short period of time the issue turned to be the 
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common cause of all the Muslims in Russia. Under the organiz.ation of ii millions were 
collected to extend aid to the Ajarians. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
disturbed by these developments and pressed by the Georgians and Armenians, decided 
to close down the ii after a short investigation. The decision was implemented on 
March 27, 1915.262 Suffice it to say that the Turkish claim to the three districts ofKars, 
Ardahan and Batum made the issue of the return of civilian prisoners of war particularly 
sensitive for the Ottoman government, while the notion of plebiscite was increasingly 
pronounced at Brest. Additionally, among those civilians who were interned in the 
prisoner camps in the Far East were Ottoman citizens, mainly from the Black Sea 
region, who settled before the war along the Russian Black Sea coast, primarily in the 
Crimea, for business purposes. 
Until 1917 the living conditions of the Ottoman prisoners of war in Russian camps were 
extremely bad. According to a report concerning the camp in Saratov, the Turks settled 
there were suffering serious shortages of food and clothing. 263 The worse of all the 
camps, however, was on the island of Nargin in the Caspian Sea. The report of a 
commission investigating the camp in Nargin pointed out the danger the health 
conditions posed to the lives of the prisoners. 264 Mehmed Asaf, a Turkish prisoner of 
war interned in. a small town near Kazan, wrote in his memoirs that they contacted a 
member of the Ottoman delegation whose name he did not mention. This person 
recommended them not to escape since the Ottoman prisoners of war, small in amount 
in comparison to the Germans and Austrians, were to be subject to the first 
exchange. 265 The Ottoman mission could not manage to include the Turks to the first 
exchange program, since the transport of them heavily depended upon the will of the 
Germans, but with the agreements concluded with the Bolshevik delegation, substantial 
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improvement was achieved with regard to the living conditions of Ottoman prisoners of 
war. Besides, the Ottoman delegation succeeded in securing the return of some invalid 
Turkish prisoners to their homes. 266 In an another agreement, this permission was also 
granted to those who were younger than 16 and elder than 45 years old.267 
Besides this issue of prisoners of war, another achievement of the Ottoman delegation 
of crucial importance was the contacts they established with the Muslims of Russia. 
The Muslims of Russia warmly welcomed the Ottoman delegation. Following the visit 
of a group of Muslims of different ethnic origins, including Alim.can Barudi Efendi, the 
mufti of Kazan, and the imam of Great Mosque in Petrograd, and their performance of 
Friday prayer together,268 Galip Kemali Bey wrote to Talat Pasha that the prestige of 
the Ottoman Empire among the Muslims of Russia was very strong. 269 In the 
proceeding days, due to the relations of Remzi Bey who had been to Russia some time 
ago270 and Yusuf Ak:yura, these contacts of the Ottoman delegation with the Muslims 
of Russia widened although they were strictly controlled by the Bolsheviks. 271 
The Muslims in the interiors of Russia who were affiliated by the right of self-
determination appealed to the Ottomans for help. In the Tatar country of the Volga and 
in Turkestan the Bolshevik threat to Muslim unity was greater than anywhere else. In 
March 1917, the Muslim deputies of the Fourth Duma set up the Central Provisional 
Bureau for the Muslims of Russia. On May l the Bureau convened the First (post-
revolutionary) Congress of the Muslims at Moscow. During this meeting delegates 
were divided into two groups: those for federation and those for centraliz.ation. While 
the former, represented by the Caucasians, the Turkestan.is, the Crimeans and a few 
Tatars, advocated the federal principle, the latter, comprising primarily the Tatars of the 
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Volga basin, supported the notion of the extraterritorial cultural autonomy of the 
Muslims in a unified, but democratic Russia. The federalists won by 446 votes to 
271. 272 The Second Congress of the Muslims of Russia was convened by the Tatar 
leaders at Kazan in July 1917.273 Compared to the first one, the attendance to the 
second congress was very weak. Only the Tatars and the North Caucasians were 
present, with a few Crimeans and Bashkirs. The delegates proclaimed the national 
cultural autonomy of the Turks and Tatars of Russia and Siberia. In accordance with 
the plan of Muslim military units, Barbi Sura was set up to raise military formations. 
Milliidare was formed at Ufa to give effect to this autonomy. In the proceeding days 
Milli idare paved the way for a national assembly and the Millet Meclisi assembled in 
Ufa on December 4.274 There were two main factions within this assembly that 
consisted of 120 representatives: territorialists and turkists.275 While the former, 
comprising primarily some officers, soldiers, the representatives of the Harbi Sura, 
young revolutionary or socialist writers, teachers and a few Bolshevik Tatars, were not 
satisfied with the notion of the extraterritorial cultural autonomy, the latter, chiefly 
represented by the progressive mollas and elder intellectuals, retained their original 
point of view with regard to the centraliz.ation. A full-scale debate ensued in the Millet 
Meclisi following the draft project of Alimcan Seref concerning a Tatar-Bashkir 
national state (idil-Ural Devleti). After bitter discussions, the assembly set up a 
committee to work out the implementation of this project. A significant event, 
however, occurred at the Second Military Congress of the Muslims of Russia, opened 
at Kazan on Feb. 8, 1918. The congress confirmed the decision to create this national 
state. 276 Galip Kemali Bey wrote in his memoirs that, following this military congress, 
the Ottoman delegation was informed of the decision of the Millet Meclisi in Ufa to 
send its representatives to Brest. 277 He added that even the '1(hanates of Bukhara and 
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Khiva" appealed to join the peace talks. 278 The realization of these demands was, for 
the time being, behind the scope of the mandate in hand. Seeking other ways, Galip 
Kernali Bey proposed to the Ottoman government to give some of the Ottoman 
prisoners of war to the service of the Muslims in Turkestan, the Crimea and the 
Caucasus279 to help organize their military formations. 
The Turkish mission left Petrograd for Berlin on February 15. They did not have 
enough time to improve these relations, but their reports would have a great impact on 
the evaluation of the Ottoman leaders regarding the situation in Russia. Consequently, 
during the final stage of the talks at Brest, the Ottoman delegation would demand the 
guarantee of the right of self-determination to the Muslims in the interiors of the 
country. As mentioned before, the Ottoman delegation failed to receive the support of 
its allies, therefore, they made new maneuvers. They succeeded in including a provision 
to the treaty stating that the Muslims of Russia were granted the "right of free and safe 
migration" to the Ottoman Empire. When Galip Kernali Bey came to Moscow towards 
the end of Apri~ this time as the Ottoman ambassador to Soviet Russia, he would base 
his entire strategy with regard to the Muslims of Russia upon different interpretations 
of this term of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. However, one thing was clear: the Ottoman 
Empire would play the role of the protector of these people before the Bolsheviks. 
On Apr. 23, 1918 the train of Count von Mirbach, the unfortunate German ambassador 
to Bolshevik Russia, arrived in Moscow,280 carrying also the Turkish diplomatic staff 
The Germans were the first foreign mission accredited to Bolshevik Russia. They took 
over a luxurious private residence on Denezhnyi Pereulok, off Arbat, the property of a 
German who wanted to keep it out of Communist hands. The Turkish mission was 
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settled temporarily in a palace of a Russian aristocrat. The first impressions of both 
ambassadors are of particular interest. Mirbach, a few days after his arrival, reported to 
Berlin that the supremacy of the Bolsheviks in Moscow was principally upheld by the 
"Livonian" battalions and then also by the large number of motor vehicles requisitioned 
by the government. It was impossible to see where these conditions would lead; for the 
moment one could only say that they bid fair to remain much of the same. 281 Galip 
Kemali Bey, in turn, wrote to the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, that 
the situation in Moscow as well as in Petrograd was under the control of the 
Bolsheviks. However, under no conditions the Bolsheviks could resist a foreign 
aggression, particularly that of the Germans.282 
On April 26 Galip Kemali Bey was received by lakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov, the head 
of the Executive Committee (Ispolnitenyi Komitet or Ispolkom for short) to present his 
letter of credentials. Chicherin and Karakhan were also present. This meeting was 
reflecting precisely the spirit of relations between the two countries that would shape 
the course of the diplomatic mission of Galip Kemali Bey in the following months. 
When the Turkish ambassador wanted to stress the friendship between Russia and 
Turkey, Sverdlov replied that it would be useless to speak of a friendship since the 
Turkish army was launching military operations in the Caucasus. Accordingly, Sverdlov 
requested Galip Kernali Bey to report to the Turkish government to stop this violation 
of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The Ottoman ambassador answered that he knew nothing 
of the military operations in the Caucasus. If this was true, the reason of these 
operations was undoubtedly related to the intention of the Ottoman government to 
protect the Muslim population from Armenian aggressions. 283 In the proceeding days 
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this argumentation would constitute Galip Kemali Bey's official diplomatic line with 
regard to the military operations of the Turkish anny. 
In May, due to the continuing advance of Ottoman troops across the lines fixed by the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire rapidly 
deteriorated. Particularly, the talks at Trabzon and the proclamation of independence of 
Transcaucasia raised the danger of further complications with the Bolsheviks. On May 
8 Galip Kernali Bey, as part of a move to hinder more distrust, sent a note to Chicherin 
stating that the proposal regarding the peace negotiations was initiated by 
Transcaucasia. Allegedly, in accordance with the Article IV of the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty, the Ottoman government decided to determine its northern border, if possible 
by peaceful means, and accepted this proposal. 234 Three days later the Bolsheviks 
applied to the German ambassador to Moscow, stressing that the Bolshevik 
government did not recognize the independence of Transcaucasia and the negotiations 
regarding the arrangements on the Turkish front should be carried on with Moscow. 285 
In his letter to von Bussche on March 1918, Count Bernstorff was complaining of the 
approach of the German Supreme Command with regard to Turkey's kaukasische 
Politik. According to the ambassador, the Germans, failing to clarify what they 
themselves wanted, supported the Turks unconditionally.286 This line of the German 
ambassador is in full accordance with the views of a scholar who investigated the 
period. Zurrer argues the fact that the German government failed to clarify at the 
Trabzon talks how far the Turkish territorial, economic and political demands with 
regard to Transcaucasia could extend was a serious mistake. 287 The German 
government at first had no particular objections to the spread of Ottoman influence 
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amongst the Muslims of Transcaucasia. As April proceeded, however, the 
disintegration of the Transcaucasian Confederation and the continuing advance of 
Ottoman troops across the Turco-Russian border of 1877 were watched with growing 
alarm in Berlin. There were several factors Germany was worried about. First and 
foremost, however, the German government was disturbed by the Porte's apparent 
determination to bring all of Transcaucasia under its control. Particularly in May 
German anxieties increased. General von Lossow warned Berlin that the Turks were 
obviously attempting to gain the control of the entire Caucasus region. 2118 This 
conflicted with Germany's own ambitions in the region that offered valuable economic 
opportunities for German business and industry. Millions were spent for the formation 
of a friendly Transcaucasian state that would enable the Germans to reach Central 
Asia.289 Consequently, when the German aim at preserving, under German tutelage, 
the Transcaucasian state, with Georgia at the center, failed, the German-Georgian 
relations rapidly acquired a form of an exclusive German political and economic 
dominance in Tillis. The agreement concluded at Poti between Georgia and Germany 
following the proclamation of Georgian independence gave the Germans such rights as 
the free circulation of German money in Georgia or the use of Georgian railways for 
the transportation of men and materials, for which purpose the port of Poti as well as 
all railroad stations were to be occupied by German troops. Lossow, in turn, pledged 
himself in writing to do everything in his power to mobilize Berlin's support to the 
young republic in gaining recognition as well as in the delineation of her borders. 290 On 
June 3 two German battalions arrived in Poti. Nevertheless, Germany had neither 
sufficient military power nor any other means to stop the Turkish advance. 
Consequently, the German government decided to concentrate on the consolidation of 
the Georgian state. 
72 
Berlin was also of the opinion that the military developments in Mesopotamia and 
Persia required an immediate concentration of Ottoman troops on those theaters of 
war. On may 25 Ludendorff wrote to General von Seeckt that the Turkish 
government, in pursuit of political interests in other areas, neglected the defence of its 
own national territory and was causing the Germans troubles in the Caucasus. 291 For 
more than twenty years the Near East occupied the cornerstone in Berlin's Drang nach 
Osten. There were vast resources of some of the most essential raw materials in the 
Near East, including petroleum. With the peaceful penetration into the region, it was 
assumed that Germany could become an economically self-sufficient unit, freed from 
dependence upon British sea power. The Bagdad Railway project that was supposed to 
help the Germans to appropriate some of the region's enormous wealth speedily 
became an integral part of the national Weltanschauung.m. Undoubtedly, one of the 
long-tenn causes of the First World War had been the imperialistic competition among 
the Great Powers regarding the control of the region. However, in 1918 the Ottomans 
had withdrawn in various theaters of war in the Near East. Such crucial cities as 
Jerusalem and Bagdad were lost to the British. For Germany, the loose of the region 
was unacceptable. In creating a new operational force, the Ninth Army, under the 
command of Y akup ~evki Pasha, and giving it the operational direction of Northern 
Persia, Enver Pasha pretended to satisfy German general headquarters. This, however, 
did not calm the Germans. Besides, the Gem1a11 government feared that the Turks, 
satisfied with their gains in the Caucasus, could conclude a separate peace with the 
British. 293 
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Another concern of Berlin was the fact that the crossing of the Ottoman army of the 
lines fixed by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty raised the danger of complications with the 
Bolshevik government in Moscow. It was feared in Berlin that the advance of Ottoman 
troops would endanger the Brest settlement. 294 The German government indeed was 
very prudent in his policy towards Moscow ·regarding the Caucasus. During the 
negotiations in Baturn, for solving Transcaucasia's relations with Russia, Germany 
proposed to act as a mediator between Moscow and Tillis. There were even talks 
between the two sides regarding the Russian participation in the Batum Conference, 
although Russia continued to refuse to recognize the "self-styled government" of 
Transcaucasia. 295 The Turks, in contrast, hardly cared much about the Bolshevik 
government in Moscow. In his cable to Halil Bey on May 24, Talat Pasha argued that if 
Russia were to be as strong as in the past, Turkey could do nothing. However, because 
Russia was not in a position to resist the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus, Turkey 
should exploit this opportunity to the fullest extent. 296 The primary aim of the Ottoman 
government thus became the acquisition of as much territory as possible and the 
separation of Transcaucasia from Russia in order to create buffer states that would 
prevent Russian aggression in the future. Ottomans were not satisfied merely with 
Transcaucasia and external factors provided them with new opportunities. This was the 
case with regard to the new Muslim republic established in the North Caucasus. 
The proclamation of independence of the North Caucasian Mountaineers' Republic on 
May 11, 1918,2-n and, upon its request to the Ottoman government,298 the inclusion of 
its delegates to the talks at Batum added fuel to the smoldering fire. Even before this 
declaration of independence the Ottoman authorities were seeking ways of including 
the representatives of the North Caucasus to peace negotiations with Transcaucasia. 
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Vehib Pasha was of the opinion that this would enable the Ottomans in the p~ding 
days to help the North Caucasians materially.299 Following the independence, the 
representatives of this newly created republic in istanbul promptly applied to Enver 
Pasha for an alliance between the two countries to form a powerful bloc against 
Russian aggression in the future. 300 This opened the way for possible Turkish 
intervention on behalf of the North Caucasian Muslims. Consequently, neither the 
Germans, 301 nor the Bolsheviks granted it recognition. On May 30 Chicherin sent a 
note to Galip Kemali Bey claiming that this "organization" which proclaimed the 
independence of the North Caucasus lacked a popular support.302 The day after 
Chicherin applied to the German government and repeated the same argument. 303 
Another source of further complications in relations, indeed a stronger one than that of 
the North Caucasus or Transcaucasia, became the Turkish advance toward the Caspian 
Sea. Ottoman troops entered Giimrii on May 25 and continued to move in the direction 
of Lori and Tiflis. The occupation of Giimrii made it clear that the new military 
objective was Baku. The Ottoman hastiness for Baku stemmed from several factors. 
Troops of the Baku Soviet, after having succeeded in defeating the anti-soviet Muslim 
forces within the city in March, pulled back the forces of Imam Gotsinskii from 
Dagestan, the north Caucasian allies of the Baku Muslims, and continued their push 
westward, in the direction of Gence. 304 There appeared a strong need of an immediate 
Ottoman assistance to the Muslims of the region before it would be too late. The 
Ottoman government was also concerned of the danger of a British invasion of Baku. 
Towards the end of June a further source .of anxiety became the increasing activities 
and propaganda of the Armenians in Berlin and particularly in Moscow. Galip Kemali 
Bey, in his cable to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry on June 20, noted the need for an 
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immediate occupation of Baku since it was necessary to break the Armenian resistance 
in the Caucasus. 305 On July 25 Galip Kernali Bey once again urged the immediate 
occupation of Baku. He added that because this would enable to break the connection 
between Moscow and the local Bolsheviks, it would be extremely easy to impose their 
tenns upon the Bolsheviks. 306 
The Bolshevik government disturbed by the apparent determination of the Ottoman 
army to bring Baku under the control of Turkey appealed to the Ottoman ambassador 
at Moscow. On May 28 Chicherin sent a note to Galip Kemali Bey protesting the 
advance of the Turkish anny towards Baku. It was particularly stressed that the 
renunciation of the three districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum in the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty was realized by the Soviet government "as a great sacrifice." Therefore, any 
other claims of the Ottoman government were unacceptable.307 The next day Galip 
Kemali Bey, in his reply to Chicherin, wrote that he knew nothing of the military 
operations of the Turkish army in the Caucasus.308 Facing this diplomatic answer of the 
Ottoman ambassador and their helplessness before the Turks, the Soviet government 
made new maneuvers. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs applied to the 
German government that eastern Transcaucasia was part of Russia and the advance of 
Ottoman troops constituted a violation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.309 Additionally, the 
Baku Soviet issued two declarations on May 2<)310 and June 1311 appealing to the 
people to defend the soviet power by armed resistance. Being worried about these 
developments and the rumors in Moscow regarding the realignment of the Red Anny 
and the Entente, Galip Kemali Bey, in his cable to the Ottoman Foreign Minister on 
June 4, stressed the necessity to find an immediate solution to this problem of the 
Caucasus. 312 
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At the beginning of June, due to these sensitive premises, the disagreements with the 
Germans regarding the Turkish aspirations in the Caucasian affairs were steadily 
increasing. On June 8 Ludendorff sent an extremely surly message to Enver Pasha 
calling the Ottoman government to respect the borders fixed by the Brest Treaty since 
otherwise the Germans had to reserve the right to take further decisions. 313 The next 
day Hindenburg followed up with another message to Enver Pasha stating that the 
German Supreme Command expected the Ottoman army to withdraw forthwith to the 
borders fixed at Brest-Litovsk.314 Enver Pasha took two measures as a skillfully 
conceived political move to counter the Germans. In his reply to these aforementioned 
messages he noted that the demand regarding an Ottoman withdrawal to the Brest line 
was impossible and threatened the Germans to resign if Germany persisted in its 
negative attitude. 315 Besides, as part of an effort to calm the Germans and to find a 
legal justification for the military operations in the Caucasus, Enver Pasha forwarded 
the "Army of Islam." 
This idea was part of a well-prepared initiative of the Ottoman general staff with regard 
to the developments in Russia. The Pan-Turkic aspirations of Enver Pasha included the 
unification of all Muslims in the Caucasus, the Volga basin and Turkestan. On Feb. 16, 
1918 Enver Pasha issued an order to the Command of the Turkish Vlth Army 
requesting the formation of an organization in Teheran that would coordinate the 
transfer of Turkish officers to the Muslim regions of Russia, particularly to the 
Caucasus and Turkestan, to support and organize the Muslim population therein. He 
appointed Nuri Bey, his half-brother, to the head of this organization.316 The 
developments in the Caucasus in the proceeding days gave Enver Pasha the opportunity 
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he was waiting for enthusiastically. He sent Nuri Bey, who had already distinguished 
himself as a partisan leader in Libya, to Musul towards the end of March to proceed 
over there to Azerbaijan to organize an armed force of local Muslims. Nuri Bey arrived 
in Gence with his headquarters on May 25, 1918. Once local Azerbaijani irregular units 
had been formed, Nuri Bey was promoted to the rank of Pasha and was named the 
commander of the new "Army of Islam." Additionally, Enver Pasha gave his uncle, 
Halil Pasha, command of the Eastern Army Group. Upon the request ofNuri Pasha, the 
Army of Islam was strengthened through the transfer of the Turkish 5th Caucasian 
division.317 In the initial days of July the contest for Balru started. This mixed Ottoman-
Azerbaijani task force, numbering about 6,000 Turkish regulars and 10,000 to 20,000 
Azerbaijani volunteers and militia members, reached Kurdemir, halfway between 
Elizavetpol and Baku, by the middle of July. 
According to the Soviet point of view, Baku had to remain within the Russian Soviet 
Republic, since its oil was necessary to the economy of Russia. Seeing their inefficiency 
to resist the advancing Ottoman forces the panic of the Bolshevik leaders augmented. 
There were two other available forces to be applied to for political help: Britain and 
Germany. British help was at that time suspect as capitalist and imperialist 
intervention.318 Germany, however, realizing that the key to the Balru problem was 
lying in Moscow, was ready to enter into a rapprochement with Moscow for the sake 
of some economic concessions. It was of vital importance for Germany's war effort to 
get hold of the Baku oil. The talks opened in Berlin at the beginning of July. In his 
cable to Stalin on July 7, Lenin wrote the German proposal that, in return for oil, 
Germany could stop the Turkish advance on Baku, was fully acceptable to the 
Bolshevik govemment. 319 Germany at the same time was trying to cement the German-
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Georgian bond even further. Ioffe, the German ambassador to Berlin, reported to 
Moscow that the Germans were willing to "take away'' only Georgia, that's why their 
relations with Turkey were rapidly becoming "strained. "'320 The Georgian delegates 
who had come to Berlin with Lossow the previous month signed a number of 
agreements on July 12 that offered the Germans a wide-range of further economic 
concessions. Avalov, in an interview with a German diplomat, was told that the 
German approach with regard to Georgia would be similar to that of the British in 
India.321 
On June 24, upon the request of the Georgian government, a conference was convened 
in istanbul between the Central Powers and the Transcaucasian states to tackle the 
Caucasian question. 322 The conference was organized by the Germans. The Germans 
proposed to invite the Soviet delegates to join the conference, but the Ottoman 
government strongly opposed to this idea. 323 This conference was of particular 
importance for the Ottomans to determine further steps in their Caucasian policy. 
Consequently, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, sent a telegram to 
Galip Kemali Bey advising to follow a very prudent diplomacy in Moscow until 
concrete results could be obtained in the conference. Moreover, the Porte reported to 
Galip Kemali Bey to present the purported aim of the conference to the Bolshevik 
government as an attempt to determine the :frontiers between the Ottoman Empire and 
the Transcaucasian states.324 However, the conference failed to create any positive 
outcomes. 
By the end of July the Army of Islam reached the Caspian Sea south of Baku and began 
to close in on the city. On July 25 Chicherin sent a telegram to Ioffe where he pointed 
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out that the danger expecting Baku became grown.325 The same day a note was given 
to the Gennan diplomatic mission at Moscow stressing that, in spite of the German 
guarantee, the Turkish advance continued. Germany was requested to help stop this 
violation of the Brest treaty.326 Meanwhile, there emerged another danger for the 
Bolshevik government with regard to Baku. Faced with the increasing Turkish threat, 
the non-Bolshevik majority of the Baku Soviet voted to call in British help. Shaumian 
reported to Moscow that this decision destroyed the morale of the soldiers defending 
the city against the Turkish anny and the situation in the city was very tense. 327 This 
move also alarmed the Germans. While having achieved a considerable progress in its 
talks with Moscow regarding the delivery of Baku oil to Germany, the appearance of 
British forces in Baku was unacceptable to the German government. Germany 
immediately resorted to diplomatic means. On July 30 Karl Helfferich, Mirbach' s 
successor,328 visited Galip Kemali Bey. He requested the Ottoman ambassador to 
report to the Porte to stop the militaiy operations, since he was informed of the 
presence of German troops in the region. 329 The same day when the Dunsterville's 
force arrived in Baku (August 4), Ludendorff sent a message to Enver Pasha stating 
that, due to the risk of a new war with Russia, the Turkish advance on Baku should be 
halted at once. He threatened Enver Pasha with recalling the German officers in the 
Turkish High Command.330 The Bolsheviks, being aware of the importance of oil to the 
German war effort, were determined to utilize this card to the fullest extent. On August 
2 Chicherin told Galip Kemali Bey that the workers at Baku would set fire to the 
oilfields of the city unless the Turkish advance continued.331 Galip Kemali Bey warned 
the Porte that the Germans were extremely troubled about this threat. 332 
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Besides the Baku problem, another subject of diplomatic correspondence between 
Galip Kernali Bey and the Bolshevik Foreign Affairs Commissariat was the joumaJ Yeni 
Dunycf33 (Novyi Mir in Russian) that was published by Mustafa Suphi.334 
Before escaping to Russia in 1914,335 Mustafa Suphi had been one of the most 
prominent opponents of the Committee ofUnion and Progress. At the beginning of the 
world war he was arrested in Batum by Russian authorities and was sent, together with 
the Turkish prisoners of war, into the interiors of Russia. In these prisoners camps he 
became familiar with the Marxist ideals_ Following the Bolshevik Revolution, he 
managed to come to Moscow and applied to the Bolsheviks to work for the revolution. 
He was the first Turk offering his service to the Bolshevik government.336 On Jan. 19, 
1918, the Council of the People's Commissars decreed to set up the Central 
Commissariat for Muslim Affairs (Muskom in short). 337 The purpose of existence of this 
newly created body that was responsible to Stalin, the People's Commissar for the 
Nationalities, was to bolshevise the Muslim masses_ Within a very short period of time 
Mustafa Suphi gained the confidence of Stalin. 338 Thus Stalin consented Mustafa 
Suphi's proposal concerning the publication of a communist journal in Turkish that 
would conduct an effective Bolshevik propaganda amongst the Turks as well as 
Muslims of Russia. Mollanur Vahitov, the chairman of the Muskom, and the two vice-
chairmen, ~erif Manatov and Alimcan ibrahim, were the names behind the scenes. 339 
Coinciding with the arrival of Galip Kemali Bey at Moscow, the first number of Yeni 
Dunya appeared towards the end of April 1918_ 
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Yeni Diinya posed a serious threat to the Ottoman government: the spread of Bolshevik 
propaganda among the Turkish prisoners of war as well as the Muslims of Russia. 
Three days after his arrival, on April 26, in his cable to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 
Galip Kemali Bey pointed out the detrimental effects of the Bolshevik propaganda 
amongst the Muslims of Russia. 340 Under the Article II of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the 
Bolsheviks committed themselves to desist from agitation and propaganda against the 
governments, armed forces and public institutions of the other signatories. 
Nevertheless, in the first number of Yeni Diinya/41 Mustafa Suphi bitterly attacked the 
CUP and its government. It was alleged that the only way to save the Turkish people 
from this tyranny was a revolution of the people. Dating from the fourth number, there 
appeared new criticisms regarding the military operations of the Turkish army in the 
Caucasus. The first time Galip Kemali Bey reported to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry 
about the publication of Yeni Diinya is on April 29. 342 In the proceeding days, after an 
interview with Chicherin, Galip Kemali Bey succeeded in having closed down the 
newspaper. However, it soon reappeared.343 On May 22 Galip Kemali Bey officially 
appealed to the Foreign Affairs Commissariat. After protesting the publication of the 
journal, Galip Kemali Bey demanded its immediate suspension in accordance with the 
Article II of the Brest treaty.344 The next day, Karakhan, in the Bolshevik reply to this 
note, stated the publication of this journal could not be related to the Article II, since it 
was merely applicable to the existing political institutions. The press, however, could 
not be taken under control. 345 Mustafa Sup hi, in his editorial in the third number of the 
newspaper, 346 wrote that the implementation of the Article II was not feasible because 
Yeni Dunya was a private-owned newspaper. Galip Kemali Bey followed up with 
another note on June 3347 once again protesting the publication of the newspaper. On 
June 6 he visited Chicherin and repeated the Turkish arguments. 348 Moreover, Galiyev 
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wrote that he organized a bitter campaign against Mustafa Suphi within the communist 
circles. Allegedly, the person responsible for a report to Mus/com where a Bosnian 
Muslim was describing the dark sides of Sophi's life was the Ottoman ambassador.349 
Nevertheless, in spite of all these efforts of Galip Kernali Bey the publication of Yeni 
Diinya continued. 
At his meeting with Chicherin on April 30, Galip Kemali Bey stressed that he regarded 
the Muslims of Russia as the main source of a close :friendship between the two 
countries. He added that the Ottoman government would enthusiastically welcome 
every Bolshevik attempt to improve the national, cultural and religious interests of the 
Muslims.350 However, the Bolshevik acts with regard to the Muslim population shortly 
became another source of further tension in diplomatic relations. 
In the initial months following their power seizure the Bolsheviks launched a bitter 
attack on the institution of private property. In accordance with their aims of 
nationalizing the means of production and imposing a single plan on the entire national 
economy, the Bolsheviks passed several laws and decrees which systematically 
prepared the ground for the abolition of private property. With the ratification of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty and disappearance of external threat, the Bolshevik efforts 
working towards the realization of their economic plans frequently increased.351 These 
Bolshevik attempts at nationalization were followed with a growing anxiety within 
Russia as well as abroad. The unrest of the Muslims of Russia, however, was 
exceptional, since the Bolshevik ideals were heavily contradicting with their religious 
beliefs. Particularly, the decree outlawing inheritance on May 1, 1918, significantly 
annoyed the Muslim population. On May 2, Galip Kernali Bey requested the Ottoman 
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Foreign Ministry to send immediately sufficient amounts of stationery, since the 
Muslims started to apply to the embassy for their nationalized properties. 352 The 
ambassador, on May 6, asked the Ministry whether he was allowed to help the Muslim 
traders to transfer large amounts of money through Berlin to the Crimea.353 
Besides this nationalization, the Bolshevik treatment of such Muslim intellectuals as 
Ayaz ishaki resulted in an increasing interference of the Ottoman ambassador on behalf 
of the Muslims of Russia. During the Brest talks, the Bolshevik governmen~ hampered 
by the threat of foreign intervention, forcefully accepted the prevalence of an actual 
dual power. In the Volga basin, for instance, there was a coexistence of two authorities, 
namely the Milli idare and the new soviet administration. The Bolshevik leaders, in 
accordance with Lenin's interpretation of self-determination, held that the right of 
secession could be considered only where the Soviets seemed to have already lost 
power such as in the Baltics. However, in the regions, particularly in the interiors of 
Russia where the soviets continued to assert partial control, the implementation of the 
right of self-determination was unimaginable. Consequently, once freed from the threat 
of foreign intervention, the Bolsheviks started the liquidation of the Muslim nationalist 
bodies. On March 26, the People's Commissariat for the Nationalities ordered the 
closure of Harbi Sura On April 2, the Bolshevik government suspended all non-
Bolshevik organs, particularly the nationalist press. Accordingly, the Bolshevik 
authorities began to arrest national leaders. 
On May 11, Sadri Maksudi and Alimcan Barudi, the mufti of Kazan, requested the 
immediate help of the Ottoman ambassador, since iJyas Allan Efendi, a member of 
Millet Meclisi, was arrested by the Bolsheviks. They informed Galip Kemali Bey that 
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the next arrest would be Aya:z ishaki. Galip Kemali Bey decided to utilize Article XI of 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that granted the Muslims of Russia the right of free and safe 
migration into the Ottoman Empire. Its implementation could help them to save the 
Muslim intellectuals and national leaders from Bolshevik arrest. This article, in addition, 
stated that those who wanted benefit this right could sell out their properties without 
facing any restrictions. Therefore, it was at the same time the most appropriate way to 
help those Muslims who were suffering nationaliz.ation of their properties. On May 18 
Galip Kemali Bey sent a note to Chicherin stating that the lists of the Muslims, who 
applied to the Ottoman embassy for migration, would be sent without delay. He 
requested the Bolshevik government to respect this right of the Muslims. 354 On June 
10, in his visit to Chicherin, he advised of reviving the Milli idare since it should not be 
"preferable" for the Bolshevik government to lose its Muslim subjects. The next day he 
reported to Ahmed Nesimi Bey that Chicherin seemed to have found his proposal 
extremely suitable.355 The Bolsheviks, however, apparently disturbed by these 
continuous appeals of the Ottoman ambassador, replied very harshly. Following the 
Turkish notes of July 29 and 30, Karl Radek sent a letter to Galip Kemali Bey on 
August 3 where he wrote that, while the Ottoman government had abolished the 
capitulations in Turkey, it was unacceptable for the Bolshevik government to consent 
the Ottoman demands regarding the annulment of nationalization. The Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty did not give the Ottomans the right of interfering in internal affairs of Russia as 
well as occupying Caucasia. 356 
The appeals of the Muslims were not merely restricted to the nationalization. In the 
initial days in Moscow, Galip Kemali Bey writes, a group of Muslims expressed their 
will regarding the Ottoman occupation of the Crimea, the Caucasus as well as Kaz.an. 357 
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Alim.can Barudi and Sadri Maksudi, in their aforementioned visit to Galip Kemali Bey, 
added to these regions Turkistan and urged the immediate occupation of Baku, since it 
constituted the passage to Central Asia. 358 On July 11 a Muslim delegation from 
Turkestan contacted Galip Kemali Bey. It was sent by Yusuf Ziya Bey who was in 
Turkestan to help the Muslim population to organize the local branches of the 
Committee of Union and Progress. The Turkestani delegates requested the immediate 
Ottoman material assistance before the region would be occupied by the British. On 
July 19 Galip Kemali Bey informed the Porte of this demand and added that its 
realization seemed to be very difficult since Baku was not occupied "yet. ·>359 
After the assassination of Mirbach on July 6, the diplomatic staffs of the Central 
Powers believed that the assault signaled a general attack on the embassies. The 
Bolshevik government succeeded in suppressing the uprising of the Left SRs in 
Moscow, but in the countryside pro-Allied SRs and anti-regime forces of the White 
Russians were taking energetic measures to crush the Bolsheviks. Due to the insecure 
circumstances, the diplomatic missions of the Central Powers decided to leave 
Moscow. Galip Kemali Bey departed for Berlin on August 9.360 From that time the 
diplomatic correspondence between the Bolshevik and Ottoman governments were to 
be realized by their embassies in Berlin. Nevertheless, military forces had to say more 
than the diplomats sitting on the tables. 
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THE CONTEST FOR BAKU (AUGUST-OCTOBER 1918) 
Ioffe, the Bolshevik ambassador to Germany, arrived in Berlin on April 19. One of the 
fundamental missions he had to accomplish was to neutralize the German generals by 
appealing to the interests of the business and banking community and negotiating a 
commercial treaty that would give Germany economic privileges in Russia. 361 
Following the Brest Peace, except for the generals, no one in Germany demanded a 
break with the Bolsheviks. Big business enterprises and the Foreign Office were the 
tv.;-o most enthusiastic supporters of the Bolshevik regime. Towards the end of June the 
Czechoslovak uprising gave the military party its final opportunity to press for 
removing the Bolsheviks. The Czechs seized on June 29 Vladivostok and on July 6 
Ufa. Ludendorff pressed to have the Bolsheviks liquidated. KUhlmann and the foreign 
service, however, with the backing of many politicians and most of the German 
business community, once again advocated to follow a moderate policy in Russia For 
the Bolsheviks, the German assurance that the Germans did not have any designs on 
Russia was of fundamental necessity, since this would make it possible to shift the 
troops from west to east to fight the Czech Legion. The Kaiser decided to side with the 
Foreign Office. He demanded the Soviet government be informed that it could safely 
withdraw troops from Petrograd and deploy them against the Czechs. 362 Immediately 
after Kaiser's decisions Kuhlmann instructed the German embassy at the end of June to 
continue collaborating with the Bolshevik regime. 363 After the assassination of Count 
Mirbach the relations between the Bolsheviks and Germans faced a serious crisis. 
Nevertheless, contrary to Lenin's fear, the German government did not take the 
opportunity provided by this assassination to destroy the Bolshevik regime by military 
intervention. Helfferich, Mirbach's successor, arrived in Moscow instructed to 
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implement the pro-Bolshevik policy of his government, at the center of which stood a 
conciliatory approach of commercial rapprochement. According to the German point 
of view, the Bolsheviks were not friends, but they abundantly took care of German 
interests by helping to paralyze Russia militarily. 364 
The Bolshevik government, hampered by the uprising of the Left SRs following the 
murder of the German ambassador, was particularly prudent with regard to its German 
policy. In the middle of a civil war they were encircled by hostile anti-regime troops 
and the possibility of a German collaboration with these forces as well as opposition 
parties was regarded by Bolshevik circles as a matter of their survival. Besides, as the 
beginning of large-scale Allied intervention in Russia, the Entente troops landed on 
Murmansk and Archangel on August 1-2. There were plans regarding an expedition for 
Vladivostok. While these military operations of the Entente in Russia aimed at 
reactivating the Eastern Front against the Germans, the Bolshevik belief that the Allies 
intended to overthrow the Bolshevik government was growing so strongly that on 
August I the Bolsheviks requested German military intervention. 
In this friendly atmosphere, the two countries were initiating talks on a commercial 
agreement.365 The accord, known as the Supplementary Treaty,366 was signed on 
August 21 in Berlin. The two terms of Part VI of the agreement covered territorial 
questions in the Caucasus. Under Article 13 Russia acknowledged the independence of 
Georgia. Since Germany pledged not to interfere with the relations between Russia and 
her border regions (Article 4), under Article 14 Germany committed to respect Russia's 
sovereignty in the Caucasus, Georgia excepted. Furthermore, Germany affirmed its 
obligation to give no assistance to any third Power in any military operations in the 
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Caucasus as well as to take measures to prevent the military forces of this Power, in 
case it would overstep the fixed lines367 in the treaty. The Germans thus eventually 
consented to leave Baku in Russia's hands, but the Soviet government in tum promised 
the supply to Germany of one quarter of Baku's annual production of oil. 
On the same day the treaty was signed Hintze sent a confidential letter to Ioffe where 
he emphasized Germany's intention to secure the withdrawal of the Ottoman army 
from the Baku area. He added that in case the Bolsheviks would.fail to expel the British 
from Baku, the British penetration would be eliminated by German troops. 368 In fact, 
this had been a matter of bitter discussions between the two sides during the talks for 
draft treaties. The draft treaties369 were already initialed in the midst of August. The 
appearance of British troops in Baku was watched with growing alarm in Berlin, 
however, under the provisions of these draft treaties neither a unilateral Turkish nor a 
joint Turco-German march on Baku was pennissible. The German government thus 
pressed Moscow for a modification. Moscow in tum consented the expulsion of the 
British from Baku by German forces. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks stated that, instead 
of the Turkish occupation of the city, they would prefer the British remain there. 370 
Seeing this answer of the Bolsheviks, Ludendorrf urged on Enver Pasha the need 
regarding the immediate withdrawal of Ottoman troops from the region. Besides, 
General Kress in Tillis was instructed to assemble as quickly as possible a German task 
force which was to be supported by the transfer of troops from the Ukraine. 371 
In a second note, as an explanatory commentary on Article 14 of the official treaty, 
Hintze wrote that, as long as the Russian troops did not violate the 1877 Russo-
Turkish frontier or the borders of Georgia, Germany would not assist the third Power 
89 
even '1t should come unfortunately to an anned conflict with the Russian troops. "372 
Ioffe, in his reply,373 confirmed these obligations ofboth sides. 
Following the Supplementary Treaty the divergence of ways between the two allies, 
Germany and Turkey, became so apparent as it had never been before. The Turks were 
particularly outraged and the Turkish suspicion regarding a German betrayal reached its 
peak. Talat Pasha, in his message to Berlin, stated that "Germany's arrangements with 
the enemy of yesterday and the enemy of tomorrow at the expense of its Ottoman ally 
might induce the Porte to go its own way altogether."374 To settle the Transcaucasian 
issue Talat Pasha arrived in Berlin on September 6. Four days later he presented a note 
to the German government and demanded the German recognition of independence of 
the North Caucasian Muslim Republic; Germany's help to organize the 14 million 
Muslims in Turkestan militarily to be used in the war against both the English and 
Russia; and, German consent to the incorporation of Bairo into the Azerbaijani 
Republic. Besides, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were to be made into buffer states 
against Russia and Georgia should cede a few districts to the Ottoman Empire. Hintze's 
reply on September 12 was precisely reflecting the German approach with regard to 
Bolshevik government since the beginning of the Batum Conference. He stated that 
Germany could recognize the independence of neither Azerbaijan and Armenia nor the 
North Caucasian Mountain Republic without prior arrangements with the Soviet 
government. He proposed that the Porte return some of the Georgian territory that it 
acquired by the Batum Treaty of June 4 and the Turkish anny should withdraw from 
the Baku area and leave it to German troops to drive the British out of the city. 
Although Turkestan constituted part of Russia, Germany had no objections if the Porte 
wished to carry out its plans in Turkestan at its "own risk and expense. "375 
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Meanwhile, seemg the complexity of relations, Enver Pasha ordered the army 
commanders to strike rapidly to complete a de facto situation. On September 14 the 
Army of Islam, strengthened by the transfer of Ottoman 36th division, attacked Baku. 
By the end of August 1918 Dunsterville had already concluded that the further defense 
of Baku was a waste of time and life. 376 At the beginning of September, moreover, he 
told the Baku authorities that no power on earth could save the city from the Turks. 377 
On September 15 the Baku volunteers attempted to launch a counter-attack to throw 
back the enemy, but they failed. More important, the Turkish forces crushed the will to 
resistance among the city's defenders.378 The next day, when the last effort to organize 
a counter-attack in force had failed, Dunsterville loaded his men on ships and left the 
city to its fate. On September 16, the Turkish forces entered the city and gradually 
restored order. The Azerbaijani government officially installed itself in Baku under the 
protection of the Army of Islam. With the capture of Baku, nevertheless, the military 
operations of the Turkish army did not come to an end. While the 5th Caucasian 
division remained in Baku the 36th moved northward along the railway on Derbent. 
Before Baku had fallen, the German Supreme Command did everything in its power to 
organize a German expeditionary force for the conquest of Baku. Ludendorff, on 
September 10, cabled to General von Kress in Tiflis that the advance to Baku was to be 
started as soon as possible and the capture of the city should be realized, if possible, 
without direct participation of Turkish or Azerbaijani troops.379 Seeing the impossibility 
of capturing Baku by German forces alone, several notifications were sent to Hali) 
Pasha by Kress requesting the participation of some German troops to the army 
advancing on Baku. Halil Pasha in turn answered to each with waste messages. He 
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even instructed the bridge that the Germans had to pass through to approach the 
Turkish troops be exploited. 380 Following the seizure of Baku by Turkish troops the 
Germans, without delay, demanded that the administration of the city should be handed 
over to German troops that were to be sent immediately. Enver Pasha issued two 
orders to Nuri Pasha stating that General von Kress should be informed of the 
impossibility of this demand. He added that the resistance to the entrance of German 
soldiers into the city should be realized ''by every means."381 
On September 15 Enver Pasha informed Talat Pasha of the capture of Baku. 382 
Meanwhile, the negotiations between Talat Pasha and the German Foreign Office 
continued. On September 21 the Bolshevik government dispatched a note to the 
German government protesting the Turkish occupation of Baku and violation of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty.383 The Germans, being aware that the resolution of the Baku 
question was dependent upon a compromise between the two allies, speeded up the 
talks. After bargaining for a while, Talat Pasha signed a protocol with von Hintze on 
the Caucasian question (Sep.23, 1918). The Turkish side agreed to a general 
withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Armenian and Azerbaijani Republics. In tum, 
although denying the recognition of independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the 
German government committed itself to work for Russia's recognition of these two 
states following the withdrawal of the Turkish army from the region. The oil industry in 
Baku, the Batum-Baku pipeline and the Titlis-Baku railroad would be administered by 
German personnel. Berlin acknowledged the importance the Porte attached to the 
protection of the rights of the Muslims of the "Crimea and Russia." The Porte, at its 
own risk and expense, could help the Muslim population of the North Caucasus and 
Turkestan to form independent states. 384 
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Due to the rapid deterioration of the military situation of the Central Powers and 
particularly the collapse of Bulgaria, Talat Pasha should have thought of the necessity 
regarding a compromise with the Bolshevik government. Consequently, in the final 
days of September he met in Berlin Ioffe. Ioffe presented to the Grand Vtzier two 
stipulations: The withdrawal of Turkish troops to the lines fixed by the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty and an indemnity to be paid by the Ottoman government for the violation of the 
Brest settlement. Talat Pasha replied that both stipulations needed to be discussed in 
the Ottoman cabinet and an answer would be communicated by wireless to the 
Bolshevik government. On October 3 the Ottoman ambassador to Berlin, Rifat Pasha, 
notified Ioffe that the evacuation of Transcaucasia had already begun. Nevertheless, he 
did not touch upon whether Russian stipulations were accepted. Consequently, Ioffe 
handed a note to Rifat Pasha in which the Bolshevik government formally declared the 
Brest-Litovsk peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire as being null and void. 385 
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CONCLUSION 
During the years of decline the fundamental principle of Ottoman foreign policy was 
the conduct of balance of power politics that helped the empire to preserve its political 
independence. It was GTeat Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century that 
served as the protector of the country. However, after the Eastern Question had again 
become acute in 1875, there appeared a drastic change in British foreign policy with 
regard to the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to Disraeli, Gladstone insisted that the 
central issue was not between support of Turkey or support of Russia, but between 
"Turkish misrule and Balkan liberty." Consequently, if Britain ranged herself on the 
Turkish side, all the Christians of the Near East would be automatically driven into the 
arms of Russia. 386 This radical shift in British foreign policy was to be noticed by a 
cunning diplomat of the time, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Dating from 
the Congress of Berlin Bismarck started to play the role once performed by 
conservative Disraeli. Nevertheless, the rapid development of political and economic 
relations between the two countries was waiting for Wilhelm's Weltpolitik. 
After Wilhelm II came to the throne in 1888, besides the divergence of approach in 
internal affairs, there appeared strong differences of opinion between the new emperor 
and Bismarck over foreign policy. The new Kaiser wanted to abandon the self-imposed 
restraint implicit in Bismarck's Kontinentalpolitik and to expose a policy of colonial 
expansion, to be supported by the construction of a great German navy. Weltpolitik 
represented a desire to catch up with the other Great Powers in imperialistic activity, 
something that had been neglected by Bismarck. In 1890 Bismarck resigned and the 
major obstacle to the Kaiser's Weltpolitik was removed. The second step for a world 
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policy was generally related to the assertion of personal rule by Wilhelm II, which 
marked a clear break with the past, and changes of personnel in the German 
government 387 Indeed, the Kaiser evinced a keen interest in the Ottoman Empire as a 
sphere in which his personal influence might be exerted on behalf of German economic 
expansion and German political prestige. Moreover, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 
a former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was sent to istanbul as the new 
ambassador. Von Bieberstein was known as a person who was a frank believer in a 
world policy for Germany and an ardent supporter of colonialism. 
Kaiser's second visit to the Ottoman Empire in late autumn 1898 is of particular 
importance. In Damascus he publicly proclaimed himself the fiiend and the protector of 
the Sultan and the Muslim world. After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 this 
claim of the Emperor had far-sighted consequences. From that time, in the eyes of 
Muslims, the action of the European concert, headed by Great Britain, often assumed 
the aspect of a religious crusade directed against the ascendancy of the Muslims in the 
Ottoman Empire. Germany, however, had practically no Muslim subjects and therefore 
had no reason to fear Muslim discontent. Besides, there were strong indications that 
the emperor honestly supported Turkey in case it faced another unjust move. During 
the Cretan crisis of 1897, for instance, he even forwarded the idea of a naval blockade 
on Greek Piraeus in order to help the Turks.388 
There is a consensus among the students of the field that the rise of German influence 
in Turkey at the tum of the last century was due to the German military missions and 
concessions granted to German enterprises for the construction of railways. 389 In 1898 
the Bagdad Railway concession was awarded to the German Anatolian Railway 
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Company. Despite Germans denied that they had any intention of utilizing the Bagdad 
Railway as a means of acquiring an exclusive sphere of economic interest in the 
Ottoman Empire, the economic consequences of the project were enormous. Within a 
very short period of time, German banks opened offices in various cities of the empire. 
The rapid expansion of German financial interests in the Near East and the established 
policy of the German banks to encourage and assist export trade were factors in a 
remarkable development of German trade in the Ottoman Empire. 390 German industrial 
enterprises were pushing their commercial operations in the Near East. In the military 
field, on the other hand, with the introduction of German training system and 
equipment, the Ottoman army became integrated into the German military foundation. 
Particularly, Ottoman officers, who were sent to Germany for military education, have 
been shown as the primary factor for establishing German influence in the Turkish 
army. This German influence was so remarkable that Turkish officers even twisted 
their mustaches according to the German style. 391 Henry Morgenthau, the American 
ambassador to istanbul, wrote in his memoirs that he was impressed and disturbed just 
before the outbreak of the world war by the apparent Prussianization of the Turkish 
army, especially after he witnessed a parade of Turkish troops.392 
A solid foundation was being laid for the eventual affiliation of Turkey with the Triple 
Alliance. Abdulhamid precisely knew that the Germans were playing a shrewd game 
for their own advantage. However, after the hostile attitudes of other European 
powers, he had come to look upon Germany as virtually the only country fiiendly to 
Turkey. He used to say of them, "The Germans do me as much good as they are 
permitted to do, whereas the rest of Europe do me as much harm as they can. "393 
Abdiilhamid' s reign thus signified the beginning of a love-hate relationship between 
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Germany and Turkey that dominated the Turkish political life until the end of the First 
World War. How the Turks looked upon the relations with Germany and what their 
expectations from this mutual cooperation were is excellently reflected by the Sultan 
saying, "The material benefits [the Germans] reap are a just return for the services they 
render to the material future of Turkey and for the more example they furnish to my 
people. "394 
In his massive study, Griff nach der Weltmacht, Fritz Fischer developed the thesis that 
Germany willed the war in 1914 in order to realize expansionist ambitions in Europe as 
well as overseas as part of its bit for world power. It may be an exaggeration to say 
that the Turks, in 1914, behaved with the same motives as the Germans did. Before the 
outbreak of the Great War the main concern of Ottoman leaders and intellectuals was 
the preservation of the territorial integrity of the empire. The fear of being left alone, 
particularly against Russia, in an environment of confronting blocs shaped the twists 
and turns of CUP's diplomacy. Under these circumstances, the treaty of alignment with 
Germany became a hastily made arrangement. Nevertheless, Pan nationalist ideologies 
and irredentist aspirations were prevalent in the thoughts of Ottoman leaders. In spite 
of the German pressure, they refrained from entering the war hastily; they waited for 
the most appropriate moment. In September the Ottoman authorities concluded that 
Germany, in a very short period of time, would crush the French and turn to Russia. 
The fear of missing this opportunity became grown. 
After bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war against the Entente, the primary war 
objective of the Ottoman government was the liberation of both co-religionists and 
people of ethnic relations from the foreign yoke. It was strongly believed that the 
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whole Muslim world was waiting for a signal of the Ottoman Sultan. There were plans 
regarding the occupation of the Caucasus and Egypt. Muslims' sympathy for the 
Ottoman Empire, however, was based on sentiment rather than on rational arguments 
or on any conception of clarified self-interest Consequently, shortly after the 
proclamation of Jihad, the Ottoman government became disappointed. As time went 
on, the burden the war brought upon the Ottoman Empire unexpectedly became a 
serious damage to the prestige of the Unionist government. While Enver Pasha and his 
colleagues miscalculated the military strength of the Central Powers, they repeatedly 
overextended the slender resources of the country in the pursuit of expansionist goals. 
There were huge territorial loses, including the Holy Places, and daily economic 
conditions were steadily worsening. It was the Bolshevik power seizure that saved the 
government from collapsing and provided Ottoman leaders with the opportunity of 
realizing the strategic and expansionist aims embodied during the initial days of the war 
and compensating war losses. The plans the Ottoman government did develop with 
regard to Russia in the final two years of the Great War can be divided into two main 
stages. 
In the short-run the primary issue was the restoration of the Caucasian frontier with 
Russia. The Bolshevik proposal for a peace without annexations and indemnities 
exceptionally echoed in istanbul. It strengthened the hope of the Ottoman public that 
the withdrawal of Russia from the war would aid the Ottoman government to preserve 
the Straits and to end the war with a relatively harmless damage. While the German 
motives regarding the armistice with Russia chiefly revolved around the transfer of 
troops from the Eastern Front for a decisive offensive in the West, the main concern of 
the Porte was the evacuation of Russian forces from its occupied territories. With 
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these instructions in hand the Ottoman delegation was sent to Brest. Dating from the 
midst of February 1918, however, the Ottoman government announced that it would 
not merely insist on the restoration of the 1914 border, but also lay claim to the 
Districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum which had fallen to Russia after the War of 
1877-1878. The Bolshevik renunciation of these three districts in the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty was met with great enthusiasm in Turk:ey.395 Pan-Turkic aspirations became 
increasingly emphasized. During this first stage which lasted until the Russian treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk the Ottoman government as well as the Turkish delegation at Brest 
carefully abstained from entering into any conflicts with the Germans. The 
disagreements, which shortly after the Brest settlement would result in a divergence of 
ways between the two allies, were still on ice. 
The primary objective of the second stage that lasted until the end of the First World 
War was the acquisition of as much territory in the Caucasus as possible since the 
Russian government was under no condition able to resist the Ottoman forces. As part 
of the long-range plans, on the other hand, the Ottoman government did everything in 
its power, militarily or politically, to separate Transcaucasia from "the enemy of 
yesterday and the enemy of tomorrow'' in order to create buffer states that would 
prevent Russian aggression in the future. Ottomans were not satisfied merely with 
Transcaucasia and external factors provided them with new opportunities. Especially, 
Galip Kemali Bey's reports to the Ottoman government, who spent a substantial 
period of time in Russia during these two years, would result in an increasing Ottoman 
interest in the Muslims of Russia. Pan-Turkism was born under the reciprocal influence 
of the Outside Turks threatened by the Russification and Ottoman Turks exposed to 
Russian expansion. The Turks of Russia considered the Ottoman Empire the only 
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independent and powerful ruler among the Turks. Long before the war, the natural 
attractiveness of istanbul as a center of the Islamic and Turkish world produced many 
links between both groups and in consequence, tinted them with Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Turkic concepts. Nevertheless, it was the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia that gave them the opportunity of realizing their political aspirations. During the 
period following the Bolshevik Revolution the Porte was bombarded with the appeals 
of the Muslims of Russia for help. At the time when the Mudros Armistice was signed 
Turkish troops were in Dagestan and there is no doubt today that if the war were to 
continue they would proceed from there to Kaz.an as well as Turkestan. 
After the Turkish abolition of the capitulations, on the other hand, this period 
witnessed a more serious deterioration of relations between Germany and Turkey, at 
the center of which stood the disagreements over the Transcaucasus question in 1918. 
As mentioned before, the Unionist leaders have been accused for many years of having 
sold their country to the Kaiser or of being under a definite obligation to subscribe to 
German diplomatic policies. Nevertheless, their approach with regard to Germany was 
not different from that of the Abdiilhamid. The American ambassador to the Porte, 
Henry Morgenthau, made a quotation from Talat Pasha that precisely reflects how the 
Unionists evaluated the cooperation with Germany: 
" ... We cannot put this country on (Germany's) 
feet with our own resources. We shall, therefore, 
take advantage of such technical and material 
assistance as the Germans can place at our 
disposal. We shall use Germany to help us 
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reconstructed and defend the country until we are 
able to govern ourselves with our own strength. 
When that day comes, we can say good-bye to the 
Germans within twenty-four hours. "396 
101 
ENDNOTES 
1 In Turkish terminology, the term ittihadt;1 is applied to people who were members of 
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In the course of this research we will 
use the English translation of the word. 
2 After the end of the war Cemal Pasha told Falih Rrfkt Atay ironically that Turkey 
entered the war to pay the salaries. There was no money in the treasury and to find the 
necessary amount the Unionist leaders had two alternatives: either to submit to the 
Entente powers or to unify with Germany. See: Falih Rrlki Atay, Zeytindaffe (istanbul, 
1981), p.93. 
3 After the Bolsheviks came to power, Trotsky publicized on Nov. 22, 1917 all the 
secret treaties and agreements among the Entente powers. For the best account of 
these secret treaties regarding the partition of the Ottoman Empire, see: Razde/ 
Aziatskoy Turtsii, ed. by E. A Adamov (Moscow, 1924). 
4 This meeting in Reval was forwarded by the Unionists as the primary reason of the 
outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Stated differently, it was assumed to 
have inflamed the revolution in Macedonia. Consequently, this view has deeply 
affected the evaluation of academic circles regarding the period. In the last decade, 
however, there appeared some works claiming that the role of the meeting in Reva! has 
been exaggerated and that the Reva! meeting, in fact, had played a secondary role. See: 
Feroz Ahmed, ittihat ve Terakki 1908-1914 (istanbu~ 1995). 
5 Leading Unionists accused Enver Pasha of having decided too hastily as a result of 
which Turkey had to enter the war in a very early stage. Cemal Pa~ Hatuat 
(istanbul, 1995), pp. 126-127~ Mithat ~ilkrii Bleda, imparatorlugun <;okii,pi {istanbul, 
102 
1979), p.79; Talat PC1¥J'nm Hat1ra/an (istanbul, 1958), pp.26-27; Arif Cemil, 
ittihadfl Seflerin Gurbet Macera/an (istanbul, 1992), pp.130-131. 
6 Talat, Enver and Cemal Pashas. 
7 This line particularly originated from the trial of leading Unionists between November 
and December 1918. For the proceedings of this trial, see: Harb Kabinelerinin 
isticvab1 (istanbul, 1933). 
8 Cemal Pa~, pp.107-110. 
9 Akdes Nimet Kurat, Tiirkiye ve Rusya (Ankara, 1990), pp.217-224; S. D. Sazonov, 
Vospominaniia (Moscow, 1991), pp.159-166. 
1° Cemal Pa~a, pp.112-116. 
11 Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (New Jersey, 
1968), p.16. 
12 YusufHikmet Bayur, Turk ink1/ab1 Tarihi (Ankara, 1991), vol.Il, part IV, p.632. 
13 F. I. Notovich, Diplomaticheskaia bor 'ba v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow, 
1947), vol.I, pp.283-287. 
14 T 25 rumpener, p. . 
15 For the best account of these actions in the Black Sea and Admiral Souchon's 
moves, see: Th. Kraus and K. Donitz, The Kreuzerfahrten der Goeben und Bres/au 
(Berlin, 1933), pp.135-157. 
16 Carl Miihlmann, in his work of Turco-German alliance during the First World War, 
clearly demonstrates the fact that Enver Pasha himself organized the attack of Admiral 
Souchon. Carl Miihlmann, Das Deutsch-Tiirkische Waffenbiindnis im Weltkriege 
(Leipzig, 1940), pp.22-23. This argument is also supported by Pomiankowski who at 
103 
the time was the Austro-Hungarian military attache to istanbul. Joseph Pomiankowski, 
Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches (Vienna, 1928), pp.85-86. 
17 Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, The Young Turks. Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 
(New Jersey, 1957), p.143. 
18 Hasan Unal, Young Turk Assessments of International Politics, 1906-1909 (London, 
1997), p.31. 
19 Tank Zafer Tunaya, Turkiye 'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952 (istanbul, 1952), 
pp.167-174. 
20 SerifMardin, Jon Turk/erin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (istanbul, 1994), p.11. 
21 Hiiseyin Cahit Yal~tn, Siyasal Amlar {istanbul, 1976), p.22. 
22 Said Halim Pa~ Buhranlarzmu (The date and the place of the publication is not 
given), p.51. 
23 Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From J"edentism to Cooperation (Indianapolis: 
1995), p.30. 
24 A. Vambery, «Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court," The 
Nineteenth Century and After, vol.LXVI, July-December 1909, p.83. 
25 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism. 1876-1908 (London, 1977), p.15. 
26 Taner Timur, Osmanll Kimligi (istanbul, 1994), p.135. 
27 Ahmed ihsan Tokgoz, Matbuat Hatua/arun (istanbul, 1993), pp.207-208. 
28 The article has been republished by the Turkish Historical Society in the proceeding 
years. See: Yusuf Akyura, Uf Tarz-z Siyaset (Ankara, 1991). 
29 Tokgoz, p.174. 
30 Harry Luke, The Old Turkey and the New. From Byzantium to Ankara (London, 
1955), p.147. 
104 
31 Pan-Turanism had as its chief objective rapprochement and ultimately union among 
all peoples whose origins are purported to extend back to Turan, an undefined 
Shangri-La-like area in the steppes of Central Asia. 
32 Ziya GOkalp, Tiirkf1iliigun Esaslar1 (istanbul, 1977), pp.20-21. 
33 Ziya GOkalp, TiirkleJlllek, jsfaml~ak, Muas1rla§mak (istanbul, 1994), pp.48-52. 
34 Ibid., p.12. 
35 The Near Fast From Within (London, 1915), p.38. 
36 Cemal Pa~a, p.105. 
37 Huseyin Cahit Yal~tn, p.217. 
38 Ibid., pp.216-217. 
39 Y ahya Kemal, \,ocuk/ugum, Gen~ligim, Siyasi ve &lebi Hat1ra/anm (istanbul, 
1986), p.132. 
4° For both the proclamation and the fatwas, see: Metin Hiilagil, Pan-islamist 
Faaliyetler, 1914-1918 (istanbul, 1994), pp.35-38. 
41 Muammer Tuksavul, Dogudan Batzya ve Sonrasr (istanbul, 1981), p.164. The 
author's observations, who participated on this ceremony as a schoolboy, are of 
particular interest. 
42 Hulagii, pp.39-41. 
43 Ibid., pp.42-46. 
44 Ibid., p.48. 
45 Ay~ Osmanoglu, Baham Sultan AbdU/hamid (Hat1ralar1m) (istanbul, 1994), 
p.231. 
46 Mithat ~iikrti Bleda, p.89. 
105 
47 For German and Ottoman Pan-Islamic propaganda during the war, see: Jacob M. 
Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam. Ideology and Organization (Oxford, 1990), 
pp. I 03-121; Peter Hopkirk., jstanbul 'un Dogusunda Bitmeyen Oyun (istanbul, 1995); 
Hiilagii, pp.58-78. 
48 At first, this mission was entrusted by Enver Pasha to Rauf Orbay alone, but Orbay 
could only reach Iran. Thereafter, he came back to istanbul. Rauf Orbay, Cehennem 
Deffenneni. Siyasi Hatzralanm (istanbul, 1993), vol.I, pp. 17-18. 
49 On the activities of Tetkilat-1 Mahsusa during the First World War, see: Arif Cemil, 
I. Diinya SavO§l 'nda Te~kilat-1 Mahsusa (istanbul, 1997). 
50 G. Wyman Bury, Pan-Islam (London, 1919). The author mentions a few cases from 
personal experience. 
51 Fahri Belen, '<_Binlerce ~ehide malolan Kafkas Seferi ve Sankarru~ Sav~1," Belgelerle 
Turk Tarihi Dergisi, no.39, December 1970, p.7. 
52 Halil Pa~, htihat ve Terakki 'den Cumfmriyet 'e Bitmeyen Sava§, ed. by Taylan 
Sorgun (istanbul, 1997), pp.136-137; Rahmi Apak, Yetmi~lik Bir Subaym Hat1ralan 
(Ankara, 1988), pp.95-96. 
53 On the German material and economic assistance to the Ottoman Empire during the 
First World War, see especially the relevant chapters of Veli Ytlmaz, 1 nci Diinya 
Barbi 'nde Turk-Alman htifak1 ve Askeri Yardunlar (istanbul, 1993). 
54 Johann Heinrich Graf von Bemstorff, Erinnerungen und Briefe (Zurich, 1936), 
p.138. 
55 Richard Pipes, Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution (New York, 1997), p.27. 
56 Politicheskaia Istoria Rossia-SSSR-Rossiyskaia Federatsia (Moscow, 1996), vol.I, 
p.461. 
106 
51 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1991), p.328. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Pipes, Three ... , p.48. 
60 James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918 (California, 
1934), pp.24-26. 
61 Cited in, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, ed. by Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New 
York, 1966), pp.21-27. 
62 Ibid. 
63 V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Moscow, 1958-1965), vol. XXXV, p.324. 
64 John Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Anny" in Revolutionary Russia, ed. by 
Richard Pipes (Cambridge, 1968), pp.232-233. 
65 Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol.XXXV, p.250. 
66 Sovetsko-Germanskie Otnosheniia, ot peregovorov b Brest-Litovske do podpisaniia 
Rapall'skovo dogovora (Moscow, 1968), vol.I, pp.1-3; on the English translation of 
the text of the decree, see: Rubinstein, pp.55-57; Jane Degras, Soviet Documents in 
Foreign Policy (London, 1951), vol.I, pp.1-3. 
67 Dukhonin's refusal to carry out the order caused a conflict with Srnolny which 
ended in the Bolshevik occupation of the Stavka on December 3 and the assasination 
ofDukhonin. 
68 Kurat, p.312. 
69 Selarni Kih~, Turk-Sovyet ili§kilerinin Dogu§U (istanbul, 1998), pp.36-37. 
70 Trumpener, p.159. 
71 Kurat, pp.321-322. 
107 
72 Birinci Diinya Harbinde Tiirk Harbi Kajkas Cephesi 3ncii Ordu Harekat1 (Ankara, 
1993), vol.II, p.418. 
73 Uygur Kocaba~gJ.u and Metin Berge, Bol§evik ihtilali ve Osmanillar (Ankara, 
1994), p.105. 
74 Kurat, p.358. 
75 Ibid., pp.353-354. 
76 Ibid., p.356. 
77 Z. A B. Zeman, ed. by, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918 
(London, 1958), p.24. 
78 Ibid., document no.76, p.75. 
79 Ibid., document no.73, p.74. 
80 Ibid., document no.74, p.74. 
81 Kurat, p.356. 
82 Fritz Fischer, Grif.f nach der Weltmacht (Diisseldorf, 1984), p.417. 
83 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, 1he Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (New 
York, 1971), p.89. 
84 According to the actual tenns of the armistice, no transfers should take place except 
those already ordered. 
85 Brian Pearce, How Haig Saved Lenin (Hampshire, 1987), pp.6-9. 
86 Klh~, pp.61-64; Kurat, pp.363-364. 
87 For the text of the agreement, see: Dokumenty vneishnei politiki SSSR (Moscow, 
1957), vol.I, document no. 27; Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp.75-80. 
88 Pipes, The Russian ... , p.578. 
108 
89 Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske, s 2219 dekabria 1917 g. po 3 marta (18 
fevra/ia) 1918 g. (Moscow, 1920), vol.I, pp.6-8. 
90 Wheeler-Bennett, p.104. 
91 Mimye peregovory ... , pp.9-11; Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp.148-150. This reply of 
Czemin was drafted by the German delegation (Fischer, p.429). 
92 Winfiied Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1918 (Vie~ 1966), p.17; Fischer, 
pp.430-431. 
93 Fischer, p.431; Richard von Kuhlmann, Erinnerungen (Heidelberg, 1948), p.532. 
94 Bunyan and Fisher, p.479; "[From Nesimi Bey] to the Foreign Ministry, 22 
December 1917," in Tiilay Duran, "I. Diinya Sav~1 Sonunda Ti.irk Diplomasisinin ilk 
Ba~s1. Brest-Litovsk Hazrrhklan," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi, no.67-68 (April-
May 1973), pp.47-48; Wheeler-Bennett, p.120. 
95 Kah~, p.121. 
96 Mimye peregovory ... , pp.28-32. 
97 Trumpener, p.170. 
98 Miihlmann, p.20; Cemal Pa~ p.139; Hiiseyin Cahit Y al~1n, p.222; Pomiankowski, 
p.81. 
99 Trumpener, pp.28-29; Jehuda L. Wallach, Bir Askeri Yard1mm Anatomisi (Ankara, 
1977), p.150; Miihlmann, p.192. 
100 The Near F,ast From Within, p.237. 
101 Trumpener, pp.168-169. 
102 ~evket Siireyya Aydemir, Makedonya 'dan Orta A.sya ya Enver P~a (istanbul, 
1992), vol.III, pp.370-373. 
109 
103 
''From Nesimi Bey to Halil Bey, 26 December 1917," in Duran, no.69 (June 1973), 
pp.22-23. 
104 On more information regarding the activities of this delegation, see: Killy, pp.124-
129. • 
105 Kuhlmann, p.523. The expression Kiihlmann used in the proceeding pages (pp.549-
550) with regard to the Turks is more interesting: ''Insbesondere die Tiirken batten 
weitgehende Expansionswiinsche im Kaukasus angemeldet, denen ich pers0nlich wenig 
Wohlwollen entgegenbrachte, da ich von meiner Taetigkeit in Konstantinopel her m 
genau wusste, dass die tiirkischen Augen stets erheblich grosser waren als der Magen, 
und dass die Moglichkeit fur die Pforte, Gebiete im Kaukasus gegen die russische 
Dbermacht m halten, in meinem sehr betri.iblichen Gegensatz stand zu den Wiinschen 
der tiirkischen Nationalisten in bezug auf papieme Eroberung." 
106 Wheeler-Bennett, p.104. 
107 0 h n t e text, see: Degras, p.22. 
108 Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp.194-198. 
109 Mirnye peregovory ... , pp.45-46. 
110 Ibid., p.47. 
111 Ibid., pp.47-48. 
112 Wh I ee er-Bennett, p.155. 
113 I _F,· 48 inlrtrye peregovory ... , p. . 
114 Wheeler-Bennett, p.166. 
115 Minrye peregovory ... , pp.49-51. 
116 Ibid., pp.92-94. 
117 Ibid., p.95. 
110 
118 Wheeler-Bennett, pp.173-174; Baumgart, p.21. 
119 Mirnye peregovory ... , p.126; Wheeler-Bennett, p.174. 
120 Kurat, p.364. 
121 Ibid., p.366. 
122 Bemstorff, p.135. 
123 Kurat, p.367. 
124 Emin Ali Turkgeldi "Brest-Litowsk Konferans1 Hatrralan.," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi 
Dergisi, no.13, March 1986, p.49; Duran, no.69, June 1973, p.26. 
125 
"From Talat Pasha to Halil Bey, 15 January 1918," in Duran, no.69 (June 1973), 
p. 25. This contention stemmed from the Peace Resolution of the Reichstag in July 
191 7, stating that Germany was not animated by any desire for conquest~ demanded a 
peace by mutual agreement and reconciliation; protested against all possible acquisition 
of territory and all political, economic and financial oppression (Wheeler-Bennett, 
p.99). 
126 ·~rom Talat Pasha to Halil Bey, 15 January 1918," Duran, no.69, June 1973, p.25. 
127 Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.43. The first sign of this decree is to be found 
in the Appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Muslims of Russia and the 
East (Documenty vneishnei ... , document no.18) declaring that, immediately after the 
cessation of military operations, the Armenians would be guaranteed the right freely to 
determine their political destiny. 
128 Galip Kemali Soylemezoglu, Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922 {istanbul, 
1949), pp.435-436. 
129 Ibid., pp.442-443. 
BoK 0 urat, pp.37 -371. 
111 
131 "From Talat Pasha to Enver Pasha, 17 January 1918," in Duran, no.69 (June 1973), 
pp.25-26. 
132 "From Talat Pasha to Enver Pasha, 1 February 1918," in Duran, no.70 (July 1973), 
pp.31-32. 
133 On the Russian text, see: Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp.298-308; for the English 
translation, see: Wheeler-Bennett, pp.392~92. 
134 Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp.311-312. 
135 Mirnye peregovory ... , pp.207-208. 
136 Kiihlmann, pp.543-544. 
137 Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp.289-290, 
138 Kuhlmann, pp.546-548; Fischer, pp.441-443; Baumgart, pp.23-26; Sovetsko-
Germanskie ... , pp.326-327. 
139 In his memoirs, Kiihlmann wrote that he opposed the idea regarding the tennination 
of the armistice because Germany's allies, Austria-Hungary in particular, were not able 
to meet the heavy burden that the restart of the war would brought upon them 
(pp.545-546). 
140 On the position of Bukharin regarding the Brest talks, see: Donny Gluckstein, The 
Tragedy of Bukharin (Colarado, 1994), pp.22-25. 
141 Seven members voted in favor of Lenin's motion, six opposed it (Lenin, Polnoe 
sobranie sochinenii, vol.XXXV, pp.486~87). 
142 Ibid., pp.339. 
143 Ibid., pp.376-380; Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp.346-349. 
144 While 116 members voted for Lenin's resolution, 85 opposed it and 26 members 
abstained (Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol.XXXV, pp.490-491). 
112 
145 Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , p.350. 
146 ''From Talat Pasha to Enver Pasha, 1 February 1918," in Duran, no. 70 (July 1973), 
pp.31-32. 
147 Ahmet izzet Pa~a, Feryad1m (istanbul, 1992), vol.I, p.283. In his memoirs, Rauf 
Orbay allocated a very small part regarding his experiences at Brest and did not touch 
upon this argument of Ahmet izzet Pasha. 
148 Ibid.; "[From Talat Pasha] to Enver Pasha and the Foreign Ministry, 3 February 
1918," in Duran, no.70 (July 1973), p.32. 
149 On the Bucharest negotiations and the disputes emerging between Bulgaria and 
Turkey, see: Emin Ali Tiirkgeldi, ''Biikr~ Andla~mast," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi 
Dergisi, no.14 (April 1986), pp.51-55~ Ahmet izzet P~ pp.288-290. Both authors 
were members of the Ottoman delegation. Also see: Kiihlrnann, pp.549-568. 
150 On the Russian text, see: Dokumenty vneishnei .. . , document no. 78; for the English 
translatio~ see: Caucasian Boundaries, Documents and Maps, 1802-1946 (Oxford, 
1996), ed. by Anita L P. Burdett, pp.463-465 and Wheeler-Bennett, pp.403-408; for 
the Turkish text, see: Tiilay Duran, "Bol~viklerin Batddarla ilk Diplomatik ili~kileri, 
Brest-Litovsk Andla~mas1 ve Tiirkiye," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi, no.38 
(November 1970), pp.16-20. 
151 Sovetsko-Germanskie ... , pp .3 70-490. 
152 Akd 383 es, p. . 
153 Mi.ihlmann, pp.190-191. 
154 Bernstorff, p. 164. 
155 V. 0. Kliuchevskii, Russkaia Jstoriia (Moscow, 1995), vol,1, p.20. 
113 
156 Cited in: Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and 
Nationalism 1917-1923 (Cambridge, 1964), p.2. 
157 With his characteristic sense for political realities, Lenin's line with regard to the 
national problem was a very pragmatic, but also opportunistic one. To prove this 
argument, one has to look to Richard Pipes (The Formation ... , p.35) who argues that 
in the development of Lenin's approach to the national program, there are three clearly 
distinguishable phases: from 1897 to 1913, from 1913 to 1917 and from 1917 to 1923. 
''In the first, he formulated his basic views on the problem; in the second, he developed 
a plan for the utilization of national minority movements in Russia and abroad; and in 
the third, after having, for all practical purposes, abondened this plan, he adopted a 
new scheme derived from his practical experience as ruler ofRussia." 
158 Ibid., p.41. 
159 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution (New York, 1996), vol.III, p.38. 
160 Pipes, The Formation ... , p.45. 
161 Cited in: Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford, 1957), ed. by X. J. 
Eudin and R. C. North, document no.3, pp.46-47. 
162 Pipes, The Formation ... , pp.48-49. The logic behind the Russian proposal regarding 
the right of self-determination for the European nations, as well as the colonies, as a 
basis of peace discussion at the beginning of the Brest talks was related to this 
expectation of Lenin. 
163 Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921 (New York, 
1951 ), p.32. 
164 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917-1918 (New Jersey, 1972), p.70. 
ll4 
165 Z. Avalov, Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike 1918-1921 g.g. (New 
Yor~ 1982), pp.7-8; Kazemzadeh, p.35. 
166 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (London, 1989), p.186. 
167 Pipes, The Formation ... , p.98. 
168 Kazemzadeh, p.39. 
169 One the Formation of the Transcaucasian Regional Government, see: Bunyan and 
Fisher, p.452. 
170 Ibid, p.453. 
171 Fevzi <;akrnak, Biiyiik Harpte Sark Cephesi Hareketleri. 1935 'de Akademide 
Verilen Dersler (Ankara, 1936), p.260. This estimation is also supported by 
Kazemzadeh (p.42). 
172 Birinci Diinya Harbinde Tiirk Harbi ... , p.428. 
173 E. K. Sarkisian, Ekspansionistskaia politika Osmanskoi lmperii b Zakavkaz 'e 
(Yerevan, 1962), p.328. 
174 W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars 
on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921 (Cambridge, 1953), p.457. 
175 Pipes, The Formation ... , p.103. 
176 Allen and Muratoff, p.458. In Turkish sources, the number of Armenian military 
formations are estimated around 40,000-50,000 persons (see: Birinci Diinya Harbinde 
Turk Har bi ... , p.438). 
m On the text of the armistice treaty, see: Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.30 
and 31; for the Turkish text, see: Tiilay Duran, "Bo~vilderin Osmanh Devleti ile 
Yapttldan ilk Anla~ma," Belgelerle Tiirk Tarihi Dergisi, no.37 (October 1970), pp.16-
20. 
115 
178 Kazemz.adeh, p.81. 
179 Birinci Danya Harbinde Tiirk Harbi ... , p.426. 
180 Bunyan and Fisher, p.454. 
181 Kazernzadeh, p.84. 
182 Bunyan and Fisher, p.454. 
183 Avalov, pp.30-31. 
184 Suny, Ihe Making ... , p.191. 
185 On the Turkish archival documents regarding the Armenian outrages during that 
period, see especially the relevant chapters of the two publications of the archives of 
the Prime Ministry and of the Turkish General Staff Ar~iv Belgelerine Gore 
Kajkaslar'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezalimi, 1906-1918 (Ankara, 1995), vol.I; 
Belgelerle Ermeni Sororm (Ankara, 1983); also see: Muarnrner Dernirel, Birinci 
Dunya Harbinde Erzurom ve (:evresinde Ermeni Hareketleri (1914-1918) (Ankara, 
1996). 
186 Belgelerle Ermeni ... , p.271; Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi ... , p.438. 
187 Ali ihsan Sabis, Harb Hatzralanm. Birinci Diinya Barbi (istanbul, 1991), vol.IV, 
p.168. 
188 Husamettin Tuga~, Bir Nes/in Dram1 (istanbul, 1975), pp.210-211. 
189 On additional information regarding this decision, see: Ibid, pp.195-196. 
1W · Cafer Seydahmet Kmmer, Baz1 Hat1ralar (Istanbul, 1993), p.302. 
191 T uga~, p.212. 
192 Birinci Danya Harbinde Ti.irk Harbi ... , p.440. 
193 Allen and Muratoff, p.460; Kazemzadeh, p.90. 
116 
194 
"Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet Respecting the Peace 
Negotiations With Turkey," in Caucasian Boundaries, Documents ... , p.500. 
195 Bunyan and Fisher, p.455. 
196 "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet .. ., p.500. Trabzon at that time 
was governed by a soviet. 
197 Bunyan and Fisher, p.450. 
198 "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... , pp.500-501. 
199 Ibid., p.501. 
20° Kazemz.adeh, p.95. 
201 
"Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... , p.502. 
202 Ibid, p.503. 
203 Kurat, pp.468-469. 
204 Ibid, p.470. 
205 Ibid, pp.471-472. 
206 
''Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... ," p.503. 
207 Sarkisian, p.346. 
208 Ibid., p.347. 
209 
'"Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... ," pp.504-505; Kurat, p.471. 
210 Kazemz.adeh, p.97. 
211 K urat, p.473. 
212 
''Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... , p.505. 
213 One of the primary reasons of Allied landing on Murmansk, for instance, was to 
prevent the Germans from acquiring military materials deposited there. 
117 
214 BU.lent Gokay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and 
British Imperialism 1918-1923 (London, 1997), p.17. 
215 Ibid, p.16; Stefanos Y erasimos, Milliyetler ve Smzr/ar. Balkanlar, Kajkasya ve 
Orta-Dogu (istanbu~ 1995), p.291. 
216 Kazemzadeh, p.97. 
217 L. C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (London, 1920), p.3. 
218 Ibid 
219 Ibid., pp.4-5. 
220 rfI Bemsto , pp.160, 172. 
221 Muhlmann, p.193. 
222 Werner Zti.rrer, Kaukasien 1918-1921 (Diisseldorf, 1978), p.43. 
223 Mti.hlmann, pp .194-195. 
224 "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... ," pp.505-506. 
225 "Ultimatum From the Turkish Government, 6 April 1918" m Caucasian 
Boundaries, Documents ... , p.507~ "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian 
Diet ... ," p.506. 
226 "Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... ," p.506. 
127 Ibid; Kazemzadeh, p.98. 
228 "Answer From the Transcaucasian Delegation, 10 April 1918," m Caucasian 
Boundaries, Documents ... , p.507. 
229 
"Declaration of the Ottoman Delegation of Summoning Its Allies to Take Part in 
the Negotiations, 13 April 1918," in Caucasian Boundaries, Documents ... , p.507. 
230 
"Report of the Delegation From the Caucasian Diet ... , p.506. 
231 Kazemzadeh, pp.99-100. 
llS 
232 "Telegram From the Government Recalling the Delegation,n m Caucasian 
Boundaries, Documents ... , p.508. 
233 Bunyan and Fisher, pp.457-458. 
234 Kazemzadeh, p.103. 
235 The pro-Turkish Musavat enthusiastically supported the decree of independence. 
The Mensheviks and Dashnaks joined it reluctantly. The Kadets, Russian SRs and 
Bolsheviks opposed the declaration. On April 26 Chkhenkeli, who in addition to the 
post of Prime Minister assumed the duties of the Foreign Minister declared his cabinet. 
The three main peoples of Transcaucasia, the Georgians, the Armenians and the 
Azerbaijanis were evenly represented in the cabinet. Each received four ministerial 
positions. 
236 Avalov, p.37. 
237 On the text of this draft treaty, minus two of the appendices, see: Caucasian 
Boundaries, Documents ... , pp. 511-519. 
238 Ibid., pp.41-42. 
239 Kurat, p.474. 
240 Halil Mente~e, Osmanlt Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Hali/ Mente§'! 'nin Am/an 
(istanbul, 1986), pp.228-229. 
241 Allen-Muratoff, pp.471-472. 
242 Avalov, p.61; Halil Mente~, p.229. 
243 Ibid 
244 al A'l ov, p.38. 
245 Kazemzadeh, pp.111-112. 
246 Miihlmann, pp.195-196. 
119 
247 Kazemzadeh, pp.113-114. 
248 AvaJov, p.57. 
249 Ibid, p.58. 
250 Suny, The Making ... , p.193. 
251 AvaJov, p.59. 
252 Ibid 
253 Kazemzadeh, p.125. 
254 M. E. Resulzade, Azarbaycan Cumhuriyyeti (Baku, 1990), p.39. 
255 For a brief biography of GaJip Kemali Bey (Erzurum 1873-istanbul 1960), see: 
Ydmaz Oztuna, Dev/et/er ve Hanedanlar, Turkiye (1074-1990) (Ankara, 1996), vol.II, 
p.862. 
256 Although grown up in an environment of Eastern culture, which does not Prate the 
leaving of written accounts behind, Galip Kemali Bey was a very proliferate writer and, 
besides many translations, he collected his memoirs in four main books; Hariciye 
Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922 (istanbul, 1949); Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hat1ralar1mm 
U~iincu ve Son Ci/di, 1918-1922 (istanbul, 1953); Yok Edilmek istenen Millet 
(istanbul, 1957); B~1m1Za Gelen/er. Mondrostan, Mudanyaya, 1918-1922 (istanbul, 
1939). 
251 K urat, p.400. 
258 The other members of the Turkish delegation were Yusuf Bey [Akyura], Turban 
Bey, Remzi Pasha and Tevfik Bey. 
259 Soylemezoglu, Hariciye Hizmetinde ... , pp.423, 431. 
260 Ibid, p.424. 
120 
261 For the text of the agreement or initial draft treaties, see: Turkiye Kizday Demegi 
Genel Merkezi Aqivi (Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, "1333-1334 (1917-1918) Rusya'da 
Esir ~ Umara ve Zabitandan Haber Almamayanlar Hakkmda Y 8.Zl~malar." 
262 M. Ayaz ishaki, "Gazetecilik i~inde 25 Yd," in Muhammed Ayaz ishaki. Hayat1 ve 
Faaliyetleri (Ankara, 1979), pp.234-235. 
263 
"Rapport uber die Taetigkeit in Kriegsgefangenenlagem zu Saratow fiir das Jahr 
1917," Ttirkiye Kmlay Demegi Genel Merkezi Ar~ivi (Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, "1333-
1334 (1917-1918) Rusya'da Esir Dti§Cll Umara ve Zabitandan Haber Almamayanlar 
Hakkmda Y az1~ar." 
264 <'Bericht des Herm phil. kand. Ragnar Tennman tiber die Verhaeltnisse auf Nargin 
bei Baku, datiert den 7. Oktober 1917," Ttirkiye Klztlay Demegi Genel Merkezi Ar~ivi 
(Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, "1333-1334 (1917-1918) Rusya'da Esir DU~ Umara ve 
Zabitandan Haber Ahnamayanlar Hakkmda Yaz1~malar." 
265 Mehmed Asaf, Volga K1y1larmda ve Muhtrra (izmir, 1994), ed. by Murat 
Cebecioglu, pp.134-136. 
266 On the text of the agreement, see: Tiirkiye Kmlay Demegi Genel Merkezi Ar~ivi 
(Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, "1333-1334 (1917-1918) Rusya'da Esir ~n Umara ve 
Zabitandan Haber Ahnamayanlar Hakkmda Y az1~malar." 
267 On the text of the agreement, see: Ibid 
268 Soylemezoglu, Hariciye Hizmetinde ... , p.434. 
269 Ibid., p.442. 
270 Ibid, p.434. 
271 Ibid, p.443. 
121 
m On the proceeding of this congress, see: ihsan Ilgar, Rusya 'da Birinci Miisliiman 
Kongresi (Ankara, 1990). For background information how the conference was 
convened or how delegates were elected, see: Zelci Velidi T ogan, Hatzralar {istanbul, 
1969), pp.155-158. 
m On this second congress, see: Tamurbek Devlet~in, Sovyet Tataristan '1 (Ankara, 
1981), pp.173-200. 
274 Ibid., p .24 3. 
275 Abdullah Battal Taymas, Kazan Tiirkleri (Ankara, 1966), pp.192-193; Abdullah 
Battal Taymas, Rus ihtilalinden Hatzralar (istanbul, 1968), pp.92-93. 
276 For more information regarding this military congress, see: Devl~in, pp.253-257. 
277 Soylemezoglu, Hariciye Hizmetinde ... , p.453. 
278 Ibid., p.436. The reliability of this information seems to be extremely diffi.cuh. 
Nevertheless, at that time there was a close contact between the Turkestani national 
leaders and the Millet Meclisi. The Meclis, for instance, decided to send a delegation 
to Turkestan to help the Muslim population there organize their national organization 
(see, Battal Taymas, Rus ihtila/inden ... , pp.20-50. The author was a member of this 
delegation). These applies of both khanates could be a reflection of their determination 
to coordinate their course of action with the Millet Meclisi. 
279 Soylemezoglu, HariciyeHizmetinde ... , p.445. 
280 Karl von Botmer, S Grafom Mirbakhom v Moskve (Moscow, 1996), p.11; 
Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatualarunm ... , p.19. 
281 d Zeman, ocument no.120, pp.120-121. 
282 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatualarzmm ... , p.22. 
283 Ibid, p.24. 
122 
284 Ibid, pp.30-32. 
285 Kazemzadeh, pp.112-113; Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.170 and 171. 
286 Bemstorff, pp.165-166. 
287 Zurrer, p. 43. 
288 Mtihlmann, p.199. 
289 Baumgart, p .1 77. 
290 Avalov, pp.65-67, 71-72. 
291 Mtihlmann, pp.198-199. 
292 Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, The Great Powers, and The Bagdad Railway (New 
Yor~ 1923), p.123. 
293 Baumgart, p .177. 
294 Ibid, p.183. For instance, Ludendorff, in his cable to General von Seeckt, pointed 
out that the Ottoman advance in the Caucasus could be perceived by the Bolsheviks as 
demonstrating the collapse of the Brest settlement (Mtihlmann, p.198). 
295 See: endnot 270. 
296 Kurat, p.476. 
297 The declaration of independence of Transcaucasia had a great impact upon the 
decision of the North Caucasians regarding the proclamation of independence of the 
North Caucasus. On related arguments of North Caucasian leaders, see: H Emirov, 
Ustanovlenie sovetskoi vlasti v Dagestane i bor 'ba s germano-ttnetskimi 
interventami (1917-1919 gg.) (Moscow, 1949), p.89. 
:m Kurat, pp.671-672. 
123 
29'J Mesut ~ "Birinci Diinya Harbinde Osmanh Devleti'nin Kuzey Katkasya 
Siyaseti (1914-1918)/' Unpublished Ph. D_ Dissertation, AtatOrk University (Erzurum, 
1995), p_47. 
300 Ibid, pp.50-55. 
301 Pipes, The Formation ... , p.197. 
302 Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.211; also see: Soylemezogl~ Otuz Sene/ik 
Siyasi Hatualanmm ... , p.45. 
303 Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.213. 
304 Suny, The Baku ... , p.263. 
305 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatua/anmm ... , p.66 
306 Ibid, pp.119-120. 
307 Ibid., pp.46-47. 
308 Ibid, pp.47-48. 
309 Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.212. 
310 Ibid, document no.208. 
311 Ibid, document no.216. 
312 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hat1ra/ar1mm .. ,, p.51. 
313 MOhlmann, pp.200-201. 
314 Ibid, pp.201-202. 
315 Ibid, pp.202-203; Aydemir, vol.III, pp.423-425. 
316 Birinci Diinya Harbinde Turk Harbi ... , p.553; Nasir Yuceer, Birinci Diinya 
Sav~z '-nda Osmanll Ordusu 'nun Azerbaycan ve Dagistan Harekatz (Ankara, 1996), 
p.42; Erol Kiirk~oglu, "1918-1920 Tiirkiye-Azerbaycan ~kileri," Unpublished Ph. 
D. Dissertation, Atatiirk University (Erzuru~ 1994), pp.167-168; 
124 
317 Birinci Dill1)'a Harbinde Turk Harbi ... , pp.555-556. 
318 Allen and Muratoff, p.481. 
319 Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.276. 
320 '"Report of Joffe from Berlin to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in 
Moscow, June 1918," in Nadezhda Ioffe, Moi otets Adolf Abramovich Joffe 
(Moscow, 1997), pp.65-68. 
321 Avalov, p.97. 
322 For more information regarding the conference, see: Kurk~iloglu, pp.218-228. 
323 Allen and Muratoff, p.478. 
324 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatzralarzmm ... , p.105. 
325 Dokumenty vneishnei..., document no.285. 
326 Ibid, document no.284. 
3n Ibid, document no.287. 
328 On July 6, the German ambassador Mirbach was killed by lakov Bliumkin and 
Nicholas Andreev. The Left SR.s who accused the Bolsheviks of betraying the 
Revolution hoped that this assasination would cause the abrogation of the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty and a declaration of war on Gennany. Helfferich succeeded Mirbach. 
329 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatzralarzmzn ... , p.127. 
330 Miihlmann, p.207. 
331 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Sene/ik Siyasi Hatzralarzmm ... , p.130. 
332 Ibid 
333 On a detailed analysis of Yeni Dunya and for the transcriptions of most of its 
numbers, see: Mete Tun~y, Mustafa Suphi 'nin Yeni Dunya 's1 (istanbul, 1995). 
125 
334 For a brief biography of Mustafa Suphi, see: Y. N. Roz.aliyev, Mustafa Suphi, 
Kavgas1 ve l>iifiinceleri ([Brussels], 1974); Mete Tun~y, Tiirkiye 'de Sol Ak1mlar, 
(1908-1925) (istanbul, 1991), vol.I, pp.98-103. 
335 For the adventurous escape of Mustafa Suphi and his initial ideals, see: Ahmed 
Bedevi Kuran, Osmanll imparator/ugunJa inla/ap Hareketleri ve Milli Miicadele 
(istanbul, 1956), pp.549-556. The author was a member of the group who escaped 
with Mustafa Suphi to the Crimea. 
336 Sultan Galiyev, 'Mustafa Suphi ve Yap1tt," in Ant (istanbul), no.182/9, January 
1971, p.51. 
337 On the formation and activities of this Commissariat, see the relevant chapters of 
Stephen Blank, "The Unknown Commissariat: The Soviet Commissariat of 
Nationalities 1917-1924," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago 
( 1979). The author states that the advent of the Muskom successfully accelerated the 
process of fragmentation that affected the Muslim community. 
338 SerifManatof [Manatov], "Mustafa Suphi Be~ Sene Evvel Moskova'da," Mustafa 
Suphi ve Yol~lart (Brussels, 1975), p.25. 
339 Taymas, Rus ihtilalinden. .. , pp.108-109. 
340 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hatzralanmzn, p.25. 
341 Tunr;ay,MustafaSuphi'nin Yeni ... , pp.15-25. 
342 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hat1ralar1mm ... , pp.25-26. Galip Kemali Bey 
sent to istanbul together with this report two numbers of the journal. 
343 Ibid., p.39. 
344 Kurat, p.434. 
345 Ibid, p.678. 
126 
346 Tuncay, Mustafa Suphi 'nin Yeni ... , pp.45-56. 
347 Kurat, pp. 679-681. 
348 Ibid, p.439. 
349 Galiyev, p.52. 
350 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hat1ralanmm. .. , p.27. 
351 On more information regarding the economic policies of the Bolsheviks, especially 
see: Pipes, The Russian ... , pp.671-713. 
352 Soylemezoglu, Otuz Senelik Siyasi Hat1ralanmm ... , p.28. 
353 Ibid, p.30. 
354 Ibid, pp.32-38. 
355 Ibid, pp. 60-61. 
356 Ibid, pp.130-131. 
357 Ibid, p.30. 
358 Ibid., pp.32-33. 
359 Ibid, pp.99-102. 
360 Ibid, p.134. 
361 Pipes, The Bolshevik ... , p.619. 
362 Baumgart, p.84. 
363 Ibid 
364 Ibid., pp.245. This was the expression of Paul von Hintze. 
365 The Brest Treaty called for a supplementary accord to regulate Russo-German 
economic relations. 
366 On the text of the treaty, see: Sovetsko-Germanskie .. ., pp.605-613~ for the English 
translation, see: Wheeler-Bennett, pp.427-434. 
127 
367 This lines were the Kuban, from its mouth to Petropavlovskoje; from there 
onwards, the boundaries of the district Shemakha to Agrioba; thence a straight line to 
the point where the boundaries of the district of Baku, Shemakha and Kuban meet~ 
thence along the northern boundary of the district of Balm to the sea. 
368 Trumpener, p.192. 
369 On more information concerning these draft treaties, see: Wheeler-Bennett, pp.345-
346. 
370 Muhlmann, p.209. 
371 Ibid 210 
' . 
372 Wheeler-Bennett, pp.435-438; Trumpener, p.193. 
373 Degras, pp.96-98. 
314 T rumpener, p.193. 
375 Ibid., pp.194-195; Kurkcuoglu, pp.272-275. 
376 Dunsterville, p.275. 
377 Ibid, p.279 
378 Allen-Muratoff, pp.494-495. 
379 Muhlmann, p.210. 
380 Halil Pa~, pp.223-224. 
381 Kiirkytioglu, pp.275-276; Aydemir, pp.448-451. 
382 K .. rk .. ;;i 275 U yU051.U, p. . 
383 Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.347. 
384 B l ayur, vo .III, part IV, pp.243-245. 
128 
385 Dokumenty vneishnei ... , document no.346 and 358. The former note was to be 
given to the Turkish government on September 21, but, due to Ioffe's meetings with 
Talat Pasha, it was postponed. 
386 R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the &istern Question. A Study in 
Diplomacy and Party Politics (London, 1971 ), p.563. 
387 John Lowe, The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865-1925 
(London, 1994), pp.141-142. 
388 Emil Ludwig, Wilhelm der Zweite (Berlin, 1925), p.209; Paul Imbert, Osmanlz 
imparatorlugu 'nda Yenile~e Hareketleri (istanbul, 1981 ), p.166. 
389 ilber Ortayh, ikinci Abdulhamid DOneminde Osmanlz imparatorlugu 'nda Alman 
Niifuzu (Ankara, 1981); Lothar Rathmann, Berlin-Bagdad Alman Emperyalizminin 
Tiirkiye ye Giri§i (istanbul, 1982). 
390 Earle, p.104. 
391 Apak, p.50. 
392 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (New York, 1918), pp.46-
47. 
393 v be am ry, p.81. 
394 Ibid 
395 Ahmed Emin Yalman, Yakm Tarihte Gordiiklerim ve Ge9irdiklerim (istanbul, 
1997), vol.I, pp.333, 352, 361. The impressions of the author, who has been one of the 
most prominent journalists in the Ottoman as well as Republican years, regarding the 
mood of the Ottoman public at that time are of particular interest. 
396 M ha orgent u, p.34. 
129 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Turkiye Ktzday Demegi Genel Merkezi Ar~ivi (Etimesgut), Dosya: 529, "1333-1334 
(1917-1918) Rusya'da Esir DU~ Omara ve Zabitandan Haber Almamayanlar 
Hakkmda Y azt.ar." 
Adamov, A. ed. Raz.de/ Aziatskoi Turtsii. Moscow, 1924. 
Ahmed, Firuz. ittihat ve Terakki 1908-1914. istanbul, 1995. 
Ahmet izzet Pqa. Feryadun. vol.II. istanbul, 1992. 
Ak~ur~ Yusuf 0f Tarz-1 Siya~t. Ankara, 1991. 
Allen, W. E. D. and Paul Muratofl: Caucasian Battlefields. A History qf the Wars on 
the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-19 21. Cambridge, 1953. 
Apak, Rahtni. Yetmi.1fik Bir Subaym Hat1ralan. Ankara, 1988. 
Ari, Kernal. ed. Birinci Diinya Savtq1 Kronolojisi. Ankara, 1997. 
Ar§iv Belgelerine Gore Kqfkaslar 'da ve Anadolu 'da Ermem Mezalimi. vol.I. Ankara, 
1995. 
Asaf, Mehmed. Volga K1ydannda ve Muht1ra. Murat Cebecioglu, ed. izmir, 1994. 
Atay, Falih RlfkI. Zeytindaffe. istanbul, 1981. 
Avalov [Avalishvili], Z. Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike 1918-1921 
g.g. New York, 1982. 
130 
Aydemir, $evket Siireyya. Malredonya 'dan Orta Asya ya Enver PQ.fll. 3 vols. istanbul, 
1992. 
Baumgart. Winfried. Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1918. Vienna, 1966. 
Bayur, YusufHikmet. Turk ink1/ab1 Tarihi. 9 vols. Ankara, 1991. 
Belen, Fabri. "Binlerce Sehide Malolan Kafkas Seferi ve Sankann~ Sav~1." Belge/erle 
Turk Tarihi Dergisi. no.39 (December 1970), pp.7-12. 
Belgelerle Enneni Sorunu. Ankara, 1983. 
Bernstorfl: Johann Heinrich Grafvon. Erinnenmgen und Briefe. Zurich, 1936. 
Birinci Diinya Harbinde Turk Barbi Kajkas Cephesi 3ncii Ordu Harekatz. 2 vols. 
Ankara, 1993. 
Blank, Stephen. "The Unknown Commissariat: The Soviet Commissariat of 
Nationalities 1917-1924," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago, 
1979. 
Bleda, Mithat $iikrii, imparatorlugun <;okii#J. istanbul, 1979. 
Botrner, Baron Karl von. S Grajom Mirbakhom v Moskve. Moscow, 1996. 
Bunyan, James and H. H. Fisher.The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918. California, 
1938. 
Burdett, Anita L. P. ed. Caucasian Boundaries, Documents and Maps, 1802-1946. 
Oxford, 1996. 
Bury, G. Wyman. Pan-Islam. London, 1919. 
Cemal Pa~. Hat1rat. istanbul, 1995. 
Cemil, Arif ittihadf 1 Sef/erin Gurbet Macera/an. istanbul, 1992. 
131 
-----. /. DUnya Sav~1'nda Te~lat-1Mahsusa. istanbul, 1997. 
c;akma.k, Fevzi. Biiyiik Harpte Sark Cephesi Hareketleri. 1935 'de Akademide Verilen 
Dersler. Ankara, 1936. 
Degras, Jane. ed. Soviet Documents in Foreign Policy. vol. I. London, 1951. 
Demirel, Muammer. Birinci Diinya Harbinde Erzurom ve (:evresinde Ermeni 
Hareketleri. Ankara, 1996. 
Devlet~in, Tamurbek. Sovyet Tataris/an '1. Ankara, 1981. 
Dokymenty vneishnei politiki SSSR voU. Moscow, 1957. 
Dunsterville, L. C. The Adventures of Dunstelforce. London, 1920. 
Duran, TOlay. ''llol~eviklerin Osmanh Devleti ile Yapttldan ilk Anla~ma." Belgelerle 
Turk Tarihi Dergisi, no.3 7 (October 1970), pp.16-20. 
-----. "Bol~viklerin Bat1blarla ilk Diplomatik ~kileri, Brest-Litovsk Andla~mas1 ve 
Ttirkiye," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi, no.38 (November 1970), pp.13-20. 
-----. "I. Donya Sava~1 Sonunda Tfuk: Diplomasisinin ilk B~s1. Brest-Litovsk 
Haz1rltldan," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi, no.67-68 (April-May 1973), pp.43-49; 
no.69 (June 1973), pp.22-26; no. 70 (July 1973), pp.31-34. 
Earle, Edward Mead. Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway. New York, 
1923. 
Emirov, H. Ustanovlenie sovetskoi vlasti v Dagestane i /Jor 'has germano-turetskimi 
interventami (1917-1919 gg.). Moscow, 1949. 
132 
Erickson, John. "The Origins of the Red Army," in Richard Pipes (ed.) Revolutionary 
Russia. Cambridge, 1968. 
Ersa.n, Mesut. ''Birinci Diinya Harbinde Osmanh Devleti'nin Kuzey Kafkasya Siyaseti 
(1914-1918)." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Atatiirk University, Erzurum, 1995. 
Eudin, X. J. and R. C. North. ed. Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927. Stanford, 
1957. 
Fischer, Fritz. Griffnachder Weltmacht. Dilsseldorf, 1984. 
Gluckstein, Donny. The Tragedy of Bukharin. Colarado, 1994. 
Gokalp, Ziya. Turkfiilugun Esaslarz. istanbul, 1977. 
------. Turkle~mek, islam/a~ak. Muaszrl~ak. istanbul, 1994. 
Halil Pa~. jttihat ve Terakki 'den Cumhuriyet 'e Bitmeyen Sava~. Taylan Sorgun, ed. 
istanbul, 1997. 
Harb Kabine/erinin jsticvab1. istanbul, 1933. 
Hopkirk, Peter. jstanbu/'un Dogusunda Bitmeyen Oyun. istanbul, 1995. 
Hiilagil, Metin. Pan-islamist Faaliyetler, 1914-1918. istanbul, 1994. 
Ilgar, ihsan. Rusya 'da Birinci Miisliiman Kongresi. Ankara, 1990. 
Imbert, Paul. Osmanll imparatorlugu 'nda Yenile.pne Hareketleri. istanbul, 1981. 
loffe, Nadezhda. Moi otets Ado/1 Abramovich Joffe. Moscow, 1997. 
133 
ishaki, M. Ayaz. "Gazetecilik i~inde 25 Ytl," in Muhammed Ayaz jshaki. Hayatz ve 
Faaliyetleri. Ankara, 1979. 
Kazemzadeh, Firuz. The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921. New York, 1951. 
Kemal, Yahya. (:ocuklugum, Geflfliffem, Siyasi ve Edebi Hatualarun. istanbul, 1986. 
Killy, Selami. Tiirk-Sovyet ili!jkilerinin Dogu!jll. istanbul, 1998. 
Kmmer, Cafer Seydahmet. Baz1 Hatrralar. istanbul, 1997. 
Kliuchevskii, V.O. Russkaia lstoriia. vol.I. Moscow, 1995. 
Kocaba~oglu, Uygur and Metin Berge. Bol§evik ihtilali ve Osmanillar. Ankara, 1994. 
Kraus, Th. and K. Donitz. The Kreuzfahrten der Goeben and Bres/au. Berlin, 1933. 
Kuran, Ahmed Bedevi. Osmanlz imparatorlugunda inkrlap Hareketleri ve Milli 
Miicadele. istanbul, 1956. 
Kurat, Akdes Nim.et. Tiirkiye ve Rusya. Ankara, 1990. 
Kushner, David. The Rise of Turkish Nationalism. 1876-1908. London, 1977. 
Kuhlmann, Richard von. Erinnenmgen. Heidelberg, 1948. 
Ktirk~iioglu, Erol. "1918-1920 Ttirkiye-Azerbaycan ili~kileri." Unpublished Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Atatiirk University, Erzurum, 1995. 
Landau, Jacob M. The Politics of Pan-Islam. Ideology and Organization. Oxford, 
1990. 
-----. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Indianapolis, 1995. 
Lenin, V. I. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. vol.XXXV. Moscow, 1958-1965. 
Lowe, John. The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865-1925. 
London, 1994. 
134 
Ludwig, Emil. Wilhelm der Zweite. Berli°' 1925. 
Luke, Harry. The Old Turkey and the New. From Byzantium to Ankara. London, 
1955. 
Manatof [Manatov), Serif "Mustafa Suphi B~ Sene Evvel Moskova'da," Mustafa 
Suphi ve Yo~lan. Brussels, 1975. pp.23-26. 
Mardi°' Serif Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri. 1895-1908. istanbul, 1994. 
Ment~, Halil. Osmanll Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Hali/ Mente~e 'nin Hat1ralan. 
istanbul, 1986. 
Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske, s 2219 dekabria 1917 g. po 3 marta (18/evra/ia) 
1918 g. vol. I. Moscow, 1920. 
Morgenthau, Herny. Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. New York, 1918. 
Miihlmann, Carl. Das Deutsch-Tiirkische Waffenbiindnis im Weltkriege. Leipzig, 
1940. 
Notovich, I. I. Dip/omaticheskaia bor'ba v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny. vol.I. Moscow, 
1947. 
Orbay, Rauf. Cehennem Degirmeni. Siyasi Hatzralarzm. vol.I. istanbul, 1993. 
Ortayh, i1ber. ikinci Abdiilhamid Doneminde Osmanlz imparatorlugu 'nda Alman 
Niifuzu. Ankara, 1981. 
Osmanoglu, Ay~. Baham Sultan Abdii/hamid (Hatzralarzm). istanbul, 1994. 
Oztuna, Ydmaz. Dev/et/er ve Hanedan/ar, Tiirkiye (1074-1990). vol.IL Ankara, 1996. 
135 
Pearce, Brian. How Haig Saved Lenin. Hampshire, 1987. 
Pipes, Richard. The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism 
1917-1923. Cambridge, 1964. 
-----. 1he Russian Revolution. New York, 1991. 
-----. Three "Wlrys" of the Russian Revolution. New York, 1997. 
Politicheskaia Jstoria Rossia-SSSR-Rossiyskaia Federatsia. vol.I. Moscow, 1996. 
Pomiankowski, Joseph. Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches. Vienna, 
1928. 
Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. The Young Turks. Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. 
New Jersey, 1957. 
Rathmann, Lothar Berlin-Bagdad Alman Emperyalizminin Tiirkiye ye Giri~i. 
istanbul, 1982. 
Resulz.ade, M. E. Azarbaycan Cumhuriyyeti. Baku, 1990. 
Roz.a.liyev, Y. N. Mustafa Suphi, Kavgas1 ve Dii§iinceleri. [Brussels], 1974. 
Rubinstein, Alfin Z. ed. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. New York, 1966. 
Sabis, Ali ihsan. Harb Hatualanm. Birinci Diinya Harbi. vol.IV. istanbul, 1991. 
Said Halim P~. Buhranlar1m1Z. (The place and date of the publication is not given) 
Sarkisian, E. K. Ekspansionistskaia politika Osmanskoi lmperii v Zakavkaz 'e. 
Yerevan, 1962. 
Sazonov, S. D. Vospominaniia. Moscow, 1991. 
136 
Sovetsko-Germanskie Otnosheniia, ot peregovorov b Brest-Litovske do podpisaniia 
Rapal/ 'skovo dogovora. vol.I. Moscow, 1968. 
Soylernezoglu, Galip Kemali. Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922. istanbul, 
1949. 
-----. Otuz Senelik Hat1ralar1mm Opincii ve Son Ci/di, 1918-1922. istanbul, 1953. 
------ Yok Edilmek istenen Millet. istanbul, 1957. 
------ B~1m1.Za Gelen/er. Mondros'tanMudanya'ya, 1918-1922. istanbul, 1939_ 
Seton-Watson, R. W. Disraeli, Gladstone and the &stern Question. A Study iii 
Diplomacy and Party Politics. London, 1971. 
Sultan Galiyev, [Mir Said]. .. Mustafa Suphi ve Yap1t1," Ant (istanbul), no.182/9, 
January 1971, pp.50-55. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Baku Commune, 1917-1918. New Jersey, 1972. 
-----. The Making of the Georgian Nation. London, 1989. 
Talat P~. Talat PQ¥l 'nm Hattralan. istanbul, 1958. 
Taymas, Abdullah Battal. Kazan Tiirkleri. Ankara, 1966. 
-----. Rus ihtilalinden Hatiralar. istanbul, 1968. 
The Near Ea.-.t From Within. London, 1915. 
Timur, Taner. Osmanlt Kimliifi. istanbul, 1994. 
Togan, Zeki Velidi. Hatiralar. istanbul, 1969_ 
Tokgoz, Ahmed ihsan. Matbuat Hat1ralar1m. istanbul, 1993. 
Trotsky, Leon. History of the Russian Revolution. New York, 1996_ 
Trumpener, Ulrich. GermanyandtheOttomanEmpire, 1914-1918. New Jersey, 1968. 
Tugac, Husamettin. Bir Nes/in Dramt. istanbul, 1975. 
137 
Tuksaw~ Muammer. Dogudan Batzya ve Sonras1. istanbul, 1981. 
Tunaya, Tan1c Zafer. Tiirkiye 'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952. istanbul, 1952. 
Tun~y, Mete. Tiirkiye 'de Sol Akunlar (1908-1925). istanbu~ 1991. 
----.Mustafa Suphi 'nin Yeni Diinyasi. istanbul, 1995. 
TOrkgeldi, Emin Ali. "Brest-Litowsk Konferans1 Hatrralan.," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi 
Dergisi, no.13, March 1986, pp.46-53. 
----- "Biikre~ Andla~mas1," Belgelerle Tiirk Tarihi Dergisi, no.14, April 1986, 
pp.51-55. 
Unal, Hasan. Young Turk Assessments of International Politics, 1906-1909. London, 
1997. 
Vambery, A. ''Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court," The 
Nineteenth Century and After, vol.LXVI, July-December 1909. 
Wallach, Jehuda L. Bir Askeri Yard1mm Anatomisi. Ankara, 1977. 
Wheeler-Bennett, John W. Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace, March 1918. New 
York, 1971. 
Y al~m, Hiiseyin Cahit. Siya.wil Amlar. istanbul, 1976. 
Yalman, Ahmed Emin. Yakm Tarihte Gordiiklerim ve Gefirdiklerim. vol.I. istanbul, 
1997_ 
Y erasimos, Stefanos. Milliyetler ve S1mrlar. Balkanlar, Kqfko.slar ve Orta-Dogu. 
istanbul, 199 5. 
138 
Ytlmaz, Veli_ 1 nci Dunya Harbi 'nde Turk-Alman ittifak1 ve Askeri Yard1mlar_ 
istanbul, 1993 _ 
Yiiceer, Nasrr_ Birinci Dunya Savt1§1 'nda Osmanli Ordusu 'nun Azerhaycan ve 
Dagzstan Harekati Ankar~ 1996_ 
Zeman, Z. A_ B. ed. Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918. London, 
1958_ 
Ziirrer, Werner_ Kaukasien 1918-1921. Diisseldorf, 1978_ 
139 
